United in Diversity? Interests, Preferences, and Patterns of Engagement of Public Development Banks in the Implementation of the EU Budget

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-63
Author(s):  
Eulalia Rubio ◽  
Matthias Thiemann
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
National Development ◽  
Financial Instruments ◽  
European Development ◽  
Development Banks ◽  
Cooperation Partners ◽  
Opening Up ◽  
Eu Commission ◽  
Structure Access ◽  
The Eu

This chapter traces the emergence and expansion of the use of EU budgetary means for financial instruments inside the EU from the 1980s onwards and its implications for the field of European development banking. It details how an initial focus on cooperation between the EIB and the EU Commission gave way to a diversification of cooperation partners for the implementation of financial instruments, now including national development banks. As financial instruments grew both in size and number, their attractiveness and importance for these development banks increased. The chapter details the tensions between the EIB and the national development banks in their lobbying attempts to structure access to these funds. These tensions came to the fore in the negotiations of the InvestEU fund in 2018, when the European Commission stripped the EIB of its unique access to the direct EU guarantee, instead opening up 25 percent of it to NDBs.

scholarly journals European Union’s Fiscal Rules and New Financial Instruments for 2021- 2017: Bulgaria’s Case Study

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-35
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Financial Instruments ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Economic Cycle ◽  
Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Eu

Fiscal policymaking of the Member States aims to follow fiscal rules through the economic cycle that ensure macroeconomic sustainability in the European Union (EU). After the 2008 global crisis, the Stability and Growth Pact introduced the enhanced supranational fiscal rules, setting additional boundaries to fiscal deficits and government debt. The new ceiling on the structural deficit in public finance laws of Member States has served to protect creditworthiness. The COVID-19 pandemic, which led to a temporary suspension of the fiscal rules, clearly indicates that the key challenges are to implement a countercyclical policy during upturns, building buffers for bad days. Under the Next Generation Europe’s initiative the European Commission (EC) will borrow up to €750 billion and distribute it over 2021-2024 to Member States (European Commission, 2020a). Raising funds in the EU budget and repayment of the EC debt may lead to amendments to the design and application of the EU fiscal rules. This paper lays out the objectives of the EU current fiscal framework and its main pillars, discusses how the EC new financial instruments for the period 2021-2027 will be accounted for in the Member States’ fiscal framework, and what are its possible changes and challenges after Covid-19 and Brexit.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Daniel Mertens ◽  
Matthias Thiemann ◽  
Peter Volberding
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
National Development ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Integration ◽  
Development Banks ◽  
Supranational Institutions ◽  
The Eu

This chapter introduces the puzzle of expanding national development banking in times of market-liberal EU integration. It presents the variegated landscape of national development banks in European Member States and their linkages to supranational institutions and programmes and builds a theoretical framework around field theory and historical-institutionalist European political economy to capture the evolution of development banking in the EU. The chapter argues that the current appearance of development banking in the EU is conditioned by constraints and guidance stemming from the integration process and the specific insertion of Member States in the European political economy. Importantly, it rests on a market-supporting, “promotional” understanding of development banks’ tasks that has consequences for contemporary debates over industrial policy and public investment in the European Union

Managing the Contradictions of Development Finance in the EU’s Eastern Periphery

2021 ◽  
pp. 224-252
Author(s):  
Dóra Piroska ◽  
Katalin Mérő
Keyword(s):  
Size Structure ◽  
National Development ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Development Finance ◽  
Core Member ◽  
Development Institutions ◽  
Eastern Periphery ◽  
Development Banks ◽  
The Eu

Eastern members of the European Union have turned to development banks only to a limited extent so far. In this chapter, in order to understand why the “development imagination” of Eastern governments remained restricted, we look at the underlying logics of the national development finance fields. Through the case studies of Hungary and Poland, we uncover marked contradictions within the fields. Initially, development finance was torn between the contradictory logics of neoliberalism and developmentalism, followed by institution-building efforts from the EU that resulted in functioning development banks designed primarily for the EU’s Single Market. Finally, when financial nationalist and authoritarian political parties came to power, development banks came under firm political control, while new development actors appeared. Development banks in Hungary and Poland also exhibit differences in size, structure, and focus that we trace over time. In the end, we argue that today Eastern development banks’ ability to connect, contribute, and benefit from EU structures shows a marked difference from core Member States, one which calls for change in the EU development institutions and policies.

