On Moral Properties

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-36
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

This paper is about the relation of resultance, signalled by the ‘because’ in ‘that was wrong because it was dishonest’. It distinguishes resultance from supervenience and uses that distinction to criticize R. M. Hare’s account of the logic of moral judgement in terms of his notion of universalizability. It considers the strengths and weaknesses of Ross’s novel notion of a prima facie duty and the distinction between prima facie duty and duty proper. And it argues that where one action’s rightness results from its having certain properties, it does not follow that all actions with those properties will be right, because other cases may have further properties acting as ‘defeaters’.

Intrafamilial Organ Donation Is Often an Altruistic Act

2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Spital
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Organ Donation ◽  
Genetic Relationship ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Logical Conclusion ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

In their recent article, Glannon and Ross remind us that family members have obligations to help each other that strangers do not have. They argue, I believe correctly, that what creates moral obligations within families is not genetic relationship but rather a sharing of intimacy. For no one are these obligations stronger than they are for parents of young children. This observation leads the authors to the logical conclusion that organ donation by a parent to her child is not optional but rather a prima facie duty. However, Glannon and Ross go a step further by suggesting that because parent-to-child organ donation is a duty, it cannot be altruistic. They assert that “altruistic acts are optional, nonobligatory…supererogatory…. Given that altruism consists in purely optional actions presupposing no duty to aid others, any parental act that counts as meeting a child's needs cannot be altruistic.” Here I think the authors go too far.

A Prima Facie Duty Approach to Machine Ethics

2011 ◽  
pp. 476-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Leigh Anderson ◽  
Michael Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Machine Ethics ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
The Real ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
Principle Theory

This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.

Trespass and Kyosei in Cyberspace

2011 ◽  
pp. 205-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Spinello
Keyword(s):  
Copyright Protection ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Data Usage ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
The Common ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
The Right ◽  
E Mail ◽  
Factual Data

This chapter considers the theme of trespass in cyberspace. In order to prevent unauthorized use of their data several U.S. companies have hastily filed lawsuits alleging trespass to chattels. But some of this data usage, especially for metasites, is socially valuable. Nonetheless, the courts are generally sympathetic with these trespass claims even if this means that activities like spidering or e-mail are constrained in certain contexts. Legal scholars have criticized this trend because it creates a novel property right in factual data which is not eligible for copyright protection. These legal concerns are justified, but what should moralists be saying about this matter? We argue here that both eastern and western philosophies recognize the need to respect the common good of a community or common venture. This awareness should temper a company’s narrow focus on proprietary property rights. We attempt to define the Net’s common good (or commonly shared values) and make the case that Internet users have a prima facie duty to support that common good. Thus, prudent and morally responsible companies operating on the Net will seek to balance their property entitlements with this affirmative duty to support the Internet’s common good. There is no magic formula for achieving this precarious balance, but we offer some general criteria that will orient managers toward the right direction. Finally, we explain that a private settlement of trespass matters is clearly welfare-enhancing.

Prima Facie Duty

1965 ◽  
Vol 62 (11) ◽  
pp. 279-287
Author(s):  
Robert K. Shope ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

Rossian Ethics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
The Right

This book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, his limited pluralism about the right, and his limited pluralism about the good. The second is to articulate a distinctive view intermediate between consequentialism and absolutist deontology, “classical deontology.” According to classical deontology the most fundamental normative principles are principles of prima facie duty, principles which specify general kinds of reasons. Consequentialists are right to think that reasons always derive from goods; and ideal utilitarians are right, contra hedonistic utilitarians, to think that there are a small number of distinct kinds of intrinsic goods. But consequentialists are wrong to think that all reasons have the same weight for all agents. Instead there are a small number of distinct kinds of agent-relative intensifiers: features that increase the importance of certain goods for certain agents. It is argued that classical deontology combines the best elements of the moral theories of Ross and of Sidgwick, and that the best philosophical interpretation of Ross is that he is a classical deontologist.

What Are Prima Facie Duties?

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-56
Author(s):  
David Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Conceptual Innovation ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

This chapter focuses on Ross’s most important conceptual innovation: the idea of prima facie duty. Four main claims are defended: first, contra some of his harsher critics, that though much of what Ross says in introducing and explaining the concept of prima facie duty is problematic or misleading, he nonetheless has a clear and coherent theoretical picture; second, contra Hurka, that Ross lacks the contemporary concept of a normative reason, but that his views should be reframed in ways that do employ that concept; third, that Ross is not and should not be a scalar deontologist; and fourth that he was wrong in the Foundations to follow Prichard in favoring subjective over objective rightness.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
David Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
The Right

This chapter introduces the project of Rossian Ethics. The book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, his limited pluralism about the right, and his limited pluralism about the good. The second is to articulate a distinctive view intermediate between consequentialism and absolutist deontology, “classical deontology.” The introductory chapter includes brief accounts of the kind of project of philosophical interpretation that the book undertakes, and of Ross’s place in the Sidgwick-to-Ewing school recently discussed by Hurka.

Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology: A Critique

Utilitas ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-152
Author(s):  
THOMAS HURKA
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Widespread Agreement ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
Rival View

In The Methods of Ethics Henry Sidgwick argued against deontology and for consequentialism. More specifically, he stated four conditions for self-evident moral truth and argued that, whereas no deontological principles satisfy all four conditions, the principles that generate consequentialism do. This article argues that both his critique of deontology and his defence of consequentialism fail, largely for the same reason: that he did not clearly grasp the concept W. D. Ross later introduced of a prima facie duty or duty other things equal. The moderate deontology Ross's concept allows avoids many of Sidgwick's objections. And Sidgwick's statements of his own axioms equivocate in exactly the same way for which he criticized deontological ones. Only if they are read as other things equal can they seem intuitive and earn widespread agreement; but that form is too weak to ground consequentialism. And in the form that does yield consequentialism they are neither intuitive nor widely accepted. Sidgwick's arguments against a rival view and for his own were, in multiple ways, unfair.

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