Metaethical theories, hybrid

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ridge ◽  
Sebastian Köhler
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Dual Nature ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
The World ◽  
Important Sense ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Theoretical Issues

Hybrid theories in metaethics hold at least one of the following theses: Moral claims express both belief-like and desire-like mental states.Moral judgments are constituted by both belief-like and desire-like components. This definition is deliberately broad and inclusive, to cover all theories that share a theoretically important aspiration: to accommodate or at least explain away both the belief-like and desire-like features of moral thought and discourse without abandoning a broadly Humean philosophy of mind. A broadly Humean philosophy of mind subscribes to two claims. First, that belief-like and desire-like states can be sharply distinguished in terms of their respective directions of fit: beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit (that is, beliefs aim to accurately represent the world), while desire-like states have a world-to-mind direction of fit (desires aim to have the world aligned with them). Second, that beliefs and desires are distinct existences: for any propositions p and q, believing that p and desiring that q can come apart. There are powerful arguments for this kind of view but, at the same time, moral thought and discourse have both belief-like and desire-like features. Hybrid theories take this appearance seriously and include both belief-like and desire-like elements in their theory at a basic level. In this way, they aim to accommodate or explain away the dual nature of moral judgments without abandoning a Humean philosophy of mind. Traditionally, philosophers have supposed that moral judgments either a) are just Humean beliefs, and that moral claims express precisely those beliefs (cognitivism) or b) are just Humean desire-like states, and that moral claims express precisely those desire-like states (expressivism). Hybrid theorists are keen to emphasize that this supposition rests on a false dichotomy. Perhaps moral judgments are hybrid states, being partly constituted by beliefs and partly by desire-like states. Even if moral judgments themselves just are beliefs, moral claims might still in some important sense express desire-like states. Either of these ways of breaking free of the traditional debate might better accommodate or explain away the dual nature of moral thought and discourse within a Humean framework. The introduction of hybrid theories does not, however, dissolve the traditional debate completely. There are several theoretical issues on which hybrid theories could have more in common with traditional cognitivism than with traditional expressivism and vice versa. It is therefore useful to distinguish two types of hybrid theory: hybrid cognitivism and hybrid expressivism.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Lauria ◽  
Julien A. Deonna
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Reward System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Crucial Aspect ◽  
Guise Of The Good ◽  
Motivational States ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Positive Evaluation

Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these dogmas and invites readers to scrutinize them. The main dogma is that desires are motivational states. This approach contrasts with the other dominant conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there are at least four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-to-mind direction of fit), desires involve a positive evaluation (the “guise of the good”), we cannot desire what we think is actual (the “death of desire” principle), and, in neuroscience, the idea that the reward system is the key to understanding desire. The second part of the introduction summarizes the contributions to this volume. The hope is to contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on this neglected, albeit crucial, aspect of the mind.

Beyond Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Language Function ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
Transmission Of Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Natural Information ◽  
Natural Ontology

This book weaves together themes from natural ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and information, areas of inquiry that have not recently been treated together. The sprawling topic is Kant’s how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Novelties are the introduction of unitrackers and unicepts whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience, a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms, a naturalist sketch of uniceptual—roughly conceptual— development, a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information, a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs, new descriptions of indexicals and demonstratives and of intensional contexts and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.

The Necessity of Idealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Segal ◽  
Tyron Goldschmidt
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
The World

This chapter formulates a version of idealism and argues for it. Sections 2 and 3 explicate this version of idealism: the world is mental through-and-through. Section 2 spells this out precisely and contrasts it with rival views. Section 3 draws a consequence from this formulation of idealism: idealism is necessarily true if true at all. Sections 4 and 5 make the case for idealism. Section 4 is defensive: it draws from the conclusion of section 3 to reply to a central, perhaps the central, anti-idealist argument. Section 5 is on the offense: it develops a new argument for idealism based on the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind. The contemporary debate in philosophy of mind has been dominated by physicalism and dualism, with idealism almost totally neglected. This chapter rectifies this situation.

