Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia

Author(s):  
Frédérique de Vignemont

Individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia report consciously feeling tactile sensations on their own body when they see another person being touched. They have what may be called vicarious tactile sensations. Vicarious tactile sensations may almost seem unbelievable. How could one feel from the inside someone else’s sensations? First, I will focus on the intersubjective dimension of vicarious touch. In particular, I will examine whether it constitutes a kind of empathy. I will then argue that vicarious touch cannot be taken as evidence in favour of embodied social cognition. Second, I will focus on the intermodal dimension of vicarious touch. I will show how it differs from standard cases of idiosyncratic synaesthesia. I will then argue that it is a by-product of the multimodal nature of non-vicarious bodily experiences.

2003 ◽  
Vol 358 (1430) ◽  
pp. 345-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ami Klin ◽  
Warren Jones ◽  
Robert Schultz ◽  
Fred Volkmar

Normative–IQ individuals with autism are capable of solving explicit social cognitive problems at a level that is not matched by their ability to meet the demands of everyday social situations. The magnitude of this discrepancy is now being documented through newer techniques such as eye tracking, which allows us to see and measure how individuals with autism search for meaning when presented with naturalistic social scenes. This paper offers an approach to social cognitive development intended to address the above discrepancy, which is considered a key element for any understanding of the pathophysiology of autism. This approach, called the enactive mind (EM), originates from the emerging work on ‘embodied cognitive science’, a neuroscience framework that views cognition as bodily experiences accrued as a result of an organism's adaptive actions upon salient aspects of the surrounding environment. The EM approach offers a developmental hypothesis of autism in which the process of acquisition of embodied social cognition is derailed early on, as a result of reduced salience of social stimuli and concomitant enactment of socially irrelevant aspects of the environment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Robertson

Abstract Osiurak and Reynaud (O&R) claim that research into the origin of cumulative technological culture has been too focused on social cognition and has consequently neglected the importance of uniquely human reasoning capacities. This commentary raises two interrelated theoretical concerns about O&R's notion of technical-reasoning capacities, and suggests how these concerns might be met.


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 257-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes H. Scheidemann ◽  
Franz Petermann ◽  
Marc Schipper

Abstract. We investigated theory of mind (ToM) deficits in Alzheimer‘s disease (AD) and its possible connection to autobiographical memory (ABM). Patients and matched controls were evaluated and compared using a video-based ToM test, an autobiographical fluency task, and a neuropsychological test battery. We found that ToM deficits were positively associated with semantic ABM in the clinical group, whereas a positive relationship appeared between ToM and episodic ABM in controls. We hypothesize that this reflects the course of the disease as well as that semantic ABM is used for ToM processing, being still accessible in AD. Furthermore, we assume that it is also less efficient, which in turn leads to a specific deficit profile of social cognition.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Müller ◽  
Klaus Rothermund

According to social cognition textbooks, stereotypes are activated automatically if appropriate categorical cues are processed. Although many studies have tested effects of activated stereotypes on behavior, few have tested the process of stereotype activation. Blair and Banaji (1996) demonstrated that subjects were faster to categorize first names as male or female if those were preceded by gender congruent attribute primes. The same, albeit smaller, effects emerged in a semantic priming design ruling out response priming by Banaji and Hardin (1996) . We sought to replicate these important effects. Mirroring Blair and Banaji (1996) we found strong priming effects as long as response priming was possible. However, unlike Banaji and Hardin (1996) , we did not find any evidence for automatic stereotype activation, when response priming was ruled out. Our findings suggest that automatic stereotype activation is not a reliable and global phenomenon but is restricted to more specific conditions.


1997 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 522-523
Author(s):  
Bernard E. Whitley
Keyword(s):  

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 845-846
Author(s):  
Dianne M. Tice ◽  
Roy F. Baumeister
Keyword(s):  

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