scholarly journals European Union’s Fiscal Rules and New Financial Instruments for 2021- 2017: Bulgaria’s Case Study

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-35

Fiscal policymaking of the Member States aims to follow fiscal rules through the economic cycle that ensure macroeconomic sustainability in the European Union (EU). After the 2008 global crisis, the Stability and Growth Pact introduced the enhanced supranational fiscal rules, setting additional boundaries to fiscal deficits and government debt. The new ceiling on the structural deficit in public finance laws of Member States has served to protect creditworthiness. The COVID-19 pandemic, which led to a temporary suspension of the fiscal rules, clearly indicates that the key challenges are to implement a countercyclical policy during upturns, building buffers for bad days. Under the Next Generation Europe’s initiative the European Commission (EC) will borrow up to €750 billion and distribute it over 2021-2024 to Member States (European Commission, 2020a). Raising funds in the EU budget and repayment of the EC debt may lead to amendments to the design and application of the EU fiscal rules. This paper lays out the objectives of the EU current fiscal framework and its main pillars, discusses how the EC new financial instruments for the period 2021-2027 will be accounted for in the Member States’ fiscal framework, and what are its possible changes and challenges after Covid-19 and Brexit.

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-187
Author(s):  
Pauline Melin

In a 2012 Communication, the European Commission described the current approach to social security coordination with third countries as ‘patchy’. The European Commission proposed to address that patchiness by developing a common EU approach to social security coordination with third countries whereby the Member States would cooperate more with each other when concluding bilateral agreements with third countries. This article aims to explore the policy agenda of the European Commission in that field by conducting a comparative legal analysis of the Member States’ bilateral agreements with India. The idea behind the comparative legal analysis is to determine whether (1) there are common grounds between the Member States’ approaches, and (2) based on these common grounds, it is possible to suggest a common EU approach. India is taken as a third-country case study due to its labour migration and investment potential for the European Union. In addition, there are currently 12 Member State bilateral agreements with India and no instrument at the EU level on social security coordination with India. Therefore, there is a potential need for a common EU approach to social security coordination with India. Based on the comparative legal analysis of the Member States’ bilateral agreements with India, this article ends by outlining the content of a potential future common EU approach.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damir Šehović

Abstract : The EMU fiscal system is specific in many areas compared to other classic fiscal systems of national states. Specific features mainly reflect in the implementation of economic policy within the EMU which is carried out by combining a common centralized monetary policy under the ECB jurisdiction and decentralized fiscal policies under the jurisdiction of the member states. The member states` sovereignty in governing their fiscal policies is one of the key causes of the EU fiscal system underdevelopment, i.e. its indigent structure in relation to “standard fiscal systems”. More indigent structure of the EU fiscal system is reflected in the fact that it consists of only three segments. The first one refers to the EU budget which is also the only instrument for implementing fiscal policy at the supranational level. The second one refers to the harmonization of taxation systems in accordance with inputs and other legislation adopted at the EU level with the aim of fostering the single internal market. Finally, the third segment refers to the fiscal policy coordination of the EMU member states related to appropriate fiscal rules, which mainly stem from the Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact.


Author(s):  
Tobias Tesche

Abstract The European Fiscal Board (EFB) is a supranational fiscal council advising the European Commission on the European Union (EU) fiscal framework. It was created as a response to the EU member states' repeated non-compliance with the EU fiscal rules and the emergence of national fiscal councils. Non-compliance with EU fiscal rules was often left unpunished and required a new expert body to regain some of the lost credibility of the EU's fiscal framework through enhanced fiscal monitoring. This article argues that the European Commission created the EFB in response to the new intergovernmental dynamics. A supranational fiscal watchdog that depends on the Commission for financial resources and access to information would deflect member states from delegating more competences away from the Commission. Thus, the Commission was able to counter a potential threat to its authority in EU fiscal governance by creating a supranational de novo body that it controlled.


