Legitimation Problems

Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

Political and epistemic authorities in the global governance system often restrain the freedom of constituent members and therefore need to be justified with reference to the impartial pursuit of a shared social purpose. An international authority must therefore develop a convincing legitimation narrative and display a sense of impartiality to be seen as legitimate. The thrust of the argument in this chapter is that the legitimacy of the global governance system is structurally precarious. Two legitimation problems can be identified: a technocratic bias in the justification of authority and the lack of impartiality in the exercise of authority. International institutions often have authority, but lack sufficient legitimacy beliefs.

Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

The authority–legitimation link states that international institutions exercising authority need to nurture the belief in their legitimacy. The authority–legitimation link points to fundamental challenges for the global governance system: with the rise of international authorities that are, at the same time, more intrusive, state consent is undermined and societies are affected directly. Consequently, legitimation problems arise, followed by processes of delegitimation, which then trigger responses by the challenged institutions. Using concepts of historical institutionalism, it is argued in this chapter that the authority–legitimation link produces reactive sequences either via the route of societal politicization or via counter-institutionalization by states. These reactive sequences may result in either a decline or a deepening of global governance depending on the responses of authority holders.


Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

This chapter argues that the notion of international cooperation as a purely executive, legal, or technocratic matter misses some decisive features of world politics today. International institutions are seen not only by political, but also by societal actors as political institutions exercising public authority requiring legitimacy. Two broad claims are tested. According to the first, the politicization of international institutions can be ascribed to the patterns of authority in the global governance system. The more political authority international institutions exercise, the more attention they attract, the more actors participate in debates and the more polarization in opinions takes place. The second broad claim is that politicization is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it leads to a broadening of legitimation efforts including participatory and fairness-based narratives. On the other hand, politicization may also lead to a significant legitimacy gap that can undermine the authorities as a whole.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Deitelhoff ◽  
Christopher Daase

Abstract A Theory of Global Governance is a long awaited book that finally theorizes the increasing authority of international institutions and the conflicts emerging from it. With its focus on reflexive deference as a basis for international authority it covers important elements of global governance but also leaves some critical blind spots regarding the forms of super- and subordination. In our engagement with Michael Zürn's book we propose to conceptualize international authority as a subcategory of international rule instead of its essence and to investigate various forms of rule by way of analyzing the resistance they provoke instead of institutionalized mandates.


Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

States increasingly contest international institutions by “counter-institutionalization.” This comes in two forms. Counter-Institutionalization by Incumbent States (CMALL 4) means regime shifting and competitive regime creation. Incumbent states build and use parallel governance forums, especially when the dominant institution exercises authority on the basis of the “one-state, one-vote” principle. In that way, Western states insist on institutionalized inequality, asking for a global governance system that gives them a privileged role and allows for double standards. The costs of this strategy are significant. Rising powers also use the strategy of counter-institutionalization. They aim at changing existing, Western-biased institutions. Counter-Institutionalization by Rising Powers (CMALL 3) aims at voice—not at exit or loyalty. At the same time, there is an ongoing suspicion that stronger international institutions are instruments of Western dominance and help to prolong an unequal distribution of benefits. This tension leads to ambiguous responses, unified by the struggle against institutionalized inequality.


Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

The global governance system rests on three normative principles, each of which qualifies the Westphalian principle of sovereignty. The first questions the implicit notion that all political communities are territorially segmented by highlighting the notion of common goods that need to be achieved together. The second questions the idea that political authorities are absolute by noting the rights of individuals and entitlements of non-state actors that they have independent of being members of a state. The third principle questions the notion that there are no authorities other than the state by mooting the possibility of international authority. This chapter discusses these normative principles and their “empirical appropriateness.” In using the method of rational reconstruction, it is shown that the assumptions of a global governance system seem to be better suited to understand world politics in the twenty-first century than the notion of an anarchic international system or an international society.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-23
Author(s):  
Marina Larionova ◽  
◽  
John Kirton ◽  

Assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on international institutions and international relations is essential for shaping global governance for the post COVID crisis world. The authors review the actions of the key international institutions in response to the pandemic undertaken in January-March 2020 reflecting on three questions. First, were the actions undertaken by the international institutions adequate, coordinated and timely? Second, could the outbreak have been contained if the global governance system was not in a state of severe strain, with many of the gaps exposed and reforms promised in the wake of the 2009 financial and economic crisis unfulfilled, its key causes unaddressed and unilateralism rising among its key members? In addition, was the COVID-19 crisis exacerbated by the crisis of multilateralism? Third, and most difficult, what is the future of global governance after the COVID-19 crisis ends? The analysis of international institutions performance three months into the crisis leads to authors to conclude that there have been inadequate actions to produce a timely, coordinated international response from all the major multilateral organizations and from the newer plurilateral summit institutions of the BRICS, G7 and G20. The failure of these global governance institutions was due not only to the severe strains from leading members’ unilateralism and competition, but from the very architecture designed in 1945 that now poorly matches intensely globalized world. Global governance in the post COVID world should not descend into the old war-prone balance of power, nor flow from a new Bretton Woods-San Francisco as in 1944–1945 but from an intensification and expansion of G20 governance that will generate and coordinate more comprehensive, stronger multilateral organizations for the benefit of all.


Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

This chapter summarizes the argument of the book. It recapitulates the global governance as a political system founded on normative principles and reflexive authorities in order to identify the legitimation problems built into it; it points to the explanation of the rise of societal politicization and counter-institutionalization via causal mechanisms highlighting the endogenous dynamics of that global governance system; and, it sums up the conditions under which the subsequent processes of legitimation and delegitimation lead to the system’s decline or to a deepening of it. In addition, the conclusion submits that the arguments put forward in this book are in line with a newly emerging paradigm in International Relations. A “global politics paradigm” is increasingly complementing the “cooperation under anarchy paradigm” which has been dominant for around five decades. The chapter finishes with suggestions of areas for further research.


Author(s):  
Michael Zürn

In this chapter, authority is developed as key concept for analyzing the global governance system. Max Weber’s foundational treatment is used to capture the paradox involved in the notion of “voluntary subordination.” Building on this foundation, the concept of reflexive authority is elaborated in contrast to two other concepts that have prevailed in international relations so far. The argument is laid out against the background of the global governance context, one in which the authority holders are in many respects weaker than most state actors. Two types of reflexive authority are identified: epistemic and political authority. Finally, the interplay between different authorities in global governance is analyzed to identify the major features of the global governance system. It is—to put it in the shortest possible form—a system of only loosely coupled spheres of authorities that is not coordinated by a meta-authority and lacks a proper separation of powers.


Author(s):  
Gina Heathcote

Reflecting on recent gender law reform within international law, this book examines the nature of feminist interventions to consider what the next phase of feminist approaches to international law might include. To undertake analysis of existing gender law reform and future gender law reform, the book engages critical legal inquiries on international law on the foundations of international law. At the same time, the text looks beyond mainstream feminist accounts to consider the contributions, and tensions, across a broader range of feminist methodologies than has been adapted and incorporated into gender law reform including transnational and postcolonial feminisms. The text therefore develops dialogues across feminist approaches, beyond dominant Western liberal, radical, and cultural feminisms, to analyse the rise of expertise and the impact of fragmentation on global governance, to study sovereignty and international institutions, and to reflect on the construction of authority within international law. The book concludes that through feminist dialogues that incorporate intersectionality, and thus feminist dialogues with queer, crip, and race theories, that reflect on the politics of listening and which are actively attentive to the conditions of privilege from which dominant feminist approaches are articulated, opportunity for feminist dialogues to shape feminist futures on international law emerge. The book begins this process through analysis of the conditions in which the author speaks and the role histories of colonialism play out to define her own privilege, thus requiring attention to indigenous feminisms and, in the UK, the important interventions of Black British feminisms.


Author(s):  
Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni

AbstractMany observers worry that growing numbers of international institutions with overlapping functions undermine governance effectiveness via duplication, inconsistency and conflict. Such pessimistic assessments may undervalue the mechanisms available to states and other political agents to reduce conflictual overlap and enhance inter-institutional synergy. Drawing on historical data I examine how states can mitigate conflict within Global Governance Complexes (GGCs) by dissolving or merging existing institutions or by re-configuring their mandates. I further explore how “order in complexity” can emerge through bottom-up processes of adaptation in lieu of state-led reform. My analysis supports three theoretical claims: (1) states frequently refashion governance complexes “top-down” in order to reduce conflictual overlap; (2) “top-down” restructuring and “bottom-up” adaptation present alternative mechanisms for ordering relations among component institutions of GGCs; (3) these twin mechanisms ensure that GGCs tend to (re)produce elements of order over time–albeit often temporarily. Rather than evolving towards ever-greater fragmentation and disorder, complex governance systems thus tend to fluctuate between greater or lesser integration and (dis)order.


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