Organizing Rebellion

Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

This book identifies the degree of organization required from non-state armed groups (i) to become party to an armed conflict and thereby bound by applicable international humanitarian law; (ii) to have possible human rights obligations; and (iii) to create a context in which international crimes can be committed. Part I identifies three principal criteria that any party to a non-international armed conflict—including decentrally organized armed groups, transnational groups, or cyber groups—must meet: it must be a collective entity with sufficient capabilities to engage in hostilities and the ability to ensure respect for basic humanitarian norms. Part II conceptualizes contemporary debate and international practice on the question of whether armed groups have human rights obligations. It suggests that the sources and scope of potential human rights obligations of armed groups are understood best on a spectrum, with consideration given to three categories: groups exercising quasi-governmental authority; groups exercising de facto control over territory and population; and groups exercising no territorial control. Part III examines the requisite degree of organization of armed groups to create contexts in which crimes against humanity or genocide can be committed. It argues that the degree of power and organization of groups behind these crimes depends on whether the group instigates or actually commits the crimes. In sum, this book shows that the requisite degree of organization of armed groups to have obligations under different fields of international law cannot be determined in the abstract. It depends on the specificities of each field of law and the circumstances of each case.

2019 ◽  
pp. 279-302
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted—jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies and Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 concerns belligerent occupation and Section 14.7. deals with the regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.8 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted — jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies. Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 deals with the issue of regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.7 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Mettraux Guénaël

This chapter discusses crimes against humanity under international law. Crimes against humanity were first introduced at Nuremberg as a means of criminalizing three sorts of criminality that so far had evaded the sanction of international law: atrocities committed outside the context of an armed conflict or independent of it; crimes committed against fellow nationals or nationals of allied nations; and institutionalized discriminatory violence that resulted in individuals being targeted and mistreated by a state because of their identity. Crimes against humanity seek to protect core attributes of all human beings: their dignity; their humanity; and their fundamental human rights. The notion of crimes against humanity reflects the fact that the protection of those interests and the punishment of serious violations of these interests is a matter of universal concern. It also makes it clear that the protection arising from international law does not depend on the nationality of the victim or his membership in a group, nor on his or relationship to the perpetrator. Instead, it is the sheer humanity of the victim that warrants and justifies the criminalization of such acts. And whilst the notion of genocide and crimes against humanity overlap in part in their efforts to protect these core values, unlike genocide, crimes against humanity seek to protect individuals as such, rather than groups of individuals. The chapter then looks at the relationship between crimes against humanity and other international crimes as well as the process of defining crimes against humanity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-33
Author(s):  
Joshua Joseph Niyo

The restriction of personal liberty is a critical feature in all conflicts, whether they are of an international character or not. With the increased prevalence of non-international armed conflict and the drastic proliferation of non-state armed groups, it is critical to explore whether such groups can legally detain or intern persons during conflict. This article proposes that there exists a power and a legal basis for armed groups to intern persons for imperative security reasons while engaged in armed conflict. It is suggested that this authorisation exists in the frameworks of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as it does for states engaged in such conflicts. It is proposed that such power and legal basis are particularly strong for armed groups in control of territory, and can be gleaned from certain customary law claims, treaty law, as well as some case law on international humanitarian law and human rights. Certain case law of the European Court of Human Rights on detention by de facto non-state entities conceivably reflects a change in traditional thinking on ‘legal’ detention by armed groups.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
DARAGH MURRAY

AbstractInternational humanitarian law establishes explicit safeguards applicable to detention occurring in non-international armed conflict. However, debate exists as to whether these treaty provisions establish an implicit legal basis for detention. This article approaches this debate in light of the application of international humanitarian law to non-state armed groups. It examines the principal arguments against implicit detention authority and then applies the law of treaty interpretation to international humanitarian law's detention-related provisions. On the basis of current understandings of international law – and the prohibition of arbitrary detention in particular – it is concluded that international humanitarian law must be interpreted as establishing implicit detention authority, in order to ensure the continued regulation of armed groups. Although, perhaps, problematic from certain states’ perspective, this conclusion is reflective of the current state of international law. However, this is not necessarily the end of the story. A number of potential ‘ways forward’ are identified: implicit detention authority may be (i) rejected; (ii) accepted; or (iii) re-examined in light of the non-state status of armed groups, and what this means for the content of the prohibition of arbitrary detention. These scenarios are examined in light of the desire to ensure: the coherency of international law including recognition of the role of armed groups, the continued effectiveness of international humanitarian law, and state sovereignty. An emphasis is placed on understanding the non-state status of armed groups and what this means for international regulation and the content of imposed obligations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 663-680
Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen

AbstractInternational human rights law is an as-yet underused branch of international law when assessing the legality of nuclear weapons and advocating for their elimination. It offers a far greater range of implementation mechanisms than does international humanitarian law (IHL), and arguably strengthens the protections afforded to civilians and combatants under IHL, particularly in non-international armed conflict. Of particular relevance are the rights to life, to humane treatment, to health and to a healthy environment, associated with the right to a remedy for violations of any human rights.


2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (895-896) ◽  
pp. 1195-1224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes ◽  
Marcos D. Kotlik

AbstractCommon Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or asui generislegal regime.


Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

Abstract In recent non-international armed conflicts in countries such as the Central African Republic, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, various non-State armed groups (NSAGs) have exercised control over territory and people living therein. In many cases, and for a variety of reasons, NSAGs perform some form of governance in these territories, which can include the maintenance of order or the provision of justice, health care, or social services. The significance of such measures became particularly apparent when in 2020 not only governments but also armed groups took steps to halt the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article examines key legal issues that arise in these contexts. First, it analyzes the extent to which international humanitarian law protects the life and dignity of persons living under the control of NSAGs, rebutting doubts as to whether this field of international law has a role in regulating what is sometimes called “rebel governance”. Second, it provides a brief overview of aspects of the lives of people in armed group-controlled territory that are addressed by international humanitarian law and aspects that instead fall into the realm of human rights law. Third, the article discusses whether and to what extent human rights law can be said to bind NSAGs as a matter of law and flags issues that need further attention in current and future debates.


Author(s):  
W Ochieng

Since the Geneva Conventions, the architecture of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has been founded upon a distinction between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Today, this claim stands to be revisited since international and non-international armed conflicts are no longer strict organising frameworks for the categorisation of rules of armed conflicts. This is seen in that over fifty years ago, when the four Geneva Conventions were negotiated, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were the cornerstones of international law and while their force today is still apparent, the interdependence of states, and global concerns such as terrorism and the commission of widespread human rights violations have eroded the traditional inviolability of borders. The dichotomy in humanitarian law is as implausible today as it is also fundamentally unworkable given the current conditions of conflicts. This dualist conception is no longer adequate to deal with current features of armed conflict, which do not fit neatly into the two categories and frequently contain mixed elements which thus make the task of classification highly complex. The codification of customary rules of international humanitarian law has narrowed the grounds on which the distinctions are predicated. In addition, the two regimes apply simultaneously on multiple situations. Moreover, the question of contemporary armed conflicts raises serious doubts as to whether the traditional understanding of international law still suffices to explain the complexities of modern day armed conflicts. This essay seeks to offer a different perspective on armed conflicts by suggesting a systematic rethinking of the categorisation of conflict. It argues that some of the dilemmas of contemporary conflicts may be attenuated by a new conceptualisation of this bipolar distinction namely a need for a unitary conception of armed conflict.


2013 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-340
Author(s):  
Dragan Jovasevic

Violation of rules of international humanitarian law during the war or armed conflict creates the need for the application of certain types and measures of criminal sanctions against perpetrators of the most serious crimes against international law in accordance with appropriate judicial procedures. Both - national as well as international judicial systems are familiar with various types of criminal sanctions prescribed by relevant legal sources. This paper discusses the characteristics of these international crimes and sanctions and the preconditions for their application. The application of these criminal sanctions requires that the existence of elements of a particular criminal offence against international law and of the guilt on behalf of the adult perpetrator of such an offence has previously been confirmed.


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