Failures of Partisan Deliberation

2019 ◽  
pp. 125-146
Author(s):  
Fabio Wolkenstein
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Harmful Effects

Although the picture of intra-party deliberation that emerges in Chapters 4 and 5 is generally very positive, it is important to note that some of the party groups that were studied for this book proved to be less deliberative than others. Those groups provided good preconditions for deliberation, yet their actual deliberations displayed numerous shortcomings. This chapter examines these shortcomings, looking closely at three types of ‘deliberative failure’—(a) group splits and defection; (b) cases where deliberation does not arise, or only seldom arises; and (c) polarizing tendencies. The chapter also sketches a number of institutional devices for making deliberative failures tractable and concludes that even though deliberative failures will be difficult to avoid in an internally deliberative party, their most harmful effects can be limited through institutional design; so, the fact that deliberation sometimes fails does not speak against a deliberative model of intra-party democracy as a whole. This is important as the proposal of a more deliberative and thus democratic party the book advances is meant to be feasible and functional even under difficult conditions.

Conflict of Interest and Decision Making

2021 ◽  
pp. 265-282
Author(s):  
Geneviève Helleringer
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Professional Norms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Harmful Effects

This chapter looks at conflicts of interest (COI). It first considers tools of analytic philosophy to highlight the notion of COI, and in particular, the connection between COIs, choice and judgment, emphasising why decision making is a central element in the characterisation of COIs. Drawing on these elements, it is clear that any question of regulation and institutional design requires a sophisticated understanding of the capacity of individuals to recognise and resist bias in themselves and others when making judgments and decisions. The chapter then studies two specific mechanisms—bounded rationality and cognitive biases—that affect the behaviour of people in COI situations. It starts by analysing how rationalisation can reframe questionable behaviour as appearing acceptable, and how a sense of invulnerability encourages people to downplay the impact of COIs. The chapter then looks at techniques (policies, procedures, incentives, etc.) used to address COI situations in the light of insights from psychological studies. It concludes that both fiduciary duties and procedural requirements reflect an erroneous understanding of psychology and have led institutions and policies to deal ineffectively—if not indeed counterproductively—with the problems caused by COIs. Finally, the chapter assesses how alternative mechanisms may overcome the highlighted deficiencies. It specifically focuses on the key role that professional norms can play in dealing with unavoidable COIs while preserving trust between the affected parties, and the potential for self-regulation to provide worthwhile tools in combatting the harmful effects of COIs.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
pp. 258-272
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Dynastic Politics

This chapter concludes the book by drawing together the key empirical findings and reflecting on the lessons that Japan’s experience with dynastic politics might hold for other democracies, such as India and the Philippines, where dynasties have been viewed as a growing problem in recent years, and Ireland, where politics is still in many ways a family affair. The key challenge is how to transform party organizations from decentralized cadres of local notables into coherent vehicles for programmatic policies. The experience of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, viewed through the lens of dynastic politics, sheds important light on the possibilities and challenges involved in institutional design and reform.

From meditation to action – a research agenda for studying informal global rule-making: remarks on ‘Cosmopolitanism, publicity, and the emergence of a “global administrative law”’

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Oliver Westerwinter
Keyword(s):  
Global Governance ◽  
Comparative Research ◽  
Research Agenda ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
Global Law ◽  
Rule Making ◽  
Law Making

Abstract Friedrich Kratochwil engages critically with the emergence of a global administrative law and its consequences for the democratic legitimacy of global governance. While he makes important contributions to our understanding of global governance, he does not sufficiently discuss the differences in the institutional design of new forms of global law-making and their consequences for the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance. I elaborate on these limitations and outline a comparative research agenda on the emergence, design, and effectiveness of the diverse arrangements that constitute the complex institutional architecture of contemporary global governance.

Low-level lead exposure: Are there harmful effects?

1983 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-79
Author(s):  
Claire B. Ernhart
Keyword(s):  
Lead Exposure ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Harmful Effects

From Market Studies to Society Analysis

2005 ◽  
pp. 63-81
Author(s):  
Ya. Kouzminov ◽  
K. Bendoukidze ◽  
M. Yudkevich
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
The Real ◽  
Economic Agents

The article examines the main concepts of modern institutional theory and the ways its tools and concepts could be applied in the real policy-making. In particular, the authors focus on behavioral assumptions of the theory that allow them to explain the imperfection of economic agents’ behavior as a reason for rules and institutions to emerge. Problems of institutional design are also discussed.

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