Complex Conflict Situations

Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter analyses the legal qualification of complex conflict situations that feature more than two conflict parties. It examines whether such situations qualify as a single internationalized armed conflict or a number of independent international and non-international armed conflicts. With this in mind, this chapter puts forward a model based on the retention of autonomy of the allied conflict parties. It argues that once the autonomy is foregone and replaced with a single use of force by the parties, the law of international armed conflict applies ‘globally’ to the situation at hand. However, until that moment, the situation should be seen as ‘mixed’; in other words, as a set of mutually independent conflict pairs.

Author(s):  
Boothby William H

This relatively brief chapter introduces the book as a whole. It positions weapons law within the framework of international law in general, and of the law of armed conflict in particular, noting the important distinctions between international and non-international armed conflicts, and between the law on the resort to the use of force and that which regulates the conduct of hostilities. The logical flow of the book is presented, and certain terms that are vital to the ensuing discussion, namely weapons, means of warfare and methods of warfare are explained. The all-important distinction between weapons law and the legal rules that regulate targeting is noted. A concluding section addresses the recently-adopted Arms Trade Treaty.


Author(s):  
Fleck Dieter

This chapter provides an overview of the law of non-international armed conflicts and its progressive development. The law of armed conflict, as it has developed in the last part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century, deals predominantly with wars between states. Its basic principles and rules are, however, likewise relevant for non-international armed conflicts: in all armed conflicts, elementary considerations of humanity must be respected under all circumstances, in order to protect victims, to reduce human sufferings, and to minimize damages to objects vital for survival. Therefore, the parties to the conflict do not have an unlimited choice of the means and methods of conducting hostilities, nor of selecting the targets to be attacked, and they must protect the victims from the effects and consequences of war. This concept is reflected in the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, to be respected by all and, while taking military necessity into account, limiting the use of force for humanitarian reasons. Parties to the conflict respecting these principles and rules are considered as respecting the international order, while those seriously violating them will commit internationally wrongful acts and perpetrators are liable to punishment.


2018 ◽  
pp. 109-124
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Ford

The U.S. military Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) restrict the use of force in armed conflict to either self-defense or “mission-specific” rules of engagement, which refer to the use of force against members of enemy armed forces or organized armed groups that have been “declared hostile.” This bifurcation of authority works well in an international armed conflict, where the enemy force is uniformed and easily distinguished. In these circumstances, the overwhelming number of engagements are against identified hostile forces. In many non-international armed conflicts, however, combatants actively attempt to camouflage their status, and U.S. forces find themselves engaging enemy forces under a self-defense framework. This creates problems. Consider, for example, a situation where three individuals of unknown affiliation launch an attack against a U.S. military convoy in Afghanistan. After a short engagement, the attackers get in a van and speed away from the attack site. The U.S. convoy is disabled, but an unmanned aerial vehicle tracks the van as it retreats into the desert. Thirty minutes later an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter arrives on scene above the still-retreating van. Can the Apache attack the vehicle? The van is retreating and poses no threat, thus self-defense principles would not allow for the use of force, despite the fact that the occupants are clearly directly participating in hostilities. This chapter addresses three questions: Why are the SROE drafted in this manner? What is the basis in the law for the SROE’s approach to self-defense? What are the problems presented by this approach?


1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Gail Gardam

Proportionality is a fundamental component of the law on the use of force and the law of armed conflict—the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. In the former, it refers to a belligerent’s response to a grievance and, in the latter, to the balance to be struck between the achievement of a military goal and the cost in terms of lives. The legitimate resort to force under the United Nations system is regarded by most commentators as restricted to the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 and collective security action under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resort to force in both these situations is limited by the customary law requirement that it be proportionate to the unlawful aggression that gave rise to the right. In the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy. Since the entry into force of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, proportionality has been both a conventional and a customary principle of the law of armed conflict.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 881-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

AbstractThis article describes the relevant interpretation of the right to life by human rights treaty bodies and analyses how this might influence the law relating to the use of force in armed conflicts and occupations where international humanitarian law is unclear. The concurrent applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights law to hostilities in armed conflict does not mean that the right to life must, in all situations, be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law. The author submits that the human rights law relating to the right to life is suitable to supplement the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the use of force for non-international conflicts and occupation, as well as the law relating to civilians taking a “direct part in hostilities”. Finally, by making reference to the traditional prohibition of assassination, the author concludes that the application of human rights law in these situations would not undermine the spirit of international humanitarian law.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter analyses the practical application of the law of belligerent occupation in internationalized armed conflicts in its temporal, geographical, and personal dimensions. Firstly, from a temporal perspective, the law is shown to apply once one of the conflict parties consolidates its control over the enemy territory and substitutes its own authority for that of the displaced enemy. Secondly, the chapter assesses the geographical scope of the applicable law and draws specific guidelines for the determination of the territory subject to the law of occupation in various types of internationalized armed conflicts. Thirdly, the chapter endorses the allegiance-based approach to the designation of protected persons under the law of occupation and applies it to the reality of internationalized armed conflict. Overall, the chapter presents a workable toolkit for the application of the law of occupation to internationalized armed conflicts.


1974 ◽  
Vol 14 (163) ◽  
pp. 527-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danièle Bujard

The year 1974 marks the centennial of the International Declaration of Brussels on the Laws and Customs of War. This effort to codify the most important laws of war, undertaken on the initiative of Czar Alexander II of Russia, constituted a decisive stage in the development of the law of war. It is this event which the Committee for the Protection of Human Life in Armed Conflicts, under the patronage of the Belgian Government, proposes to commemorate by an international seminar on the theme “The Concept of International Armed Conflict—New Perspectives”, in December of this year.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Olaitan Oluwaseyi Olusegun

Abstract Armed conflicts are characterised by violence and human rights violations with various implications on the citizens, economy and development of nations. The impact is however more pronounced with life-long consequences on children, the most vulnerable members of the society. This article examines the impact of non-international armed conflicts on children in Nigeria and identifies the laws for the protection of children against armed conflicts, both in international law and Nigeria’s domestic law. It also addresses the challenges involved in the protection of children in armed conflict situations in Nigeria. The study found that legal efforts to protect children have not been given sufficient attention in Nigeria. This is mostly due to various challenges including the fragmentation of legal framework and the refusal to domesticate relevant treaties. It is thus recommended that these challenges be addressed through the implementation of effective legal frameworks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 252-260
Author(s):  
Bartłomiej Krzan

Abstract The present study analyses climate change from the perspective of the law of armed conflict. Climate may be both a victim and a means of warfare. Arguably, the existing normative framework is broad enough to allow for accommodating climate change. It cannot be denied that the environment is easily harmed, or at least jeopardized in times of armed conflicts. Despite the obvious lack of explicit references in the instruments of international humanitarian law, it may be argued that it is possible to fit climate change in. The accompanying analysis addresses the respective potential and the ensuing hurdles.


Author(s):  
Bothe Michael

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.


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