The Intentionality of Actions

According to the definition proposed by this chapter you intentionally perform the basic bodily action of causing p now if you now have an occurrent decisive desire to cause p directly—that is, without causing anything as a means to it—and this desire now causes something because you correctly and justifiably think that it is p. Since it has been claimed that conscious occurrences are not causally related, this account has to be modified to suit mental acts such as visualizing something. In this connection some rival theories of intentional action which refer to acts of will or volitions are critically examined. Finally, building on the definition of an intentional basic action, the notion of an intentional non-basic action is defined.

Reasoning about Means

An advantage of using conditionals as the standard formula for reasons for action is that the conditional form can also be used to bring out the structure of reasons for belief—thus making possible a close comparison between these kinds of reasons and reasoning. It then becomes apparent that the direction of derivation is the reverse in the practical case when we reason our way to desiring sufficient means to an end from desiring the end to the theoretical case when we derive beliefs from sufficient conditions for their truth. This reversal reflects the opposite direction of fit of beliefs and desires. The implications of this account of reasoning with desires for the moral doctrine of the double effect and for reasoning with respect to emotions are briefly considered.

Acting and Thinking

This chapter has two main objectives. First, to defend the existence of a broad sense of action, which does not involve that anything is done intentionally, for instance, a reflex action. Such actions are simply causing something to happen. Secondly, to argue that, as opposed to thinking whether something is the case, occurrently thinking that something is the case, which is an actualization of the disposition of believing that it is the case, is not an action. Since these two claims are true, the broad sense of action and of thinking that something is the case can be employed in an account of acting intentionally for a reason which is reductionist in the sense of not using any concepts that are distinctive of action theory.

Refraining

You let it be the case that q by refraining from causing p just in case: (a) you correctly believe that if you cause p, q will not be the case, (b) you correctly believe that you have an all-in dual power concerning causing p, (c) you do not decisively desire to cause p because you do not find sufficient reasons for forming such a desire, and (d) q becomes the case because you do not cause p due to (c). Since refraining is intentional, it importantly follows from this that characterizing something as intentional does not involve causality. Moreover, when we can refrain from causing something, we must have the all-in dual power of causing it and avoiding to do so. Thus, the concept of refraining raises questions about free will and responsibility which are briefly discussed.

Conclusion

The overarching aim of this book is to provide a reductionist analysis of what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally perform the action that we have a reason for performing—an action that will in the end be a basic action—and intentionally achieve the end or goal for which we do this action, as specified by the reason. This analysis of intentional action is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any irreducibly action-theoretical concepts. It does not refer to anything that is unanalysably an action in virtue of involving either a unique type of agent-causation, or anything like a volition, trying, or decision that is assumed to be an act(ion) in a primitive sense. Nor does it refer to any unanalysable states or attitudes that are essentially directed at actions, like intentions and desires (to act). It does refer to a kind of desire—decisive desire—but it is in turn analysed as the causal power of some physical states in conjunction with propositional thinking. The direction of fit between thought and fact here is not that something is thought to fit the facts, but that something is caused to be fact because of how it is thought of....

Introduction and Outline of the Book

The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it means to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we do this action, as specified by the reason. This analysis will also cover the simpler case in which we perform actions intentionally without having any reasons to perform them, for their own sake. It is, however, of interest to see how reasons fit in with intentional actions, since by far most of them are performed for reasons. By contrast, it will transpire that the analysis needs to be adapted to suit situations in which we let something be the case, or allow it to be the case, by refraining from acting....

The Reference to Desire in Reasons for Action

It is here argued that when we act for a reason, the consequent of this reason(-conditional) must specify something that we desire. Intelligent desires, which are involved in intentional action, are distinguished from non-intelligent desires. It is intelligent desires which are ‘decisive’ that determine our intentional actions. Such desires can be said to be formed by decisions, but not necessarily decisions preceded by deliberation. You have an occurrent decisive desire to cause p now just in case you are in an internal state which, along with its underlying thought that you can now cause p (and thereby cause consequences specified by reasons that you may have for causing p), causes something to become a fact because you think that it is that p (and thereby will have the specified consequences).

The Purport of Reason-Conditionals

In everyday parlance we formulate reasons for action in many different ways, but it is here argued that they can all be rephrased as conditionals in which the antecedent is a description of the action that the reason is a reason for performing, and the consequent specifies a state of affairs that for the agent counts in favour of performing this action. The antecedent is taken to presuppose that the agent can in an ‘all-in’ sense, which includes having both ability and opportunity, perform the relevant action, and it states that performance of the action in conjunction with background assumptions ensures the truth of the consequent. Due to the fact that it is impossible for us to predict our decisions, it is also epistemically possible that the agent decides to perform this action.