The Authoritarian Governor’s Dilemma
Even authoritarian leaders cannot rule alone. This chapter explores the politics of indirect authoritarian governance through coercive institutions in socialist Poland and East Germany. It explains why the Polish Bezpieka’s staff and secret informant network shrank after 1956 despite significant mass opposition to the regime, while the East German Stasi grew to become a much larger agency. Authoritarian governors face a problematic tradeoff between the competence of the secret police and their ability to control it. When goal divergence with the police leads a regime to exert more control, agency competence suffers and the regime must turn to violent ex post repression, rather than ex ante deterrence and subversion of threats. In Poland, replacement of the Stalinist party leader in 1956 created significant goal divergence between the upper ranks of the secret police and the new elites the police had previously victimized. Elites shrank the coercive agency to exert control over it, despite significant mass opposition to the regime. In East Germany, in contrast, continuity of Stalinist leadership led to less goal divergence between elites and the secret police, enabling its continued growth.