More Right than Wrong

2021 ◽  
pp. 375-393
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Reason ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
Reason For Action

This paper argues that Ross, despite the importance and innovativity of his conception of a prima facie duty, fails entirely to make sense of the relation between prima facie duty, as he understands it, and duty proper. He thus fails to make any sense of what it is to be a moral reason for action, and of right-making and wrong-making properties. Basing my approach on some suggestions of Prichard’s, I suggest that the only way to do this is to abandon any distinct conception of duty proper, restricting ourselves to the idea of what we have most duty to do – what we most ought to do. This retains, but reframes, Ross’s focus on something that is a matter of degree.

Intrafamilial Organ Donation Is Often an Altruistic Act

2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Spital
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Organ Donation ◽  
Genetic Relationship ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Logical Conclusion ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

In their recent article, Glannon and Ross remind us that family members have obligations to help each other that strangers do not have. They argue, I believe correctly, that what creates moral obligations within families is not genetic relationship but rather a sharing of intimacy. For no one are these obligations stronger than they are for parents of young children. This observation leads the authors to the logical conclusion that organ donation by a parent to her child is not optional but rather a prima facie duty. However, Glannon and Ross go a step further by suggesting that because parent-to-child organ donation is a duty, it cannot be altruistic. They assert that “altruistic acts are optional, nonobligatory…supererogatory…. Given that altruism consists in purely optional actions presupposing no duty to aid others, any parental act that counts as meeting a child's needs cannot be altruistic.” Here I think the authors go too far.

A Prima Facie Duty Approach to Machine Ethics

2011 ◽  
pp. 476-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Leigh Anderson ◽  
Michael Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Machine Ethics ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
The Real ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
Principle Theory

This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.

Identity as Social Location

2018 ◽  
pp. 114-126
Author(s):  
Ásta
Keyword(s):  
Social Identity ◽  
Moral Reason ◽  
Social Location ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Subjective Identity ◽  
Reason For Action

The author offers conception of social identity that accompanies the theory of social. This conception is to meet the following requirements: 1) do justice to how our identity is constrained by others; 2) do justice to our own contribution to our identity; 3) do justice to how highly contextual our identity is; 4) make sense of the phenomenon of passing; 5) make sense of the intersection of the various aspects of our identity; and 6) be compatible with a plausible account of agency in which identity can be a source of reason for action, including a moral reason for action. The conception of identity the author offers is this: our objective social identity is the location on a social map that we occupy stably in a context; our subjective identity is the location on that same map that we identify with.

Trespass and Kyosei in Cyberspace

2011 ◽  
pp. 205-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Spinello
Keyword(s):  
Copyright Protection ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Data Usage ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
The Common ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
The Right ◽  
E Mail ◽  
Factual Data

This chapter considers the theme of trespass in cyberspace. In order to prevent unauthorized use of their data several U.S. companies have hastily filed lawsuits alleging trespass to chattels. But some of this data usage, especially for metasites, is socially valuable. Nonetheless, the courts are generally sympathetic with these trespass claims even if this means that activities like spidering or e-mail are constrained in certain contexts. Legal scholars have criticized this trend because it creates a novel property right in factual data which is not eligible for copyright protection. These legal concerns are justified, but what should moralists be saying about this matter? We argue here that both eastern and western philosophies recognize the need to respect the common good of a community or common venture. This awareness should temper a company’s narrow focus on proprietary property rights. We attempt to define the Net’s common good (or commonly shared values) and make the case that Internet users have a prima facie duty to support that common good. Thus, prudent and morally responsible companies operating on the Net will seek to balance their property entitlements with this affirmative duty to support the Internet’s common good. There is no magic formula for achieving this precarious balance, but we offer some general criteria that will orient managers toward the right direction. Finally, we explain that a private settlement of trespass matters is clearly welfare-enhancing.

Prima Facie Duty

1965 ◽  
Vol 62 (11) ◽  
pp. 279-287
Author(s):  
Robert K. Shope ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

Rossian Ethics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
The Right

This book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, his limited pluralism about the right, and his limited pluralism about the good. The second is to articulate a distinctive view intermediate between consequentialism and absolutist deontology, “classical deontology.” According to classical deontology the most fundamental normative principles are principles of prima facie duty, principles which specify general kinds of reasons. Consequentialists are right to think that reasons always derive from goods; and ideal utilitarians are right, contra hedonistic utilitarians, to think that there are a small number of distinct kinds of intrinsic goods. But consequentialists are wrong to think that all reasons have the same weight for all agents. Instead there are a small number of distinct kinds of agent-relative intensifiers: features that increase the importance of certain goods for certain agents. It is argued that classical deontology combines the best elements of the moral theories of Ross and of Sidgwick, and that the best philosophical interpretation of Ross is that he is a classical deontologist.

What Are Prima Facie Duties?

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-56
Author(s):  
David Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Conceptual Innovation ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

This chapter focuses on Ross’s most important conceptual innovation: the idea of prima facie duty. Four main claims are defended: first, contra some of his harsher critics, that though much of what Ross says in introducing and explaining the concept of prima facie duty is problematic or misleading, he nonetheless has a clear and coherent theoretical picture; second, contra Hurka, that Ross lacks the contemporary concept of a normative reason, but that his views should be reframed in ways that do employ that concept; third, that Ross is not and should not be a scalar deontologist; and fourth that he was wrong in the Foundations to follow Prichard in favoring subjective over objective rightness.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
David Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
The Right

This chapter introduces the project of Rossian Ethics. The book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, his limited pluralism about the right, and his limited pluralism about the good. The second is to articulate a distinctive view intermediate between consequentialism and absolutist deontology, “classical deontology.” The introductory chapter includes brief accounts of the kind of project of philosophical interpretation that the book undertakes, and of Ross’s place in the Sidgwick-to-Ewing school recently discussed by Hurka.

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