The Beautiful in Aristotle’s Ethics

This article argues for an aesthetic reading of to kalon, primarily as it appears in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle uses to kalon to indicate that, to the morally serious, virtue is attractive and productive of a kind of pleasure. Read aesthetically, to kalon mitigates the tension between one’s own good and the common good. Aristotle shows how his students’ understanding of to kalon can be refined and thus preserved as an important and salutary feature of moral and political life.

Action Theory in the Respective Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Chung-ying Cheng

This article advances a dialogue between the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the ontological hermeneutics of Chung-ying Cheng. This discussion draws into relief a question of whether or not these respective theories provide us with decision-making procedures for determining appropriate or right action in any given situation. In other words, we are inquiring into whether or not these respective hermeneutical theories incorporate forms of ethics. Following this line of questioning, we turn to Cheng’s philosophy of the Yijing and Gadamer’s analysis of Aristotle’s ethics.

Philia: the biological foundations of Aristotle’s ethics

This article is the first one to offer an investigation, from a biological perspective, of “natural philia” or “kin-based” philia (commonly translated as “friendship”) in Aristotle’s practical philosophy. After some preliminary considerations about its place in Aristotle’s ethical treatises, the discussion focuses on Aristotle’s biology. Here we learn that natural philia, couched in terms of a biological praxis rather than a trait of character, is widespread in the animal kingdom, although in different ways and to varying degrees. To account for such differences, Aristotle establishes a Scala Philiae in two different biological texts—Historia Animalium and Generation of Animals—where natural bonds in animals are classified in view of their strength and duration. Each level of Aristotle’s Scala is examined. Finally, the argument returns to Aristotle’s ethical and political texts, drawing greater attention to the biological mechanisms that underlie natural philia in human beings. I conclude that natural philia provides one fundamental biological building-block of Aristotle’s ethics and politics.

Introduction

The chapters in this volume have mostly been selected from papers given at a workshop and three conferences which brought together on the one hand a group of philosophers, most of whom were interested in one way or another in what has come to be known as ‘virtue ethics’—moral psychology in the wake of Aristotle—and, on the other, some developmental psychologists working, albeit in different ways, in an attachment paradigm. I organized these meetings partly because my own reading of attachment theory persuaded me there were a number of exciting points of contact between developmental psychology done this way and the kinds of questions Aristotle’s ethics raises, and which interest me; partly because almost no philosophers back then seemed even to have heard of attachment theory. This Introduction presents, inevitably through the eyes of a philosopher, what I take to be attachment theory’s main claims, and then tries to identify why philosophical moral psychologists should take it much more seriously than they have done to date—as I hope this volume itself will help them to do....

Understanding responsibility in Responsible AI. Dianoetic virtues and the hard problem of context

During the last decade there has been burgeoning research concerning the ways in which we should think of and apply the concept of responsibility for Artificial Intelligence. Despite this conceptual richness, there is still a lack of consensus regarding what Responsible AI entails on both conceptual and practical levels. The aim of this paper is to connect the ethical dimension of responsibility in Responsible AI with Aristotelian virtue ethics, where notions of context and dianoetic virtues play a grounding role for the concept of moral responsibility. The paper starts by highlighting the important difficulties in assigning responsibility to either technologies themselves or to their developers. Top-down and bottom-up approaches to moral responsibility are then contrasted, as we explore how they could inform debates about Responsible AI. We highlight the limits of the former ethical approaches and build the case for classical Aristotelian virtue ethics. We show that two building blocks of Aristotle’s ethics, dianoetic virtues and the context of actions, although largely ignored in the literature, can shed light on how we could think of moral responsibility for both AI and humans. We end by exploring the practical implications of this particular understanding of moral responsibility along the triadic dimensions of ethics by design, ethics in design and ethics for designers.

Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics

How do Aristotle’s empiricist views bear on the role perception plays for the virtuous? Do they point towards a certain kind of ethical particularism, according to which universal rules could never adequately codify virtuous behavior? I argue they do not. Virtuous agents always need perception to determine what to do, and it is inexpedient for them to articulate general rules of conduct, but this is not because it is in principle impossible to do so, or because virtuous conduct does not admit of theoretical treatment. Still, perception and experience do play an indispensable role in the development and deployment of practical wisdom. For our learning to be virtuous depends on first-hand, personal experience that theoretical modes of thought could not provide. I end by considering what a practically-oriented treatment of virtuous conduct would look like, and how we might conceive of its ethical significance.

Collingwood’s philosophy of art as a basis for virtue aesthetics.

In this thesis I show how Aristotle’s approach to ethics can be applied to aesthetics in order to address normative concerns relating to practices of artistic creation and spectatorship, and how R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of art provides an understanding of these practices that works as a basis for such an approach. I begin by discussing the connection between aesthetic and ethical normativity as found in the thought of various prominent philosophers, and review the contemporary work done in the name of ‘virtue aesthetics’. I then explicate Aristotle’s ethics, with a particular focus on his definition of virtue and his discussion of practical wisdom, and give an overview of Collingwood’s understanding of art and the role of imagination in artistic expression and understanding, before synthesizing the structure of Aristotle’s ethics with the content of Collingwood’s philosophy of art in order to arrive at an outline of a Collingwoodian virtue aesthetics.

Collingwood’s philosophy of art as a basis for virtue aesthetics.

In this thesis I show how Aristotle’s approach to ethics can be applied to aesthetics in order to address normative concerns relating to practices of artistic creation and spectatorship, and how R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of art provides an understanding of these practices that works as a basis for such an approach. I begin by discussing the connection between aesthetic and ethical normativity as found in the thought of various prominent philosophers, and review the contemporary work done in the name of ‘virtue aesthetics’. I then explicate Aristotle’s ethics, with a particular focus on his definition of virtue and his discussion of practical wisdom, and give an overview of Collingwood’s understanding of art and the role of imagination in artistic expression and understanding, before synthesizing the structure of Aristotle’s ethics with the content of Collingwood’s philosophy of art in order to arrive at an outline of a Collingwoodian virtue aesthetics.

Good’s Irreducibility: The Discordancy Argument and Aristotle

In this paper, I argue that the good is irreducible. I use the term ‘irreducible’ in a way similar to but not identical to G. E. Moore’s usage of ‘indefinable’ as found in Principia Ethica. By ‘irreducible,’ I mean that something cannot be simplified into something other than itself. For my purposes, this is to say that the good is sui generis and cannot be accounted for by anything other than itself. Inspired by what I take to be Moore’s basic insight, I develop my own argument pertaining to the uniqueness of the good. My argument goes partially beyond intuition, and hence beyond Moore, by means of applied intuitions (counterexamples). In the penultimate section, I apply the Discordancy Argument to Aristotle’s ethics, arguing that it is an attestation to the general virtue thesis that what is good does not admit of a reducible deduction. Broadly speaking, I consider the Discordancy Argument and general ethical intuitionism as justification for the Aristotelian idea that good actions are found in concrete particulars and not reducible abstractions, hinting at Aristotle’s affinity for ethical intuitionism. Furthermore, a recent debate surrounding moral ontology (per William Lane Craig and dissenters) is deemed obsolete.