Does Poverty Wear a Woman's Face? Some Moral Dimensions of a Transnational Feminist Research Project

Hypatia ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison M. Jaggar
Keyword(s):  
Feminist Research ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Global Poverty ◽  
Research Project ◽  
Decent Life ◽  
Moral Argumentation ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Dimensions

This article explains some moral dimensions of a transnational feminist research project designed to provide a better standard or metric for measuring poverty across the world. The author is an investigator on this project. Poverty metrics incorporate moral judgments about what is necessary for a decent life, so justifying metrics requires moral argumentation. The article clarifies the moral aspects of poverty valuation, indicates some moral flaws in existing global poverty metrics, and outlines some conditions for a better global metric. It then explains the methodology used in our project, providing its moral rationale and discussing some remaining moral concerns.

Copernican Revolution in Physics and Cosmology: Vantage Point from beyond Earth

2018 ◽  
pp. 351-376
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
The World ◽  
Pulling Forces ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

Why do we so stubbornly cling to the assumption of mind? Despite the so far presented empirical, ontological, and conceptual-logical evidence against mind, the philosopher may nevertheless reject the world-brain problem as counter-intuitive. She/he will argue that we need to approach the question for the existence and reality of mental features in terms of the mind-body problem as it is more intuitive than the world-brain problem. Our strong adherence to mind is thus, at least in part, based on what philosophers describe as “intuition”, the “intuition of mind” as I say. How can we resist and escape the pulling forces of our “intuition of mind”? The main focus in this chapter and the whole final part is on the “intuition of mind” and how we can avoid and render it impossible. I will argue that we need to exclude the mind as possible epistemic option from our knowledge, i.e., the “logical space of knowledge”, as I say. The concept of “logical space of knowledge” concerns what we can access in our knowledge, i.e., our possible epistemic options that are included in the “logical space of knowledge”, as distinguished from what remains inaccessible to us, i.e., impossible epistemic options, as they are excluded from the “logical space of knowledge”. For instance, the “logical space of knowledge” presupposed in current philosophy of mind and specifically mind-body discussion includes mind as possible epistemic option while world-brain relation is excluded as impossible epistemic option. This, as I argue, provides the basis for our “intuition of mind” and the seemingly counterintuitive nature of world-brain relation. How can we modify and change the possible and impossible epistemic options in our “logical space of knowledge”? I argue that this is possible by shifting our vantage point or viewpoint - that is paradigmatically reflected in the Copernican revolution in cosmology and physics. Copernicus shifted the “vantage point from within earth” to a “vantage point beyond earth”; this enabled him to take into view that the earth (rather than the sun) moves by itself which provided the basis for his shift from a geo- to a helio-centric view of the universe. Hence, the shift in vantage point modified his epistemic options and thus expanded the presupposed “logical space of knowledge”. I conclude that we require an analogous shift in the vantage point we currently presuppose in philosophy of mind. This will expand our “logical space of knowledge” in such way that makes possible to include world-brain relation as possible epistemic option while, at the same time, excluding mind as impossible epistemic option. That, in turn, will render the world-brain problem more intuitive while the mind-body problem will then be rather counter-intuitive. Taken together, this amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy – that shall be the focus in next chapter.

Embodied Digital Rhetoric

2014 ◽  
pp. 312-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nonny de la Peña
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
High Resolution ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Digital Rhetoric ◽  
Immersive Virtual Reality ◽  
The World ◽  
Technological Tools ◽  
Pass Through

A new embodied digital rhetoric emerges when using nonfiction narratives built in fully immersive virtual reality systems that take advantage of the plasticity of our sensations of presence. The feeling of “being-in-the-world” as described by phenomenologists, including philosophy of mind, film, and virtual reality theorists, is part of the adaptability that humans show in their relationship to technological tools. Andy Clark's “soft selves” and our “plastic presence” merge as the high resolution graphics of the latest virtual reality goggles and robust audio captured at real events tricks our minds into having an embodied connection with the stories portrayed in these new spaces. By putting people into news or documentary pieces on scene as themselves, opportunities for persuasive and effective rhetoric arise. This chapter cites theory, psychology and virtual reality research as well as the author's specific case studies to detail the potential for this new embodied digital rhetoric that allows us to pass through the screen and become present as witnesses to a nonfiction story.

