From Something Old to Something New: Functionalist Lessons for the Cognitive Science of Scientific Creativity

An intuitive view is that creativity involves bringing together what is already known and familiar in a way that produces something new. In cognitive science, this intuition is typically formalized in terms of computational processes that combine or associate internally represented information. From this computationalist perspective, it is hard to imagine how non-representational approaches in embodied cognitive science could shed light on creativity, especially when it comes to abstract conceptual reasoning of the kind scientists so often engage in. The present article offers an entry point to addressing this challenge. The scientific project of embodied cognitive science is a continuation of work in the functionalist tradition in psychology developed over a century ago by William James and John Dewey, among others. The focus here is on how functionalist views on the nature of mind, thought, and experience offer an alternative starting point for cognitive science in general, and for the cognitive science of scientific creativity in particular. The result may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, the article claims that the functionalist conceptual framework motivates rejecting mainstream cognitive views of creativity as the combination or association of ideas. On the other hand, however, the strategy adopted here—namely, revisiting ideas from functionalist psychology to inform current scientific theorizing—can itself be described as a process of arriving at new, creative ideas from combinations of old ones. As is shown here, a proper understanding of cognition in light of the functionalist tradition resolves the seeming tension between these two claims.

Are Humans Mobot Minded? Some Implications of Embodied Cognitive Science for Cognitive Psychology.

This chapter explores the idea that the design of the human mental architecture, like those of situated robots, is a product of integration, morphological, environmental, and interaction space constraints. Although much situated robotics research has focused on the generation of rather basic behaviours, rather than the kinds of complex cognitive abilities central to cognitive psychology, I want to suggest that we have much to learn from the synthetic methodology used in ECS.

Stretching Detection: The Unique Selling Point of Embodied Cognitive Science

By contrast with classical approaches to cognitive science, embodied cognitive science is characterised by claims that cognition is the product of coordinated systems of distributed and decentralised cognitive resources, and that it is grounded in survival-oriented architectures. I suggest that these ideas derive from a deeper change of perspective from viewing the cognizer as a representer to that of a detector/actor. Unlike some of the more abstract issues considered by other theorists, this change in perspective has practical implications for the ways in which psychologists study and understand cognition. In particular, it raises the important question of how we are able to access information about unperceivable environments using mental machinery that is not primarily designed for that purpose. A framework for understanding cognition as ‘time/space stretching’ is presented and three strategies for enabling that stretching are described.

Embodied instrumentation in learning mathematics as the genesis of a body-artifact functional system

Recent developments in cognitive and educational science highlight the role of the body in learning. Novel digital technologies increasingly facilitate bodily interaction. Aiming for understanding of the body’s role in learning mathematics with technology, we reconsider the instrumental approach from a radical embodied cognitive science perspective. We highlight the complexity of any action regulation, which is performed by a complex dynamic functional system of the body and brain in perception-action loops driven by multilevel intentionality. Unlike mental schemes, functional systems are decentralized and can be extended by artifacts. We introduce the notion of a body-artifact functional system, pointing to the fact that artifacts are included in the perception-action loops of instrumented actions. The theoretical statements of this radical embodied reconsideration of the instrumental approach are illustrated by an empirical example, in which embodied activities led a student to the development of instrumented actions with a unit circle as an instrument to construct a sine graph. Supplementing videography of the student’s embodied actions and gestures with eye-tracking data, we show how new functional systems can be formed. Educational means to facilitate the development of body-artifact functional systems are discussed.

Placebo From an Enactive Perspective

Due to their complexity and variability, placebo effects remain controversial. We suggest this is also due to a set of problematic assumptions (dualism, reductionism, individualism, passivity). We critically assess current explanations and empirical evidence and propose an alternative theoretical framework—the enactive approach to life and mind—based on recent developments in embodied cognitive science. We review core enactive concepts such as autonomy, agency, and sense-making. Following these ideas, we propose a move from binary distinctions (e.g., conscious vs. non-conscious) to the more workable categories of reflective and pre-reflective activity. We introduce an ontology of individuation, following the work of Gilbert Simondon, that allow us to see placebo interventions not as originating causal chains, but as modulators and triggers in the regulation of tensions between ongoing embodied and interpersonal processes. We describe these interrelated processes involving looping effects through three intertwined dimensions of embodiment: organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective. Finally, we defend the need to investigate therapeutic interactions in terms of participatory sense-making, going beyond the identification of individual social traits (e.g., empathy, trust) that contribute to placebo effects. We discuss resonances and differences between the enactive proposal, popular explanations such as expectations and conditioning, and other approaches based on meaning responses and phenomenological/ecological ideas.

The Impossibility of Automating Ambiguity

On the one hand, complexity science and enactive and embodied cognitive science approaches emphasize that people, as complex adaptive systems, are ambiguous, indeterminable, and inherently unpredictable. On the other, Machine Learning (ML) systems that claim to predict human behaviour are becoming ubiquitous in all spheres of social life. I contend that ubiquitous Artificial Intelligence (AI) and ML systems are close descendants of the Cartesian and Newtonian worldview in so far as they are tools that fundamentally sort, categorize, and classify the world, and forecast the future. Through the practice of clustering, sorting, and predicting human behaviour and action, these systems impose order, equilibrium, and stability to the active, fluid, messy, and unpredictable nature of human behaviour and the social world at large. Grounded in complexity science and enactive and embodied cognitive science approaches, this article emphasizes why people, embedded in social systems, are indeterminable and unpredictable. When ML systems “pick up” patterns and clusters, this often amounts to identifying historically and socially held norms, conventions, and stereotypes. Machine prediction of social behaviour, I argue, is not only erroneous but also presents real harm to those at the margins of society.

Letting language be: reflections on enactive method

Prompted by our commentators, we take this response as an opportunity to clarify the premises, attitudes, and methods of our enactive approach to human languaging. We high-light the need to recognize that any investigation, particularly one into language, is always a concretely situated and self-grounding activity; our attitude as researchers is one of knowing as engagement with our subject matter. Our task, formulating the missing categories that can bridge embodied cognitive science with language research, requires avoiding premature abstractions and clarifying the multiple circularities at play. Our chosen method is dialectical, which has prompted several interesting observations that we respond to, particularly with respect to what this method means for enactive epistemology and ontology. We also clarify the important question of how best to conceive of the variety of social skills we progressively identify with our method and are at play in human languaging. Are these skills socially constituted or just socially learned? The difference, again, leads to a clarification that acts, skills, actors, and interactions are to be conceived as co-emerging categories. We illustrate some of these points with a discussion of an example of aspects of the model at play in a study of gift giving in China.Keywords: Enactive epistemology, Enactive ontology, Dialectics, languaging, Shared know-how.

The hegemony of the practical in embodied cognitive science and the question of bodily vulnerability

When perception is made the subject of philosophy, it is primarily understood as pre-theoretical sensual knowledge, and the question of its truth content becomes the focus of attention. In contrast, approaches that fall within the philosophy of embodiment quite rightly point out that perception is bodily anchored and closely linked to interests in action. The primacy of knowledge is therefore substituted by a primacy of praxis. This article aims to point out the blind spots that such a hegemony of the practical entails. In a phenomenological way, it is to be shown that beside the aspect of instrumentality, perceptive situations are also experienced as pleasant or unpleasant as such. This points to the importance of the pathical character of perception. However, it is not a call to enthrone the primacy of affect instead of the primacy of practice. The paper concludes with a thought on the philosophy of pedagogy and education. Proceeding from that perceptive position, it is argued that film in particular offers a chance to apply the phenomenology of pathical perception to the field of intersubjectivity.