The Purport of Reason-Conditionals

2019 ◽  
pp. 31-41
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Reasons For Action ◽  
State Of Affairs

In everyday parlance we formulate reasons for action in many different ways, but it is here argued that they can all be rephrased as conditionals in which the antecedent is a description of the action that the reason is a reason for performing, and the consequent specifies a state of affairs that for the agent counts in favour of performing this action. The antecedent is taken to presuppose that the agent can in an ‘all-in’ sense, which includes having both ability and opportunity, perform the relevant action, and it states that performance of the action in conjunction with background assumptions ensures the truth of the consequent. Due to the fact that it is impossible for us to predict our decisions, it is also epistemically possible that the agent decides to perform this action.

Reasons for Action

1971 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Rachels
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Characteristic Pattern ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
The Third ◽  
State Of Affairs

We can often explain a person's action by citing some fact which prompted him to do what he did. For example:Tom quit his job because he was offered more money elsewhere;Dick took his daughter to the dentist because she had a toothache;Harry rushed out of the theater because it was on fire.In each case there are four elements which fit together in a characteristic pattern. (1) The first is the fact that Tom has been offered more money, that Dick's daughter has a toothache, or that the theater in which Harry is sitting is on fire. If the theater were not on fire, for example, then we would have to give a different sort of explanation of why Harry rushed out: we would have to say that he left because he thought it was on fire, not because it was on fire. I shall have more to say about this point later. (2) The second is their knowledge of these facts. If Dick is unaware of the girl's toothache, he can hardly do anything on account of it; and of course the same goes for the other cases. (3) The third element is the attitude which each agent has toward the existing state-of-affairs. Tom wants to earn more money; Dick loves his daughter and doesn't want her to suffer; and Harry, like the rest of us, doesn't want to be burned. (4) Finally, there is the action which is being explained: Tom quits his job, Dick takes the girl to the dentist, and Harry rushes from the theater.

Legal reasoning and interpretation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil MacCormick
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Deductive Reasoning ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Legal Decisions ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
True State ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Special Case

Legal reasoning is the process of devising, reflecting on, or giving reasons for legal acts and decisions or justifications for speculative opinions about the meaning of law and its relevance to action. Many contemporary writers, such as Aulis Aarnio (1987), Robert Alexy (1988), Manuel Atienza (1991) and Aleksander Peczenik (1989), propound the view that legal reasoning is a particular instance of general practical reasoning. They suppose, that is to say, that reasoning can link up with action, guiding one what to do, or showing whether or not there are good reasons for a proposed course of action or for something already done. They suppose also that in law reason links up to legal decisions in this way. Both suppositions are well founded. Law regulates what to do and how to respond to what has been done, doing so within an institutional framework of legislatures, lawcourts, enforcement agencies and the like. It is a feature of legal institutions that they are expected to have, and usually do give, good reasons for what they do, and to do this in public. Legal reasoning is therefore not only a special case of practical reasoning, but a specially public one. Rationality in action has at least two requirements: first, attention to facts, to the true state of affairs in relation to which one acts; second, attention to reasons for action relevant to the facts ascertained. The former aspect concerns reasoning about evidence; the latter, reasoning about rules or norms as reasons for action. In law, such rules and other norms have an institutional character. But how are these applied – by some kind of deductive reasoning, or nondeductively? Behind the rules of the law, there presumably lie other reasons, reasons for having these rules. What kind of reasons are these, developed through what modes of discourse? A discourse of principles, perhaps – but then how do reasons of principle themselves differ from rules? Reasoning from either rules or principles must always involve some process of interpretation, so how does interpretive reasoning enter into the practical reason of law? Answering such questions is the business of a theory of legal reasoning. Legal reasoning is to be understood as a form of practical reasoning concerning these very issues.

scholarly journals Agent-Relative Restrictions and Agent-Relative Value

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Stephen Emet
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Relative Value ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Commonsense Morality

In this article I pose a challenge for attempts to ground all reasons in considerations of value. Some believe that all reasons for action are grounded in considerations of value. Some also believe that there are agent-relative restrictions, which provide us with agent-relative reasons against bringing about the best state of affairs, on an impartial ranking of states of affairs. Some would like to hold both of these beliefs. That is, they would like to hold that such agent-relative restrictions are compatible with a teleological theory, one that grounds all reasons for action in considerations of value. This is what I will argue is problematic. I will argue that agent-centered restrictions will not fit into a teleological theory. If the correct moral theory is a teleological one, then there are no agent-relative restrictions. If there are agent-relative restrictions, then teleology is false. My argument challenges a particular project, of showing that all ethical theories are broadly consequentialist. The attraction of this project is that it promises to preserve what is thought to be compelling about consequentialism—its teleology and maximizing—while also preserving elements of commonsense morality—such as agent-relative restrictions—that have typically been thought of as distinctly non-consequentialist in nature. If my argument is correct, then this promise cannot be fulfilled.

The Need for a Broad-Based Model of Phonological Disorders

1992 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan G. Kamhi
Keyword(s):  
Speech Production ◽  
Phonological Disorders ◽  
Production Processes ◽  
Assessment And Treatment ◽  
Speech Delays ◽  
Explanatory Adequacy ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Assessment Procedures ◽  
Treatment Procedures

My response to Fey’s article (1985; reprinted 1992, this issue) focuses on the confusion caused by the application of simplistic phonological definitions and models to the assessment and treatment of children with speech delays. In addition to having no explanatory adequacy, such definitions/models lead either to assessment and treatment procedures that are similarly focused or to procedures that have no clear logical ties to the models with which they supposedly are linked. Narrowly focused models and definitions also usually include no mention of speech production processes. Bemoaning this state of affairs, I attempt to show why it is important for clinicians to embrace broad-based models of phonological disorders that have some explanatory value. Such models are consistent with assessment procedures that are comprehensive in nature and treatment procedures that focus on linguistic, as well as motoric, aspects of speech.

What Is an Institution?

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle
Keyword(s):  
Physical Structure ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Fact ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Creation ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Typical Point

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.

POST-COSMISM AND POST-HUMANISM: TWO STRATEGIES IN THE MOD-ERN PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN

Chelovek RU ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 217-220
Author(s):  
Natalia Rostova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Exceptionalism ◽  
Current State ◽  
Human World ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Post Humanism

The article analyzes the current state of affairs in philosophy in relation to the question «What is hu-man?». In this regard, the author identifies two strategies – post-humanism and post-cosmism. The strat-egy of post-humanism is to deny the idea of human exceptionalism. Humanity becomes something that can be thought of out of touch with human and understood as a right that extends to the non-human world. Post-cosmism, on the contrary, advocated the idea of ontological otherness of the human. Re-sponding to the challenges of anthropological catastrophe, its representatives propose a number of new anthropological projects.

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