Competence and Justification

2021 ◽  
pp. 188-202
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Virtue Epistemologist

Chapter 10 explains how the expanded view makes room for a sort of “epistemic justification” constitutive of knowledge. Critics have argued repeatedly that no externalist epistemology can account for epistemic justification. Their main argument repurposes the celebrated Cartesian evil demon thought experiment. The conclusion is now that the beliefs of the demon’s victim can be about as well justified as are many of our perceptual and other beliefs, although it is hard to see how any externalist epistemology could account for this fact. This chapter seeks a way out for the externalist virtue epistemologist.

Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mylan Engel
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Truth Condition ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Externalist Theory ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Justification Condition ◽  
Internal States ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The internalism/externalism distinction in epistemology applies to both theories of justification and theories of knowledge. The distinction is most clearly defined for theories of justification. An internalist theory of epistemic justification is any theory that maintains that epistemic justifiedness is exclusively a function of states internal to the cognizer. Externalism is the denial of internalism. Thus, an externalist theory is any theory that maintains that epistemic justifiedness is at least partly a function of states or factors external to the cognizer, i.e., states or factors outside the cognizer’s ken. There is no unified agreement among internalists as to which internal states are epistemically relevant, and different internalisms emerge based on the subset of internal states deemed relevant. (See Internalism and Justification for details.) Internalists typically maintain that justification is a normative notion in the belief-guiding/regulative sense. Internalists also typically maintain that one can tell whether one is justified in believing p simply by reflecting on one’s internal evidence for p. The central internalist intuition, as highlighted by the New Evil Demon Problem is this: There can be no difference in justification without a difference in epistemically relevant internal states. Externalism is motivated by the intuition that epistemic justification must be conceptually connected to truth such that the conditions that make a belief justified also make it objectively probable. Externalists are also typically motivated by the view that children and animals can form justified beliefs, while failing to satisfy the internalist’s intellectualist requirements for justification. The dominant externalist theory of justification is process reliabilism, a simplified version of which holds that a belief is justified iff it’s produced by a reliable process. There is less canonical agreement when it comes to applying the internalist/externalist distinction to theories of knowledge. In one sense, every plausible epistemology is an externalist theory because every plausible epistemology requires an externalist truth condition and an externalist Gettier-blocking fillip. However, in another widely used sense, “externalist” theories of knowledge are theories that replace the internalist justification condition with either an externalist justification condition or some other externalist constraint (such as a causal or modal constraint); while “internalist” theories of knowledge hold that internalist justification is necessary for knowledge and also typically hold that no other kind of justification is needed for knowledge, though they do incorporate some sort of externalist constraint to handle the Gettier problem.

scholarly journals Knowledge and Justification

Epistemology ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 207-222
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
Main Components ◽  
Epistemic Competence ◽  
Virtue Epistemologist

This chapter offers a way out for the externalist virtue epistemologist, with implications for the perennial problematic of radical skepticism. Consisting of three parts, the chapter outlines some main components of the epistemology laid out in the earlier chapters while providing further historical context. The first part briefly reprises the account of knowledge as action using the notion of epistemic competence, then connects this with central ideas of Aristotle's ethics and Descartes' epistemology. This analysis then illuminates epistemic justification in part two and radical skepticism in part three. The chapter shows that only with understanding of how knowledge is constituted can scholars properly seek the place of epistemic justification in that constitution.

Accessibilism

2019 ◽  
pp. 223-253
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem

Chapter 7 answers the explanatory challenge by combining phenomenal mentalism with accessibilism to yield phenomenal accessibilism. Section 7.1 defines accessibilism as the thesis that epistemic justification is luminous in the sense that you’re always in a position to know which propositions you have epistemic justification to believe. Section 7.2 argues that phenomenal mentalism is part of the best explanation of accessibilism: if accessibilism can be motivated on independent grounds, then phenomenal mentalism is supported by inference to the best explanation. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 use accessibilism to motivate the intuitions about cases that support phenomenal mentalism—namely, clairvoyance, super-blindsight, and the new evil demon problem. Finally, section 7.5 answers the explanatory challenge for phenomenal mentalism: epistemic justification is determined by your current phenomenally individuated mental states because they are luminous by introspection.

scholarly journals The Cartesian evil demon and the impossibility of the monstrous lie

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Alfonso González
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
The Third ◽  
Idea Of God

In this paper, I address the issue of whether the evil demon could have caused the idea of God. In order to determine the capabilities of the evil demon, I perform a thought experiment in which I reaffirm the conclusion that an imperfect being could have never caused an idea of perfection and infinitude, i.e., the idea of God. The article is divided into five sections and a conclusion. While the first section is introductory, the second looks at the problem of God and knowledge certainty. Elucidating how reality is gradual according to Descartes, in the third section I address the distinction between objective, formal and eminent reality. In turn, in the fourth section, I argue that if the objective reality of God exists, that is, an idea of perfection, the imperfect evil demon could have never caused it. The last section examines the reverse argument of the fourth section, viz, whether God could have caused the existence of evil and imperfection. Keywords: God, evil demon, imperfection.

Mentalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-220
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Problem Section ◽  
Epistemic Role ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem

Chapter 6 develops a theory of epistemic justification designed to capture the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness: namely, phenomenal mentalism. Section 6.1 defines epistemic justification within the framework of evidentialism. Section 6.2 defines mentalism about epistemic justification and explores its connection with evidentialism. Section 6.3 argues for phenomenal mentalism, the thesis that epistemic justification is determined solely by your phenomenally individuated mental states, by appealing to intuitions about clairvoyance, super-blindsight, and the new evil demon problem. Section 6.4 argues for a phenomenal conception of evidence, which says that your evidence is exhausted by facts about your current phenomenally individuated mental states, and defends it against Timothy Williamson’s arguments for the E = K thesis. Finally, section 6.5 outlines an explanatory challenge for phenomenal mentalism, which sets the agenda for the second part of the book.

THREE FORMS OF INTERNALISM AND THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM

Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Moon
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem

AbstractThe new evil demon problem is often considered to be a serious obstacle for externalist theories of epistemic justification. In this paper, I aim to show that the new evil demon problem (‘NEDP’) also afflicts the two most prominent forms of internalism: moderate internalism and historical internalism. Since virtually all internalists accept at least one of these two forms, it follows that virtually all internalists face the NEDP. My secondary thesis is that many epistemologists – including both internalists and externalists – face a dilemma. The only form of internalism that is immune to the NEDP, strong internalism, is a very radical and revisionary view – a large number of epistemologists would have to significantly revise their views about justification in order to accept it. Hence, either epistemologists must accept a theory that is susceptible to the NEDP or accept a very radical and revisionary view.

Epistemological Status of Models and Thought Experiments in Economics

2015 ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Koshovets ◽  
T. Varkhotov
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Theoretical Modeling ◽  
Epistemological Status ◽  
Epistemological Analysis ◽  
Field Of Inquiry

The paper considers the analogy of theoretical modeling and thought experiment in economics. The authors provide historical and epistemological analysis of thought experiments and their relations to the material experiments in natural science. They conclude that thought experiments as instruments are used both in physics and in economics, but in radically different ways. In the natural science, a thought experiment is tightly connected to the material experimentation, while in economics it is used in isolation. Material experiments serve as a means to demonstrate the reality, while thought experiments cannot be a full-fledged instrument of studying the reality. Rather, they constitute the instrument of structuring the field of inquiry.

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