The European Commission: Ami Fidèle or Faux Ami? Exploring the Commission’s Role as Amicus Curiae in ICSID Proceedings

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-91
Author(s):  
Alexander G. Leventhal ◽  
Akshay Shreedhar
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
System A ◽  
Eu Commission ◽  
The Eu

ICSID’S Rule 37(2) introduced into the ICSID system a process by which a nondisputing party may make submissions as an amicus curiae. While amicus submissions have existed in the ICSID system for nearly 20 years, the majority of Rule 37(2) applications have been filed only recently by one party – the EU Commission – on one issue – the applicability of the arbitration agreements in intra- EU BIT S. In this article, we explore how tribunals and ad hoc committees have addressed these applications, which do not seek to provide insight on a particular issue in relation to the merits (as past amicus have), but to strip the ICSID process of jurisdiction over all intra- EU BIT disputes.

The Reinvention of Development Banking in the European Union

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
National Development ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Level ◽  
Member States ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Formation And Evolution ◽  
Development Banks ◽  
The Eu

National development banks (NDBs) have transformed from outdated relics of national industrial policy to central pillars of the European Union’s economic project. This trend, which accelerated after the Financial Crisis of 2007, has led to a proliferation of NDBs with an expanded size and scope. However, it is surprising that the EU—which has championed market-oriented governance and strict competition policy—has actually advocated an expansion of NDBs. This book therefore asks, why has the EU supported an increased role for NDBs, and how can we understand the dynamics between NDBs and European incentives and constraints? In order to answer these questions, this book analyzes the formation and evolution of a field of development banking within the EU. We identify a new field around an innovative conceptualization of state-backed financing for the purposes of policy implementation. However, rather than focusing solely on national development banks, we instead broaden the focus to the entire ecosystem of the field of development banking, which includes political institutions (both in Brussels and in the Member States), financing vehicles (such as the Juncker Plan), regulatory bodies (DG Competition, DG ECFIN), and commercial actors. Seven in-depth case studies on European NDBs, along with three chapters on European-level actors, detail this field of development banking, and answer the questions of when, where, and how development banking occurs within the EU. We conclude that the EU has supported the expansion of NDBs as a means to support a European-wide industrial policy without creating new financial obligations, and that the European dynamics have differentially impacted Member States’ NDBs leading to a fragmented and asymmetrical field.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE TREATIES

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (05) ◽  
pp. 160-163
Author(s):  
Sevil Aliheydar Damirli ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Community Law ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Guardian ◽  
Eu Commission ◽  
The Eu

As in any community, coexistence and cooperation only works if it is well organized. In the EU, there are EU bodies for this purpose. We all know that living together of different members can often lead to a dispute. In the European Union, the subject of dispute can not only be the violation of primary law, but also the violation of secondary community law. In order to better understand the important role of the Commission in the EU, we examine in this paper its composition and Tasks. We know that the European Union is based on the rule of law. This means that every EU activity is based on treaties that have been accepted by all EU Member States on a voluntary and democratic basis. A contract is a binding agreement between the EU member states. It sets out the objectives of the EU, the rules governing the EU institutions, the decision-making process and relations between the EU and its Member States. Therefore it is important to adhere to these treaties to carry out community policy. According to Art. 258 and 259 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, actions for breach of contract can be filed against a Member State by the EU Commission or another Member State (1, Art.258-259). For the European Commission, as the «Guardian of the Treaties», this option is a particularly important instrument of power politics that it can use against member states' governments that do not recognize or do not comply with the norms of Community law. In practice, the infringement procedures requested by the Commission are of particular importance for ensuring compliance with Community law by the Member States. In no other area does the Commission have so much power and independence against the Member States. Now we should take a closer look at the EU institution and especially the EU Commission.

Twilights and rebirths of National Development Banks in Latin America: Understanding factors that could have affected different trajectories in Argentina and Brazil

2016 ◽  
pp. 101-139
Author(s):  
María Luz Martínez Sola
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Industrial Policy ◽  
National Development ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Historical Period ◽  
World War ◽  
Political Coalitions ◽  
Development Banks ◽  
Second World

National Development Banks (NDB) could be pictured as engines pushing backward economies through the developmental ladder's rungs. After being key protagonists of industrial policy after Second World War, most NDBs were dismantled during the 1980s and 90 s. Notable exceptions to this trend exist, however. The goal of this study is thus to understand the political economy issues; Institutional Capacity International Bargaining Power and Domestic Political Coalitions; that explain those trajectories, by taking the cases of Argentina (BANADE) and Brazil (BNDES). When analyzing these three dimensions of political economy the paper concludes that the main difference between BANADE and BNDES' trajectories seems to stem from the diverse Domestic Political Coalitions crafted by Argentina and Brazil, in each historical period. Understanding the underlying conditions to create a cohesive and solid NDB is fundamental to reassess their roles in the XXI century industrial policy.

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