Variations in Member State Use of Preliminary References

2021 ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Morten Broberg ◽  
Niels Fenger
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Total Variation ◽  
Structural Factor ◽  
Common Law ◽  
National Court ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Court ◽  
Behavioural Factor ◽  
Two Factors

Chapter 2 analyses the variations in frequency of preliminary references to the European Court of Justice from the different Member States. This analysis focuses upon two factors; firstly the structural factor that a relevant case must be pending before a national court in an EU Member State (structural factor), and secondly a behavioural factor that the national judge/judges hearing the national case must choose to make a preliminary reference (behavioural factor). The chapter determines each of these two factors and it concludes that about three-quarters of the total variation in preliminary references across Member States can be explained exclusively on the basis of total number of cases (a component of the structural factor). If we fully account for the structural factor and also account for the component whether the Member States may be categorised as either civil law or common law we are able to explain almost 90% of the total variation.

scholarly journals The European Court of Justice and the Policy Process

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Administrative Practices ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.

Ireland in Europe: A Legal Perspective

2001 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Regan
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
Ec Law

The Member States of the European Union have diverse legal traditions explained in part by the dichotomy of common law and civil law systems. Yet notwithstanding this diversity all Member States have adjusted to the new legal order created by the European Community in accepting the primacy of EC law and the legal principles establishing by the European Court of Justice. This paper examines briefly the Irish experience in making that adjustment.

Wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości w sprawie National Grid Indus BV – złote runo czy puszka Pandory?

2014 ◽  
pp. 24-42
Author(s):  
Ewa Prejs
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
A Company ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
Interest Payments

This paper examines the decision of the European Court of Justice in the National Grid Indus case issued on 29 November 2011, concerning exit tax levied on unrealised capital gains relating to the assets of a company transferring its place of management for tax purposes between Member States. The author indicates the significance of the judgment. She generally shares the ECJ’s opinion but argues that justifications based on the need to safeguard the allocation of taxing rights among Member States should not be rejected by the ECJ without any differentiation regarding specific circumstances. The author also considers whether the ECJ changed its view on the provisions introduced by the member states in their domestic law relating to remedies safeguarding the recovery of the tax, such as interest payments and bank guarantees, and mandatory provisions allowing for future decreases in value of the company assets transferred to another Member State.

Arbitration cases and preliminary references to the European Court of Justice—an assessment of ‘the Danish Solution’

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-155
Author(s):  
Morten Broberg ◽  
Niels Fenger
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
National Court ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Commercial Arbitration ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court

Abstract When a case, that is pending before a national court in one of the Member States of the European Union, requires a decision on the interpretation or validity of an EU legal measure, the national court can seek a preliminary ruling on the matter from the European Court of Justice before deciding the main action. In its preliminary ruling, the European Court of Justice establishes authoritatively the interpretation or validity of the relevant EU legislation. When EU law plays a role in commercial arbitration it may be very useful for arbitration tribunals to have access to the preliminary reference procedure. However, according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, only ‘a court or tribunal of a Member State’ can make a preliminary reference and this notion does not include commercial arbitration tribunals. In order to give arbitration tribunals access to the preliminary reference procedure Denmark has introduced a scheme which allows them to ask the ordinary Danish courts to make preliminary references on behalf of the arbitration tribunal. This article explains the Danish scheme and considers to what extent it provides a useful model for other Member States.

scholarly journals The Court of Justice and treaty revision: A case of strategic leniency?

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 570-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis Castro-Montero ◽  
Edwin Alblas ◽  
Arthur Dyevre ◽  
Nicolas Lampach
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Judicial Politics ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Treaty Negotiations ◽  
The Relationship

Students of European Union judicial politics have debated the credibility of legislative override as constraint on the behaviour of the European Court of Justice. Yet because of the high political hurdles for the passage of treaty amendments, treaty revision has been dismissed as the ‘nuclear option’, exceedingly effective but difficult to use. However, when treaties are being renegotiated, the ability of member state governments to pass treaty amendments to either punish or reward the Court is greater. We argue that this may induce the Court of Justice to display more leniency towards member states in cases coinciding with ongoing treaty negotiations. To test this hypothesis, we examine the outcome of all infringement cases adjudicated between 1961 and 2016. We find that the European Court of Justice is significantly less likely to render adverse rulings in cases concomitant with the final, most salient stage of treaty negotiations. Our analysis suggests that the relationship between treaty revision and judicial behaviour may be more nuanced than commonly assumed in the literature.

Centros Ltd—A Complete U-Turn in the Right of Establishment for Companies?

2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Looijestijn-Clearie
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Member State ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Registered Office ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right ◽  
A Company

InCentros Ltd and Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelesen (hereinafter Centros),1 the European Court of Justice ruled that it is contrary to Article 52 (now Article 432) and Article 58 (now Article 48) of the EC Treaty for the authorities of a member State (in casu Denmark) to refuse to register a branch of a company formed under the law of another member State (in casu the United Kingdom) in which it has its registered office, even if the company concerned has never conducted any business in the latter State and intends to carry out its entire business in the State in which the branch is to be set up. By avoiding the need to form a company there it would thus evade the application of the rules governing the provision for and the paying-up of a minimum share capital in force in that State. According to the Court, this does not, however, prevent the authorities of the member State in which the branch is to be set up from adopting appropriate measures for preventing or penalising fraud, either with regard to the company itself, if need be in co-operation with the member State in which it was formed, or with regard to its members, where it has been determined that they are in fact attempting, by means of the formation of a company, to evade their obligations towards creditors established in the territory of the member State of the branch.