2020 ◽  
pp. 97-105
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kusztykiewicz-Fedurek

Political security is very often considered through the prism of individual states. In the scholar literature in-depth analyses of this kind of security are rarely encountered in the context of international entities that these countries integrate. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to key aspects of political security in the European Union (EU) Member States. The EU as a supranational organisation, gathering Member States first, ensures the stability of the EU as a whole, and secondly, it ensures that Member States respect common values and principles. Additionally, the EU institutions focus on ensuring the proper functioning of the Eurozone (also called officially “euro area” in EU regulations). Actions that may have a negative impact on the level of the EU’s political security include the boycott of establishing new institutions conducive to the peaceful coexistence and development of states. These threats seem to have a significant impact on the situation in the EU in the face of the proposed (and not accepted by Member States not belonging to the Eurogroup) Eurozone reforms concerning, inter alia, appointment of the Minister of Economy and Finance and the creation of a new institution - the European Monetary Fund.


Author(s):  
Dmitrii О. Mikhalev ◽  
◽  
Egor’ A. Sergeev ◽  

The article presents a retrospective analysis of relations between the government of Italy and the European Union institutions in the context of supranational fiscal regulation in 2002–2019. The authors analyze the influence of external and internal factors on the state of public finance in Italy, note the reasons that made it difficult to meet the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, study the main issues on the agenda in the EU-Italy relations and their evolution. The authors also come to conclusion that unlike the earlier discussions about correcting budget deficit in Italy, current focus of supranational fiscal governance is shifted to preventing it, what challenges the economic sovereignty of Italy and country’s opportunities to conduct a discretionary fiscal policy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.


Author(s):  
Petr YAKOVLEV

The decision on Britain’s secession from the European Union, taken by the British Parliament and agreed by London and Brussels, divided the Union history into “before” and “after”. Not only will the remaining member states have to “digest” the political, commercial, economic and mental consequences of parting with one of the largest partners. They will also have to create a substantially new algorithm for the functioning of United Europe. On this path, the EU is confronted with many geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, which should be answered by the new leaders of the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament.


2010 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Meyer

SummaryThe financial and guarantee aids within the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism suspend the Stability and Growth Pact as the basis of the European Economic and Monetary Union. The actual ‘suspension’ from the ‘no bail-out’ restriction (Art. 125 TFEU) and the prohibition of funding national debts (Art. 123 TFEU) transfers risks and financial burdens from deeply indebted states to solvent EU member states. This is the beginning of an unauthorized ‘transfer union’.This analysis does not display any evidence of market failure with respect to a potential domino effect for other EU member states. In addition, a destabilizing speculation cannot be identified. The case ‘Greece’ is rather a special case which has become a common model for other member states, caused by the Council of the European Union and the aid packages. Speculations build a part of the observable market reactions apart from pure hedging, but they simply indicate political system errors.The interventions by the European Central Bank do not lead to functioning markets. These interventions rather lead to yield structures that are inadequate in terms of risks and scarcity. Therefore they will cause a misallocation of financial resources with high economic costs.


2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-145
Author(s):  
Ursula G. Sauer ◽  
Roman Kolar

In 1999, the European Commission presented its second report on the numbers of laboratory animals used in the European Union (EU). The plausibility of the data and the usefulness of the format of the registration tables remain questionable, for reasons previously discussed in connection with the Commission's first statistical report. In addition, it is impossible to derive sound information on trends in animal use in the EU and its Member States from the second statistical report. The European Commission and the Member States have agreed on new tables to be used for future statistics on the use of experimental animals in the EU. These new tables have been significantly extended and improved. Several categories of little relevance have been revised, and ambiguous expressions have been clarified. However, several problems either persist or have been newly created. Moreover, some important data (i.e. categories for pain and distress, as well as for several specific purposes of use; the origin of some animal species; types of institutions; and the use of genetically engineered animals) are still not required. Nevertheless, these are highly relevant to animal welfare and must be regarded as indispensable for a well-aimed application of the statistics to set priorities concerning the Three Rs.


elni Review ◽  
2009 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Ana Barreira

The European Commission has recognised that “[l]aws do not serve their full purpose unless they are properly applied and enforced”. In addition “[t]he European Institutions and the Member States should continue to develop their work to ensure that Community law is correctly applied and implemented”. There are diverse tools for guaranteeing compliance such as compliance indicators, compliance and enforcement strategies and environmental inspections, the purpose of which is to supervise compliance. This article focuses on the latter. Firstly, the way in which this instrument was incorporated under Community environmental policy is examined. Secondly, the current status of environmental inspections at EU level is briefly analysed. Thereafter, it will concentrate on the proposals for the review of this tool, ending with some recommendations on how environmental inspections should be regulated in the European Union with a focus on the demands of European Environmental Bureau (EEB) on this matter.


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