KOMPARASI PRINSIP VERIFIKASI POSITIVISME LOGIS DAN PENERAPAN HUKUM QIYAS

The view of the logical positivism group regarding science is based on the development of exact sciences, scientific truth can be measured positively, namely the truth must be real, concrete, logical, accurate and useful, but the effect behind everything abstract and metaphysical in the dimensions of life is ignored and regardless of observation. The main idea of logical positivism that was promoted by Alfred Jules Ayer, one of which is the principle of verification. In the application of the verification principle, it can also be taken for study studies in the determination of Qiyas law, namely by analogizing a law that has not yet been stipulated in the text, by testing and observing by verifying the causes of its similarity with the established law, determining the similarity of causes with logical parameters. and also empirical. The analogy in Qiyas must go through a verification stage, namely because it must be a real and visible nature by the five senses, and logic, as well as through the empirical proof stage. According to logical positivism and qiyas, the main condition is that it must be something that is visible, and get rid of pseudo-problems. Keywords: Logical positivism, Verification, Qiyas.

The Place of Skepticism in the 21st Century Gnoseological Debate: Selecting Logical Positivism and Postmodernism

This study is centered on The Place of Skepticism in the 21st Century Gnoseological Debate: Selecting Logical Positivism and Postmodernism. Within the context of Western philosophy, skepticism, which arguably began in the ancient times with the likes of Gorgias neither ends with the Contra Academicos of St. Augustine nor with Kant’s noumena as some scholars argued. Skepticism is an indispensable part of epistemic discourse that cuts across diverse ages of philosophical discipline ranging from the ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary; and also permeates all the branches of philosophy. The philosophical postulates of the logical positivists who unequivocally argued that any proposition that cannot be subjected to their verification principle is meaningless, was occasioned by skepticism. The postmodernist philosophers’ argument against objective knowledge, grand totalizing, and their downplaying of foundationalism, was orchestrated by skepticism. It is the position of this study that skepticism is not only a continuum, but most importantly, the episteme-vitae (the life-wire of epistemology). As a necessary evil in the philosophical discipline skepticism is an inevitable driving force in the 21st century gnoseological debate, and instrumentum laboris (instrument of labour) in the hands of philosophers. The research methods employed in this work include: analytic, contextual, historical, and textual.

Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science

The pursuit of a definitive explanation of how scientists produce knowledge and what kinds of knowledge they produce became more urgent in the early twentieth century as science became increasingly important to society in the form of society-transforming technologies. As the century proceeded, philosophy of science emerged as a subdiscipline within philosophy, coordinate with the elusiveness of the goal of explaining science. By mid-century, philosophers, many trained in the physical sciences, had displaced scientists as the dominant figures in this effort. Henri Poincaré proposed a Mach-like relationalist theory of science, Bertrand Russell defended a logical atomism theory indebted to Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Percy Bridgman defended a theory he called operationalism. Concurrently, William James and John Dewey developed the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce into an action- and belief-based explanation of science. But the dominant philosophy of science from the 1920s through the 1950s was logical positivism/empiricism.

Prospective primary teachers’ views on the nature of science

This article presents the results of a piece of research that analyzed the views on the nature of science (NOS) among student teachers enrolled in programs of Primary Education at two public universities in Spain. Previous studies have reported that science teachers maintain ‘eclectic’ epistemological perspectives on science; in this article, we test if such a hypothesis holds when teachers’ NOS ideas are ‘anchored’ in specific periods and topics of the philosophy of science. We studied 114 prospective teachers attending an undergraduate teaching course with emphasis on the natural sciences at the Universities of Burgos and Valladolid in the period of 2017-18. A Likert-scale questionnaire with 50 items was applied to determine trends in those teachers’ epistemological views on science. The results showed that teachers’ views are mostly correlated with the philosophical period of Logical Positivism/Received View, and to some extent to the period of Recent and Contemporary Accounts. Regarding the classical epistemological topics of correspondence, methodologies, intervention, evolution and representation, teachers’ views could be related to the period of Logical Positivism/Received View and Critical Rationalism, but also to the New Philosophy of Science. The main conclusion of this study is that teachers’ expressed views on NOS are epistemologically eclectic to a much smaller degree when examined with more detail concerning specific periods and topics of the philosophy of science.

Revisiting An Islamic Approach to Humanities: A Critical Review

Purpose: The study aims to develop a relevant counter-argument and supporting justification on ideas offered by Zaman (2014) in his paper titled "An Islamic Approach to Humanities." Design/Method/Approach: This study adopts a quantitative approach in form of a literature survey, discourse and critical content analysis. For achieving the goal, we capitalize on Ghazi (2006) to support the argument that the source of knowledge is not only through observations. Kalin (2016) and Zarkasyi (2018) are being used to show that Islam encourages reasoning and observations. To support the argument that Islamic economics can be positivistic, we use Abdullahi (2018) as a related paper to deal with that issue. Findings: The study found that Islamic Economics can use the tools of logical positivists in its observation as long as such tools do not contradict the logical structure of the Islamic worldview. Social science like Islamic economics is only an avenue to see the expression of free will that Allah gives to the human being by observing the pattern of human behavior. When the results can describe closer to reality, it can survive and support the development of social science itself. Originality/Values: The main contribution of this study is to clarify the position of Islamic economics on the logical positivism method and its implication in value integration.

Reichenbach: scientific realist and logical empricist?

Hans Reichenbach’s position in the debate over scientific realism is remarkable. On the one hand, he endorsed the programmatic premises of logical empiricism; on the other, he explicitly employed a realist approach to conceptions such as reference, causality, and inference to the best explanation. How could that work out? It will be shown in the present paper that in Reichenbach’s view scientific realism is not, as frequently assumed, opposed to logical empiricism but rather to logical positivism. A distinction without a difference? Not at all, at least for Reichenbach. As is well known, his particular—probabilistic—variant of logical empiricism was intended to circumvent what he considered the shortcomings of the Vienna Circle’s verificationist (reductionist) approach to the language of science. In Experience and Prediction (1938), Reichenbach became most explicit in this regard. However, I shall argue that his position remained notoriously unstable in the end. It oscillated between a full-fledged scientific realist reading and an eminently pragmatist reading. Nevertheless, Reichenbach’s contribution proved instrumental in preparing subsequent efforts at reconciling logical empiricism and scientific realism.