Principal–Agent Problems in Militant Groups

2018 ◽  
pp. 101-114
Author(s):  
Max Abrahms
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
Militant Groups ◽  
And Behavior

Militant leaders must not only understand the folly of terrorism, but prevent members from carrying it out. Members are known to harm civilians even when their leaders oppose this targeting practice. This disconnect between the preferences of leaders and behavior of subordinates is due to what economists call a principal–agent problem. This chapter explains the principal–agent problem facing militant leaders and how they can overcome it. The second rule for rebels is grasping this organizational predicament to minimize it. Smart leaders know not only the political costs of civilian attacks, but how to restrain their members from committing them.

Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics

2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Abrahms ◽  
Philip B.K. Potter
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
North Africa ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Principal Agent Problem ◽  
Group Violence ◽  
Drone Strikes ◽  
Second Intifada ◽  
Militant Groups

AbstractCertain types of militant groups—those suffering from leadership deficits—are more likely to attack civilians. Their leadership deficits exacerbate the principal-agent problem between leaders and foot soldiers, who have stronger incentives to harm civilians. We establish the validity of this proposition with a tripartite research strategy that balances generalizability and identification. First, we demonstrate in a sample of militant organizations operating in the Middle East and North Africa that those lacking centralized leadership are prone to targeting civilians. Second, we show that when the leaderships of militant groups are degraded from drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal regions, the selectivity of organizational violence plummets. Third, we elucidate the mechanism with a detailed case study of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Palestinian group that turned to terrorism during the Second Intifada because pressure on leadership allowed low-level members to act on their preexisting incentives to attack civilians. These findings indicate that a lack of principal control is an important, underappreciated cause of militant group violence against civilians.

Mainland Chinese Enterprises in Hong Kong

Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 464-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
The Political ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
High Property ◽  
Chinese Enterprises ◽  
Mainland Chinese ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Property Prices ◽  
Principal Agent Problem

This paper examines the under-researched subject of the political and economic functions of Mainland Chinese enterprises in Hong Kong. The lack of effective cross-border supervision of these offshore state assets has exacerbated the longstanding principal–agent problem, resulting in spillover effects such as high property prices and worsening corporate corruption.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document