Cyborgs and Cyberpunks

2014 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Loveless
Keyword(s):  
Digital Technologies ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Learning Tools ◽  
Educational Processes ◽  
Corporate Globalization ◽  
The World ◽  
Theoretical Issues

This conceptual chapter introduces theoretical issues to consider when reflecting on digital technologies in educational processes. Rather than beginning this book with a practical discussion of how to employ digital technologies as teaching or learning tools, the ideas presented here, and in this section of the book, provide a beginning to philosophically probing the implications of integrating such technologies into schooling. This type of reflection, initiated in this chapter and developed further in others, should continue throughout the book to inform perspectives shaped when reading about more practical matters. Ideally, theory and practice concerning digital technologies form a cyclical relationship. The dialogue presented here on empowerment, identity, and social/corporate globalization will hopefully lead to a Freirian notion of praxis involving reflection and action that transforms the world.

Searle, John (1932–)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Rust
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
Basic Facts ◽  
In Virtue Of

John Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932) is the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. This analytic philosopher has made major contributions to the fields of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and social ontology. He is best known for his Chinese room argument, which aims to demonstrate that the formally described systems of computer functionalism cannot give rise to intentional understanding. Searle’s early work focused on the philosophy of language, where, in Speech Acts (1969), he explores the hypothesis that speaking a language is a rule-governed form of behavior. Just as one must follow certain rules in order to be considered to be playing chess, rules determine whether a speaker is making a promise, giving a command, asking a question, making a statement, and so forth. The kind of speech act that an utterance is depends on, among other conditions, its propositional content and illocutionary force. The content depicts the world as being a certain way, and the force specifies what a speaker is trying to do with that content. For example, for an utterance to qualify as a promise a speaker must describe a future act (content) and intend that the utterance place him or herself under an obligation to do that act (force). In Intentionality (1983), Searle argues that the structure of language not only mirrors but is derivative of the structure of intentional thought, so that core elements of his analysis of speech acts can be used as the basis for a theory of intentionality. Just as we can only promise by bringing certain propositional contents under a certain illocutionary force, intentional states such as belief, desire, fear, and joy can only be about the world in virtue of a representative content and a psychological mode. A theory of intentionality does not explain how intentionality is possible, given the basic facts of the world as identified by the natural sciences. Much of Searle’s work in the philosophy of mind, as found in Minds, Brains, and Science (1984) and The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), is dedicated to the question of how mental facts, including but not limited to intentional facts, can be reconciled with basic, natural facts. Searle’s Chinese room argument is formulated in the service of rejecting computer functionalism, a prominent attempt at such reconciliation. Searle’s positive view, which he describes as "biological naturalism," is that mental facts are both caused by and features of underlying neurophysiological processes. In Speech Acts (1969), Searle claims that using language is akin to playing chess, in that both activities are made possible by participants following what he describes as "constitutive rules," rules that must be followed in order for someone to be considered to be undertaking those activities. Other institutional facts, such as money or the U.S. presidency, are also created and maintained in virtue of our following certain constitutive rules. For example, someone can only count as a U.S. president if that person is, among other conditions, a U.S. citizen who receives a majority of electoral votes. This thought is extended and explored in Searle’s two book-length contributions to the field of social ontology, The Construction of Social Reality (1995) and Making the Social World (2010). In addition to the philosophy of language and social ontology, Searle has made book-length contributions to the philosophy of action (Rationality in Action (2001)) and the philosophy of perception (Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception (2015)). He also famously engaged Jacques Derrida’s critique of J. L. Austin’s discussion of illocutionary acts ("Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida" (1977)). Searle has summarized his various positions in Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (1998) and Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004).

Vital Force

2021 ◽  
pp. 77-89
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Interracial Marriage ◽  
Vital Force ◽  
Right Action ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Claims

Chapter 5 addresses the moral theory suggested by the African tradition according to which one is obligated to promote (or honour) liveliness in oneself and others. This sort of principle has been advanced by philosophers such as Noah Dzobo, Bénézet Bujo, and Laurenti Magesa. Vitalism is a globally under-explored approach to right action that deserves much more consideration. However, the chapter concludes that it cannot account for some comparatively uncontroversial moral claims salient in the African tradition. Sometimes settling for majoritarian rule and avoiding reconciliation in respect of criminal justice would best promote (or honour) liveliness, and yet most African philosophers would judge these actions to be wrong to some degree. The chapter also argues that vitalism cannot account for certain intuitions with a global scope; forbidding interracial marriage and deceiving people might best promote (or honour) liveliness, but ethicists around the world would judge these actions to be pro tanto immoral.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document