Reluctant European

Author(s):  
Stephen Wall

In 2016, the voters of the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union. The majority for ‘Leave’ was small. Yet, in more than forty years of EU membership, the British had never been wholeheartedly content. In the 1950s, governments preferred the Commonwealth to the Common Market. In the 1960s, successive Conservative and Labour administrations applied to join the European Community because it was a surprising success, whilst the UK’s post-war policies had failed. But the British were turned down by the French. When the UK did join, twelve years after first asking, it joined a club whose rules had been made by others and which it did not much like. At one time or another, Labour and Conservative were at war with each other and internally. In 1975, the Labour government held a referendum on whether the UK should stay in. Two thirds of the voters decided to do so. But the wounds did not heal. Europe remained ‘them’, not ‘us’. The UK was on the front foot in proposing reform and modernization and on the back foot as other EU members wanted to advance to ‘ever closer union’. This book tells the story of a relationship rooted in a thousand years of British history, and of our sense of national identity in conflict with our political and economic need for partnership with continental Europe.

Author(s):  
Ludovic Highman

On such divisive issues as EU membership and, consequently, the post-Brexit relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, it is unsurprising that Theresa May’s government has been torn between a “hard” and a “soft” Brexit. As of June 2018, there is still no indication of which approach will prevail, putting at risk UK universities’ participation in the Erasmus+ program, which has provided, among other things, opportunities for over four million Europeans to study, train, and volunteer abroad since its inception. Full access to EU research funds is also at risk. Universities cannot depend on the UK government’s help in securing the frameworks allowing for continuity. In such a context, universities have started to use their limited resources to secure bilateral international and European links to foster research collaboration and staff and student mobility, post-Brexit.


2018 ◽  
pp. 19-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ludovic Highman

On such divisive issues as EU membership and, consequently, the post-Brexit relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, it is unsurprising that Theresa May’s government has been torn between a “hard” and a “soft” Brexit. As of June 2018, there is still no indication of which approach will prevail, putting at risk UK universities’ participation in the Erasmus+ program, which has provided, among other things, opportunities for over four million Europeans to study, train, and volunteer abroad since its inception. Full access to EU research funds is also at risk. Universities cannot depend on the UK government’s help in securing the frameworks allowing for continuity. In such a context, universities have started to use their limited resources to secure bilateral international and European links to foster research collaboration and staff and student mobility, post-Brexit.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 1055-1064 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justine N Stefanelli

The United Kingdom (‘UK’) has indicated its intention not to opt-in to two proposals from the European Commission aimed at further developing the Common European Asylum System through the replacement of existing instruments on asylum procedures and reception conditions. The purpose of the European Union (‘EU’) amendment process is to establish rules that more closely align the legal framework for asylum in the Member States so that asylum seekers receive the same higher standard of treatment in any Member State in which they choose to make their application, and to address criticism that the Directives are incompatible with human rights obligations. The UK asserts that its asylum procedures satisfy the standards imposed by its obligations under international and European law, and does not view further harmonization of asylum matters at EU level as necessary or appropriate. Its decision not to opt-in raises issues regarding sovereignty, subsidiarity, the rule of law and European integration. This article will explore these issues, as well as provide an overview of select provisions from the proposals in light of UK asylum policy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 252-286
Author(s):  
Graham BUTLER ◽  
Gavin BARRETT

AbstractIn recent years, the Schengen Area—and the suppression within its territory of border controls—has become a strong focus of attention. This article focuses on another region of Europe where such controls have been suppressed: the Common Travel Area (‘CTA’). Historically, both Ireland and the United Kingdom have rejected membership of the Schengen system—albeit securing certain ‘opt-in’ rights—and instead maintained the CTA between their respective jurisdictions. The CTA has, however, garnered relatively little public attention until recently, when concerns as to the implications of Brexit for the maintenance of an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland have gained ground, and threatened to be a deal breaker in the negotiations under Article 50 TEU on UK exit from the EU (‘Brexit’). This article examines the background to the CTA, exploring its surprisingly fluid legal framework; its development in the legal systems of Ireland and the United Kingdom; and subsequently, how it was exempted from what is now EU law as the Schengen arrangements were integrated into the Union. The recent introduction of the British-Irish Visa Scheme, which formalises some visa rules regarding citizens of third states, and which tends in the direction of consolidating CTA arrangements, is also examined. The article further explores the challenges that confront the CTA in coping with the outcome of the June 2016 Brexit referendum, which should result in the UK leaving the European Union in March 2019, and the implications of Brexit for the CTA. Finally, it seeks to identify some key characteristics of the CTA in light of experience to date.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ania Plomien

The United Kingdom has a long history of a fraught relationship with the European Union, a discomfort demonstrated in the 23 June 2016 referendum on the membership of the EU, in which the UK voted to leave with nearly 52 per cent majority vote. Among the key concerns underlying UK's unease with EU are the interrelated areas of the economy, polity, and society. However, public debate surrounding the event focused on a relatively narrow range of issues. The two official campaigns representing the choice in the referendum, ‘Vote Leave, take control’ and ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’, were marshalled either to support Eurosceptic feelings or to emphasise the benefits of access to the Single Market. Commonplace convictions that the EU is responsible for that which is negative, inconvenient, or difficult to explain circulated alongside (though less frequently than) the recognition of the economic privileges and opportunities that come from EU membership. The political, economic and social concerns were encapsulated in themes of taking power back from Brussels, redirecting resources from the UK's contributions to the EU budget towards nationally determined projects (most famously allocating £350 million a week for the National Health Service), and effective border control to significantly curb migration. Contradictory claims about the EU and the UK's affiliation with it were further complicated by the fact that divisions over the support for or opposition to Britain's withdrawal spanned the whole political spectrum.


