Reply to Boghossian on the A Priori and the Analytic1

2020 ◽  
pp. 86-92
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Metaphysical Modality ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
And Mathematics

This chapter replies to Boghossian’s defence of the a priori–a posteriori distinction against the arguments for its shallowness in?The Philosophy of Philosophy. In particular, it shows how to understand the example of an unorthodox thinker who is linguistically competent with conjunction but refuses to treat the rule of conjunction elimination as logically valid. It also rebuts Boghossian’s charge of circularity against the account of knowledge of metaphysical modality in terms of the cognitive capacities required to assess ordinary counterfactual conditionals. For the explanation of knowledge of logic and mathematics, the key significance is emphasized of the distinction between knowing the truth of what is in fact a necessary truth and knowing that it is necessary.

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

A posteriori

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul K. Moser
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Sensory Experience ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Common ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Common Understanding ◽  
Priori Knowledge

A prominent term in theory of knowledge since the seventeenth century, ‘a posteriori’ signifies a kind of knowledge or justification that depends on evidence, or warrant, from sensory experience. A posteriori truth is truth that cannot be known or justified independently of evidence from sensory experience, and a posteriori concepts are concepts that cannot be understood independently of reference to sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge contrasts with a priori knowledge, knowledge that does not require evidence from sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge is empirical, experience-based knowledge, whereas a priori knowledge is non-empirical knowledge. Standard examples of a posteriori truths are the truths of ordinary perceptual experience and the natural sciences; standard examples of a priori truths are the truths of logic and mathematics. The common understanding of the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge as the distinction between empirical and non-empirical knowledge comes from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787).

Necessary truth and convention

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Sidelle
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Word Meaning ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Priori Knowledge

Necessary truths have always seemed problematic, particularly to empiricists and other naturalistically-minded philosophers. Our knowledge here is a priori - grounded in appeals to what we can imagine or conceive (or can prove on that basis) - which seems hard to reconcile with such truths being factual, short of appealing to some peculiar faculty of a priori intuition. And what mysterious extra feature do necessary truths possess which makes their falsity impossible? Conventionalism about necessity claims that necessary truths obtain by virtue of rules of language, such as that ‘vixen’ means the same as ‘female fox’. Because such rules govern our descriptions of all cases - including counterfactual or imagined ones - they generate necessary truths (‘All vixens are foxes’), and our a priori knowledge is just knowledge of word meaning. Opponents of conventionalism argue that conventions cannot ground necessary truths, particularly in logic, and have also challenged the notion of analyticity (truth by virtue of meaning). More recent claims that some necessary truths are a posteriori have also fuelled opposition to conventionalism.

Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism

Philosophy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen K. McLeod
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Logical Positivist ◽  
Contingent Truth ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary Truth

AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive.

Are the Notions ‘A Priori Truth’ and ‘Necessary Truth’ Extensionally Equivalent?

1974 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Erwin
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
The World ◽  
Important Sense ◽  
The Subject ◽  
And Mathematics

There is a widely held view that the expressions ‘necessary truth’, ‘a priori truth’ and ‘analytic truth’ either express the same concept or, at least, refer to all and only the same items. Philosophers who hold this view, and who are sometimes described as ‘empiricists’, often draw the conclusion that the truths of logic and mathematics, if necessary, are also a priori and are, in some important sense, empty or not about the world. The subject matter of these disciplines, then, is said to differ in a philosophically important way from that of the empirical sciences, such as physics or chemistry. Rationalists, in contrast, have traditionally held that some a priori truths, either of logic or mathematics (or of some other area), are synthetic and, hence, non-analytic: i.e., there are synthetic a priori truths.

A posteriori

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul K. Moser
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Sensory Experience ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
The Common ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Common Understanding ◽  
Priori Knowledge

A prominent term in theory of knowledge since the seventeenth century, ‘a posteriori’ signifies a kind of knowledge or justification that depends on evidence, or justification, from sensory experience. A posteriori truth is truth that cannot be known or justified independently of evidence from sensory experience, and a posteriori concepts are concepts that cannot be understood independently of reference to sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge contrasts with a priori knowledge, knowledge that does not require evidence from sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge is empirical, experience-based knowledge, whereas a priori knowledge is nonempirical knowledge. Standard examples of a posteriori truths are the truths of ordinary perceptual experience and the natural sciences; standard examples of a priori truths are the truths of logic and mathematics. The common understanding of the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge as the distinction between empirical and nonempirical knowledge comes from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason1781/1787.

scholarly journals In defence of logical nominalism: reply to Leftow

2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-330
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Human Language ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Transcendent Reality ◽  
Recent Attack

AbstractThis paper defends (especially in response to Brian Leftow's recent attack) logical nominalism, the thesis that logically necessary truth belongs primarily to sentences and depends solely on the conventions of human language. A sentence is logically necessary (that is, a priori metaphysically necessary) iff its negation entails a contradiction. A sentence is a posteriori metaphysically necessary iff it reduces to a logical necessity when we substitute for rigid designators of objects or properties canonical descriptions of the essential properties of those objects or properties. The truth-conditions of necessary sentences are not to be found in any transcendent reality, such as God's thoughts. ‘There is a God’ is neither a priori nor a posteriori metaphysically necessary; God is necessary in the sense that His existence is not causally contingent on anything else.

A priori/a posteriori

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heinrich Schepers ◽  
Giorgio Tonelli ◽  
Rudolf Eisler
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori
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