Group (epistemic) competence

In this paper, I present an account of group competence that is explicitly framed for cases of epistemic performances. According to it, we must consider group epistemic competence as the group agents’ capacity to produce knowledge, and not the result of the summation of its individual members’ competences to produce knowledge. Additionally, I contend that group competence must be understood in terms of group normative status. To introduce my view, I present Jesper Kallestrup’s (Synthese 1–19, 2016) denial that group competence involves anything over and beyond the aggregation of individual competences. I have divided my response into two parts. First, I compare two conceptions of competence from Ernest Sosa’s reliabilist virtue epistemology (Sosa in Philos Stud 142:5–15, 2009; Philos Perspect 24:465–475, 2010a; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, 2010b; Judgment & agency, Oxford University Press, 2015; Epistemology, Princeton University Press, 2017; in: Silva-Filho, Tateo (eds), Thinking about oneself: The place and value of reflection in philosophy and psychology, Springer, 2019) and David Löwenstein’s (Know-how as competence. A Rylean responsibilist account, Vittorio Klostermann, 2017) account of know-how. Second, I take the results from this comparison and apply them to the issue of group know-how, by the hand of Orestis Palermos and Deborah Tollefsen’s twofold approach to the topic (Palermos and Tollefsen, in: Carter, Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, Pritchard (eds) Socially extended epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2018). Finally, I return to Kallestrup’s denial to make my point in favour of the conception of genuine group competence as the group normative status to achieve success.

Mark Harris as a Naturalistic Theist: The Perspective of the Model of Levels of Analysis

Presently, naturalistic theism is the dominant position in the debate on the relation between science and religion, defending a thesis that the conflict between science and religion is only an apparent one. Also, this version of theism accepts the naturalist assumptions behind contemporary science and attempts to reformulate the beliefs held within the traditional Christian theism in order to present the religious view of reality as not conflicting with the scientific picture of the world. Certain assumptions behind Mark Harris’s views on the relations between science and religion can be described as consistent with naturalistic theism. The model of levels of analysis helps to analyze the most important themes found within naturalistic theism and show how these are described in the works of Harris. The model facilitates the identification of the relations between particular kinds of assumptions behind the position taken from the point of view of naturalistic theism in the debate on the relation between science and religion. The list of most frequently recurring assumptions — that are also important in Harris’s writings — include: the general division of epistemic competence, which assumes theology (religion) to be competent in dealing with the metaphysical issues (Levels 1 and 2) and science to be the only one competent to deliver the empirical statements describing processes and entities found within the empirical sphere (Levels 4 and 5); the acceptance of the naturalistic assumptions behind contemporary science (Level 2) and skepticism toward the religious notions found in the traditional Christian theism describing supernatural interventions and toward the dualist interpretation of human soul (Level 3). This leads to the acceptance of purely scientific, naturalistic, explanations of the events found within the empirical sphere and to skepticism toward the literal meaning of descriptions of empirical events (Level 5) that are not consistent with the anti-interventionist assumptions behind science. Harris’s acceptance of naturalistic theism in terms of the relation between science and religion and his use of the techniques found in the modern biblical scholarship have led him to the ideas of plurality of meanings and the lack of one definite truth with respect to the specific issues he deals with. From the point of view of MLA it is the rejection of super-naturalistic assumptions of the traditional Christian theism and the acceptance of the naturalistic assumptions of science that seems to be the cause of lack of definite truth in his theological explanations.

What Does It Take to Vote with Care?

This chapter offers an account of what it means to vote with care. It argues that there are two requisites for rendering a vote judicious: an epistemic one and a moral one. The former entails that citizens should evince a minimal degree of rationality and that they should possess enough information before casting their ballot. The latter entails that citizens should follow a test of fair-mindedness when deciding how to vote. This means that they should ponder on how their individual views will affect others, and whether other citizens may have legitimate justice reasons to reject those views. The chapter addresses political science and voter behavior research that suggests that minimal epistemic competence is not impossible for the average citizen despite the fact that voter ignorance is an actual problem.

Knowledge and Justification

This chapter offers a way out for the externalist virtue epistemologist, with implications for the perennial problematic of radical skepticism. Consisting of three parts, the chapter outlines some main components of the epistemology laid out in the earlier chapters while providing further historical context. The first part briefly reprises the account of knowledge as action using the notion of epistemic competence, then connects this with central ideas of Aristotle's ethics and Descartes' epistemology. This analysis then illuminates epistemic justification in part two and radical skepticism in part three. The chapter shows that only with understanding of how knowledge is constituted can scholars properly seek the place of epistemic justification in that constitution.

Der kompetente Sünder. Zur auktorialen Selbstdarstellung Francesco Petrarcas in De otio religioso

Francis Petrarch has developed many diverse strategies to present himself as an author. When constructing his own figura auctoris, he refers to a highly stylized version of his autobiographical ego to which he ascribes a particular epistemic competence. Indeed, such competence serves as the basis of both authority and authorship. In his De otio religioso, Petrarch addresses the community of the Carthusian monks of the Abbey of Montrieux in Southern France. Paradoxically, he introduces himself to them as being competent with regard to questions of monastic life, although in this respect his addressees should be much more competent than Petrarch can be. At the same time the author depicts himself as a great sinner. As such, he cannot dispose of considerable knowledge in religious matters. Instead, he points out his extraordinary cultural expertise as a philologist, humanist and owner of books, a knowledge that makes him, the sinner, become an author able to instruct the monks. Petrarch negotiates the claims to validity asserted by two different cultures (Christian vs. pagan, late antique/medieval vs. antique/early-modern) and seeks to position himself as an author with authority in both fields.

Questions can answer questions about mechanisms of selective word learning

This paper examined the interaction between two possible underlying mechanisms of children’s selective word learning–associative generalizations and inferences about epistemic competence. Three-4-year-olds (N=128) learned words from informants who asked questions, mentioning either the correct or incorrect object labels. Such questions show similar levels of informants’ epistemic competence, however, inaccurate labels may generate error signals that can generalize to future information from the same person. Preschoolers retained novel labels from both informants but were slower to respond in the incorrect labeler condition. When tested in a disabmiguation procedure, children performed above chance in both conditions, and their response times did not differ. These results suggest that preschoolers’ selective word learing is influenced by these two mechanisms in a complementary way.