Author(s):  
Michael Keating

The devolution settlement of 1999 was introduced during UK membership of the European Union. The EU provided an external support system for it. Ideas of shared and divided sovereignty, on which the EU is (for many) based, complement similar interpretations of the United Kingdom as a union rather than a nation state. Like the UK, the EU has no fixed demos, telos, ethos or agreed locus of sovereignty; these are, rather, contested. The EU also provided for market integration through the internal market, obviating the need for internal market provisions in the devolution settlement. EU membership for both the UK and Ireland meant that the physical border could be dismantled. UK withdrawal from the EU therefore destabilizes the settlement, especially given the Remain majorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland. This has revived demands for Scottish independence and Irish reunification. There is a protocol allowing Northern Ireland to remain within the regulatory ambit of both the UK and the EU. A demand for similar provisions for Scotland was refused.


Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This chapter examines the European Union because of Brexit, focusing on a number of transitional problems that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU—and its delay owing to subsequent requests to extend EU membership for extra time—posed for the EU’s functioning and funding. In particular, it emphasizes the consequences of Brexit for the composition of the 9th European Parliament (2019–2024), and its elections in May of 2019. It explains how the participation of the UK in this democratic process had pro tempore effects on both the EP outlook and its electoral outcome. The chapter also considers the transitional institutional challenges faced because of Brexit by both the European Commission and the Council of the EU. It highlights the implications of Brexit for the EU’s multi-annual financial framework (MFF), stressing how the UK’s withdrawal created a budget gap for the EU, attributable to the way the EU is funded, and how this would create challenges in the next MFF negotiations—as indeed happened.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-91
Author(s):  
Yige Zu ◽  
Richard Krever

Post-Brexit, UK law conforming to Directives of the European Union such as the value added tax (VAT) Directive will remain in effect and UK courts will be permitted to consider decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) when interpreting that law. How UK common law courts, steeped in the tradition of the doctrine of precedent, will use CJEU judgments in the post-Brexit era has been the subject of much speculation. This article considers the question in the context of a case study, looking at the application by UK courts of CJEU decisions in an important area of VAT law, the treatment of customer loyalty plan benefits. The evidence suggests that, even prior to Brexit, UK courts had started to pursue a separate path, declining to follow CJEU precedents that yielded clearly inappropriate policy outcomes. If the results of the case study are replicated more widely in UK rulings, it can be expected that the influence of CJEU judgments may taper off where formalistic and literalist CJEU interpretations have led to outcomes inconsistent with the recognized policy intent of UK law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Philip Martin

The vulnerability of migrants of Roma heritage[1] to insecure, low status, (and sometimes exploitative), employment conditions in the UK has been highlighted by various studies (e.g. Poole & Adamson 2008;, Martin et al 2017, Tileaga et al. 2019). Such patterns of employment have frequently been identified as ‘precarious labour’ across the European Union (e.g. Apostolova et al 2014; Vincze, 2015).Following the 2016 Referendum vote to leave the EU[2], the UK government indicated that providing evidence of consistent, regular working histories would form the basis of applications by EU migrants seeking to remain in the country long-term. (Home Office, 2018, 2020). In doing so, it made evidence of legal, paid employment central to future legitimacy in the country, but those struggling to produce such information face potentially precarious futures (Migration Observatory, 2018). Studies have suggested that, given the specific disadvantages faced by Roma migrants in the UK, the aftermath of ‘Brexit’[3] posed enhanced risks an intensification of the precarity they already experienced.Drawing on interviews conducted in two different locations in 2019, this paper adds experiential detail to their specific experiences of precarious work, located in the ‘no man’s land’ between the 2016 vote and final departure, due at the end of 2020. It assesses the implications for their continued residence, with particular reference to the status of EU migrants post Brexit and the proposed requirements for remaining in the UK. However, it argues that for Roma in the UK, Brexit represents a contemporary, but expanded example of labour precarity, encompassing not only work, but family and future, hopes and aspirations.[1] ‘Migrants of Roma heritage’ is used to recognise the diversity (national, cultural, educational, and linguistic among others) present across the communities who identify as Roma and to avoid the ethnicity based essentialising criticised by many scholars.[2] The 2016 Referendum on EU membership offered UK voters a single question ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union? The 51.6% majority who chose to leave are colloquially referred to as the ‘Leave Vote’, and the process of leaving as ‘Brexit’  [Britain/British-exit][3] ‘Brexit’ is here used to denote the process from the Referendum campaign, through the negotiations, towards final departure.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-3) ◽  
pp. 70-81
Author(s):  
David Ramiro Troitino ◽  
Tanel Kerikmae ◽  
Olga Shumilo

This article highlights the role of Charles de Gaulle in the history of united post-war Europe, his approaches to the internal and foreign French policies, also vetoing the membership of the United Kingdom in the European Community. The authors describe the emergence of De Gaulle as a politician, his uneasy relationship with Roosevelt and Churchill during World War II, also the roots of developing a “nationalistic” approach to regional policy after the end of the war. The article also considers the emergence of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereinafter - CAP), one of Charles de Gaulle’s biggest achievements in foreign policy, and the reasons for the Fouchet Plan defeat.


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