Do the imaginings that fictions invite have a direction of fit?

2021 ◽  
pp. 131-152
Author(s):  
Manuel García-Carpintero
Keyword(s):  
Direction Of Fit

The chapter argues that a normative view of fictionality that I have defended elsewhere allows us to put in a perspicuous way an intriguing claim by Kathleen Stock regarding the imagination. The chapter puts it in terms of the direction of fit (DoF) asymmetry: imaginings prescribed by fictions have the thetic DoF of beliefs and assertions, as opposed to the telic DoF of desires and requests. Although the chapter argues that the imagination itself lacks DoF, it argues for Stock’s claim understood in these terms: imaginings prescribed by fictions have the direction of fit of judgements and assertions, not that of directives and intentions.

Acting on Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
General Schema ◽  
Action Intention ◽  
Knowledge Norms

This chapter develops and refines the analogy between knowledge and action in Knowledge and its Limits. The general schema is: knowledge is to belief as action is to intention. The analogy reverses direction of fit between mind and world. The knowledge/belief side corresponds to the inputs to practical reasoning, the action/intention side to its outputs. Since desires are inputs to practical reasoning, the desire-as-belief thesis is considered sympathetically. When all goes well with practical reasoning, one acts on what one knows. Belief plays the same local role as knowledge, and intention as action, in practical reasoning. This is the appropriate setting to understand knowledge norms for belief and practical reasoning. Marginalizing knowledge in epistemology is as perverse as marginalizing action in the philosophy of action. Opponents of knowledge-first epistemology are challenged to produce an equally systematic and plausible account of the relation between the cognitive and the practical.

Reasoning about Means

2019 ◽  
pp. 76-89
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Opposite Direction ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Double Effect ◽  
Practical Case ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
Standard Formula

An advantage of using conditionals as the standard formula for reasons for action is that the conditional form can also be used to bring out the structure of reasons for belief—thus making possible a close comparison between these kinds of reasons and reasoning. It then becomes apparent that the direction of derivation is the reverse in the practical case when we reason our way to desiring sufficient means to an end from desiring the end to the theoretical case when we derive beliefs from sufficient conditions for their truth. This reversal reflects the opposite direction of fit of beliefs and desires. The implications of this account of reasoning with desires for the moral doctrine of the double effect and for reasoning with respect to emotions are briefly considered.

Metaethical theories, hybrid

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ridge ◽  
Sebastian Köhler
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Dual Nature ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
The World ◽  
Important Sense ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Theoretical Issues

Hybrid theories in metaethics hold at least one of the following theses: Moral claims express both belief-like and desire-like mental states.Moral judgments are constituted by both belief-like and desire-like components. This definition is deliberately broad and inclusive, to cover all theories that share a theoretically important aspiration: to accommodate or at least explain away both the belief-like and desire-like features of moral thought and discourse without abandoning a broadly Humean philosophy of mind. A broadly Humean philosophy of mind subscribes to two claims. First, that belief-like and desire-like states can be sharply distinguished in terms of their respective directions of fit: beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit (that is, beliefs aim to accurately represent the world), while desire-like states have a world-to-mind direction of fit (desires aim to have the world aligned with them). Second, that beliefs and desires are distinct existences: for any propositions p and q, believing that p and desiring that q can come apart. There are powerful arguments for this kind of view but, at the same time, moral thought and discourse have both belief-like and desire-like features. Hybrid theories take this appearance seriously and include both belief-like and desire-like elements in their theory at a basic level. In this way, they aim to accommodate or explain away the dual nature of moral judgments without abandoning a Humean philosophy of mind. Traditionally, philosophers have supposed that moral judgments either a) are just Humean beliefs, and that moral claims express precisely those beliefs (cognitivism) or b) are just Humean desire-like states, and that moral claims express precisely those desire-like states (expressivism). Hybrid theorists are keen to emphasize that this supposition rests on a false dichotomy. Perhaps moral judgments are hybrid states, being partly constituted by beliefs and partly by desire-like states. Even if moral judgments themselves just are beliefs, moral claims might still in some important sense express desire-like states. Either of these ways of breaking free of the traditional debate might better accommodate or explain away the dual nature of moral thought and discourse within a Humean framework. The introduction of hybrid theories does not, however, dissolve the traditional debate completely. There are several theoretical issues on which hybrid theories could have more in common with traditional cognitivism than with traditional expressivism and vice versa. It is therefore useful to distinguish two types of hybrid theory: hybrid cognitivism and hybrid expressivism.

On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit

2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Frost
Keyword(s):  
Direction Of Fit

Might Desires Be Beliefs about Normative Reasons for Action?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Gregory
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Weakness Of Will ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Direction Of Fit

This paper examines the view that desires are beliefs about normative reasons for action. It describes the view, and briefly sketches three arguments for it. But the focus of the paper is defending the view from objections. The paper argues that the view is consistent with the distinction between the direction of fit of beliefs and desires, that it is consistent with the existence of appetites such as hunger, that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs about reasons are not sufficient for desire, such as weakness of will, and that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs about reasons are not necessary for desire, such as addiction. The paper also shows how it is superior to the view that desires are appearances of the good.

Towards a Formal Pragmatics of Discourse

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Vanderveken
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Speech Act Theory ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
The Real ◽  
Structure And Dynamics ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
Sentence Meaning

Could we enrich speech-act theory to deal with discourse? Wittgenstein and Searle pointed out difficulties. Most conversations lack a conversational purpose, they require collective intentionality, their background is indefinitely open, irrelevant and infelicitous utterances do not prevent conversations to continue, etc. Like Wittgenstein and Searle I am sceptic about the possibility of a general theory of all kinds of language-games. In my view, the single primary purpose of discourse pragmatics is to analyse the structure and dynamics of language-games whose type is provided with an internal conversational goal. Such games are indispensable to any kind of discourse. They have a descriptive, deliberative, declaratory or expressive conversational goal corresponding to a possible direction of fit between words and things. Logic can analyse felicity-conditions of such language-games because they are conducted according to systems of constitutive rules. Speakers often speak non-literally or non-seriously. The real units of conversation are therefore attempted illocutions whether literal, serious or not. I will show how to construct speaker-meaning from sentence-meaning, conversational background and conversational maxims. I agree with Montague that we need the resources of formalisms (proof, model- and game-theories) and of mathematical and philosophical logic in pragmatics. I will explain how to further develop propositional and illocutionary logics, the logic of attitudes and of action in order to characterize our ability to converse. I will also compare my approach to others (Austin, Belnap, Grice, Montague, Searle, Sperber and Wilson, Kamp, Wittgenstein) as regards hypotheses, methodology and other issues.

Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire

Analysis ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Sobel ◽  
D. Copp
Keyword(s):  
Direction Of Fit

Communicating Organizational Trust: An Exploration of the Link Between Discourse and Action

2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Slavica Kodish
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Metropolitan Area ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Organizational Trust ◽  
Southeastern United States ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Regional Center ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
The World ◽  
Different Parts

Communication has frequently received attention in studies on trust. One question that has remained unanswered is, How is organizational trust communicated? Consistent with the view of organizations as discursive entities, research presented here examines discursive qualities of trust and attempts to provide an understanding of the manner in which organizational trust is communicated. Research presented in this article includes the results of two studies conducted in two different parts of the country: a large metropolitan area in the southeastern United States and a regional center in the south. Findings reveal that against the background of a continuous discursive and interactional flow, trust is communicated as a speech act characterized by the world-to-words direction of fit. Findings have implications for both theory and practice.

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