While the Treaty does not affect the existence of intellectual property rights, there are nonetheless circumstances in which the exercise of such rights may be restricted by the prohibitions laid down in the treaty. 2. Article 36 permits exceptions to the free movement of goods only to the extent to which such exceptions are necessary for the purpose of safeguarding the rights that constitute the specific subject-matter of the type of intellectual property in question. Perhaps the main advantage of this formula, apart from the fact that it narrows the scope of the exceptions permitted by Article 36, is that it allows subtle distinctions to be made depending on the type of intellectual property in issue. 3. The exclusive right conferred on the owner of intellectual property is exhausted in relation to the products in question when he puts them into circulation anywhere within the Common Market. Spelt out more fully, ‘the proprietor of an industrial or commercial property right protected by the legislation of a Member State may not rely on that legislation in order to oppose the importation of a product which has lawfully been marketed in another Member State by, or with the consent of, the proprietor of the right himself or person legally or economically dependent on him’. The expression ‘industrial and commercial property’ clearly embraces patents and trademarks. It also extends to such specialised areas as plant breeders’ rights. The court has held that copyright can also be a form of industrial or commercial property because it ‘includes the protection conferred by copyright, especially when exploited commercially in the form of licences capable of affecting distribution in the various Member States of goods incorporating the protected literary or artistic work’. The principle that the Treaty does not affect the existence of industrial and commercial property rights is derived from Article 222 of the treaty. This provides that ‘the treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership’. Consequently intellectual property rights are unaffected by the provisions of the treaty unless they hinder free movement or offend the rules of competition. In Keurkoop v Nancy Kean (see below) the design of a handbag which was manufactured in Taiwan was registered in the Benelux countries but without the authority of the actual author. In Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v Metro-SB Grossmärkte [1971] ECR 487, [1971] CMLR 631, the European Court stated:

1997 ◽  
pp. 110-114
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Member State ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
Member States ◽  
Commercial Property ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Exclusive Right

6. The preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.

Germany's Dialogue with Strasbourg: Extrapolating theBundesverfassungsgericht'sRelationship with the European Court of Human Rights in the Preventive Detention Decision

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 757-772 ◽  
Author(s):  
Birgit Peters
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
National Level ◽  
National Court ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Member States ◽  
Proper Role ◽  
European Court ◽  
New Applications ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Sheer Number

Within the Council of Europe, the relationship between the ECtHR and the member states is crucial for the survival and effective functioning of the Court. The ECtHR is currently overwhelmed by applications, the bulk of which emanate from a relatively small number of states, notably Russia, Rumania, Turkey, and the Ukraine. The backlog of cases will soon be toppling the vertiginous mark of 160,000, the adjudication of which alone would take the Court more than six years. The sheer number of cases exemplifies the system's urgent need for reform. Lately, discussions have been heavily influenced by considerations of subsidiarity, which the earlier Interlaken Declaration-as well as the recent Brighton Conference-emphasized as the key for the future relationship between the ECtHR and member states. Discussions about the principle's proper role in the relationship between member states and the ECHR, however, are far from over. This is due to questions regarding the principle itself, as well as to the factual realities dominating in the ECtHR-national court relationship. The principle often focuses on a strict separation of competences at two different levels, the national and the international, and many understandings of that principle require that the two levels stand in a more or less hierarchical relationship. This is difficult to assume in the Council of Europe context, where, compared to the EU, neither the doctrine of direct effect nor the principle of primacy in application reigns. Moreover, Strasbourg's emphasis on subsidiarity appears to focus on the responsibility of the member states to remedy human rights violations. In line with that argument, scholars have opined that the ECHR system should focus on an approach in which the ECtHR would be involved only if there are good reasons to depart from interpretation at the national level. Nonetheless, others recently doubted the overall usefulness of such an understanding of subsidiarity, since those member states responsible for the lion's share of new applications to the ECHR often neither possess a functioning judiciary nor functioning judicial or executive institutions, in general.

scholarly journals The European Court of Justice: What are the Limits of its Exclusive Jurisdiction?

2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lock
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Member States ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Community Law ◽  
Exclusive Jurisdiction ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Academic Discussion

The article explores the limits of the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction by addressing two main issues: firstly, whether there are exceptions to that exclusivity, such as the application of the CILFIT case law or the exclusion of Community law from the dispute. Secondly, it asks whether other international courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction over a case. The article commences by briefly discussing the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction as it was established in Opinion 1/91 and the Mox Plant-Case and draws conclusions from this case law. It then addresses the above-mentioned points and comes to the conclusion that there are generally no exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and that the only option open to Member States is to exclude Community law from a dispute (and even that option is subject to limitations). Furthermore, after exploring several routes advanced in the academic discussion, the article comes to the conclusion that other courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction and as a consequence declare the case inadmissible.

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