The Structure of Success

How can the militant leader help to ensure that members faithfully execute his targeting preferences? That is, how can he promote task cohesion in the ranks so subordinates refrain from targeting civilians? For the militant leader, the key to task cohesion is centralizing the organization. Centralizing the organization helps the leader to communicate his tactical instructions to the rank-and-file, discipline wayward members for attacking civilians, and vet out high-risk recruits prone to subverting the cause with terrorism. The leader has considerable agency over the degree to which his group is centralized. This chapter explains the benefits of centralizing it before quantifying them statistically.

Principal–Agent Problems in Militant Groups

Militant leaders must not only understand the folly of terrorism, but prevent members from carrying it out. Members are known to harm civilians even when their leaders oppose this targeting practice. This disconnect between the preferences of leaders and behavior of subordinates is due to what economists call a principal–agent problem. This chapter explains the principal–agent problem facing militant leaders and how they can overcome it. The second rule for rebels is grasping this organizational predicament to minimize it. Smart leaders know not only the political costs of civilian attacks, but how to restrain their members from committing them.

Introduction: The Stupid Terrorist

Islamic State was depicted in the media as a bunch of terrorist masterminds. The leadership was supposedly strategic to maximize fear by encouraging Muslims to inflict bloodshed around the world and then bragging about it over social media. But pundits were too busy extolling the genius of this evil strategy to realize that the caliphate was going up in smoke. The Islamic State’s plight was predictable from the get-go because the leaders failed to follow the rules for rebels. The author has extensively studied the political plights of hundreds of militant groups throughout world history and reveals that successful militant leaders have followed three rules. These rules are based on original insights from the fields of political science, psychology, criminology, economics, management, marketing, communication, and sociology. It turns out there’s a science to victory in militant history. But even rebels must follow rules.

Denial of Principal Intent

The previous chapter showed that smart leaders take public relations seriously by denying organizational involvement in civilian attacks. What should leaders do when the culpability of the organization is undeniable? The key, then, isn’t denying organizational involvement but DPI or Denial of Principal Intent. With DPI, the leader acknowledges his organization committed the terrorist attack, but denies that it reflects his intentions or the mission of the group more generally. The field of communication identifies several ways for people to restore their image after an offense has been committed either by them or in their name. This chapter describes the most relevant accounts and how militant leaders can apply them to distance their organization from the reputational fallout of terrorism.

Cultivating Task Cohesion

The key for militant leaders is to cultivate in the ranks what’s known in management as task cohesion. Task cohesion is the degree to which group members act together to accomplish a common goal. This chapter offers what might seem like obvious advice for rebels to cultivate task cohesion in the ranks. But this initial step is crucial and inconsistently applied by leaders to restrain members from jeopardizing the cause with terrorism. Task cohesion in militant groups begins with educating the rank-and-file about their political ends and the optimal means to achieve them. As this chapter shows, education is necessary, though insufficient, for leaders to prevent subordinates from attacking civilians and sinking the cause.

What Smart Leaders Know

The first rule for rebels is to avoid attacking civilians. As previous chapters have shown, terrorism hurts the cause by lowering the odds of concessions and survival. There is considerable variation in the tactical IQ of militant leaders. Smart leaders understand the costs of terrorism or at least learn them over time from their own experience or that of others. By contrast, stupid terrorist leaders, such as those of the Armed Islamic Group, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Islamic State never learn the value of tactical restraint. These groups pay a steep price for having ignorant leaders. This chapter shows that the leadership is important to militant groups in order for them to wield violence productively.

How Terrorism Expedites Organizational Demise

This chapter explains why terrorism reduces the lifespan of militant groups. Whereas previous chapters showed that terrorism is ineffective for achieving their demands, this chapter shows that the civilian attacks decrease support, membership size, and ultimately the prospects of survival. Current and prospective members must reconcile the benefits of participation with the near-universal norm against killing civilians. Not only does terrorism present moral barriers to participation, but governments are far more likely to violently oppose groups that attack civilians, raising the physical costs of being a member. It is thus important for militant leaders to follow Rule #1, refraining from harming civilians, even when they are uninterested in pressuring government concessions.

Terrorism Success Stories Revisited

This chapter revisits the most commonly cited examples in history of terrorism paying politically. If even these cases fail to illustrate the political effectiveness of terrorism then that would further undermine the evidentiary basis of the Strategic Model. Many scholars point to the political successes of the Irgun, African National Congress, and Hezbollah as evidence that terrorism is an effective instrument of coercion. Yet these campaigns did not coerce the occupying powers to withdraw by attacking their civilians. Instead, the groups focused their attacks on military and other government targets. This chapter shows that people overestimate the value of terrorist campaigns by lumping them together with guerrilla campaigns that have been far more successful.

Testing the Strategic Model of Terrorism

This chapter tests the Strategic Model of Terrorism. The Strategic Model posits that groups engage in terrorism because doing so increases the likelihood of achieving their political demands. Testing the efficacy of a tactic is challenging and there are trade-offs to every methodological approach. For this reason, the author presents several statistical approaches showing that groups lower the odds of government compliance when they engage in terrorism by attacking civilians. Terrorism negatively affects the odds of concessions even after taking into account the capability of the perpetrators, the nature of their demands, and the strength of government opposition. This information is invaluable for militant group leaders, forming the basis of Rule #1 to refrain from terrorism.

Conclusion: The Future of Terrorism

ISIS paid a steep, albeit foreseeable, price for inverting these rules for rebels. Its playbook of broadcasting the indiscriminate attacks instilled terror around the world, but quickly united the world against the group. In countless media interviews, think tank pundits repeated the conventional wisdom that ISIS was following a brilliant script—unaware that it was the opposite to the one that triumphant militant groups have successfully followed. Militant leaders have a choice. They can maximize terror as political losers or forgo the terror and possibly win. The good news is that moderation pays. The bad news is that extremism will nonetheless continue. This chapter explains why terrorism will persist despite its ineffectiveness and suggests ways to reverse this deadly trend.