Decreasing Supplies, Increasing Risks in Oil Development

Author(s):  
Christine Shearer

The ongoing, large demand for oil in the United States has helped push oil companies from onshore to offshore, increasing the complexity of the operations and the risks. This has been encouraged by US policy, which has historically encouraged an increase in both national oil demand and domestic oil production. This chapter focuses on expanded offshore oil drilling in the United States and its risks, highlighting the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil blowout. Such events are examples of explicitly “human-caused” disasters that nonetheless can be expected to increase as we resort to lower quality and harder to reach fossil fuels, offering an interesting example of Charles Perrow’s concept of “normal accidents.”

Subject Prospects for fossil fuels to end-2019. Significance Slowing global trade suggests oil demand forecasts will be downgraded, while non-OPEC production growth, led by the United States, will keep the market well supplied, despite disruptions and restrictions on major OPEC producers. However, weak pricing will be offset by risk premiums associated with conflict in Libya and the threat of US-Iranian conflagration affecting oil from the Gulf.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-601

On 2 November 1992, Iran filed an application instituting proceedings against the United States in respect of a dispute arising out of the attack on and the destruction of three offshore oil production complexes. In it, Iran contended that these acts constituted a fundamental breach of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, signed in 1955.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita Nieves-Zárate

Abstract The Deepwater Horizon accident is one of the major environmental disasters in the history of the United States. This accident occurred in 2010, when the Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore drilling unit exploded, while the rig's crew was conducting the drilling work of the exploratory well Macondo deep under the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Environmental damages included more than four million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, and economic losses total tens of billions of dollars. The accident brought into question the effectiveness of the regulatory regime for preventing accidents, and protecting the marine environment from oil and gas operations, and prompted regulatory reforms. Ten years after the Deepwater Horizon accident, this article analyzes the implementation of Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) as one of the main regulatory reforms introduced in the United States after the accident. The analysis uses the theory of regulation which takes into account both state and non-state actors involved in regulation, and therefore, the shift from regulation to governance. The study includes regulations issued after the Deepwater Horizon accident, particularly, SEMS rules I and II, and reports conducted by the National Academy of Sciences, the National Commission on the BP Oil Spill, the Center for Offshore Safety, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). The article reveals that though offshore oil and gas operators in the U.S. federal waters have adopted SEMS, as a mechanism of self-regulation, there is not clarity on how SEMS have been implemented in practice towards achieving its goal of reducing risks. The BSEE, as the public regulator has the task of providing a complete analysis on the results of the three audits to SEMS conducted by the operators and third parties from 2013 to 2019. This article argues that the assessment of SEMS audits should be complemented with leading and lagging indicators in the industry in order to identify how SEMS have influenced safety behavior beyond regulatory compliance. BSEE has the challenge of providing this assessment and making transparency a cornerstone of SEMS regulations. In this way, the lessons of the DHW accident may be internalized by all actors in the offshore oil and gas industry.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Sicotte

Abstract Baku, the center of the Russian and then Soviet oil industry, represented the raw economic potential of early Soviet industry. At the head of the industry was Alexandr Serebrovskiĭ, head of Azneft, the largest Soviet oil trust, and a pivotal figure in reviving Soviet oil production across the 1920s. His trip to the United States in 1924 and his subsequent plan to restore Baku’s productive capacity via American technology and methodology would not only improve the industry’s output but allow Azneft to directly compete with American oil companies on the international stage, thus demonstrating the latent potential of the Soviet Union for exportation. However, while this project seemed initially successful, it created a difficult fiscal legacy as Azneft became increasingly financially insolvent across the 1920s.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-307

On 2 November 1992, Iran filed an application instituting proceedings against the United States in respect of a dispute arising out of the attack on and the destruction of three offshore oil production complexes. In it, Iran contended that these acts constituted a fundamental breach of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, signed in 1955.


2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (06) ◽  
pp. 520-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.R. Harrell ◽  
Thomas L. Gardner

Summary A casual reading of the SPE/WPC (World Petroleum Congresses) Petroleum Reserves Definitions (1997) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) definitions (1978) would suggest very little, if any, difference in the quantities of proved hydrocarbon reserves estimated under those two classification systems. The differences in many circumstances for both volumetric and performance-based estimates may be small. In 1999, the SEC began to increase its review process, seeking greater understanding and compliance with its oil and gas reserves reporting requirements. The agency's definitions had been promulgated in 1978 in connection with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and at a time when most publicly owned oil and gas companies and their reserves were located in the United States. Oil and gas prices were relatively stable, and virtually all natural gas was marketed through long-term contracts at fixed or determinable prices. Development drilling was subject to well-spacing regulations as established through field rules set by state agencies. Reservoir-evaluation technology has advanced far beyond that used in 1978;production-sharing contracts were uncommon then, and probabilistic reserves assessment was not widely recognized or appreciated in the U.S. These changes in industry practice plus many other considerations have created problems in adapting the 1978 vintage definitions to the technical and commercial realities of the 21st century. This paper presents several real-world examples of how the SEC engineering staff has updated its approach to reserves assessment as well as numerous remaining unresolved areas of concern. These remaining issues are important, can lead to significant differences in reported quantities and values, and may result in questions about the "full disclosure" obligations to the SEC. Introduction For virtually all oil and gas producers, their company assets are the hydrocarbon reserves that they own through various forms of mineral interests, licensing agreements, or other contracts and that produce revenues from production and sale. Reserves are almost always reported as static quantities as of a specific date and classified into one or more categories to describe the uncertainty and production status associated with each category. The economic value of these reserves is a direct function of how the quantities are to be produced and sold over the physical or contract lives of the properties. Reserves owned by private and publicly owned companies are always assumed to be those quantities of oil and gas that can be produced and sold at a profit under assumed future prices and costs. Reserves under the control of state-owned or national oil companies may reflect quantities that exceed those deemed profitable under the commercial terms typically imposed on private or publicly owned companies.


Author(s):  
S. A. Zolina ◽  
I. A. Kopytin ◽  
O. B. Reznikova

In 2018 the United States surpassed Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the largest world oil producer. The article focuses on the mechanisms through which the American shale revolution increasingly impacts functioning of the world oil market. The authors show that this impact is translated to the world oil market mainly through the trade and price channels. Lifting the ban on crude oil exports in December 2015 allowed the United States to increase rapidly supply of crude oil to the world oil market, the country’s share in the world crude oil exports reached 4,4% in 2018 and continues to rise. The U.S. share in the world petroleum products exports, on which the American oil sector places the main stake, reached 18%. In parallel with increasing oil production the U.S. considerably shrank crude oil import that forced many oil exporters to reorient to other markets. Due to high elasticity of tight oil production to the oil price increases oil from the U.S. has started to constrain the world oil price from above. According to the majority of authoritative forecasts, oil production in the U.S. will continue to increase at least until 2025. Since 2017 the tendency to the increasing expansion of supermajors into American unconventional oil sector has become noticeable, what will contribute to further strengthening of the U.S. position in the world oil market and accelerate its restructuring.  


Focaal ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (52) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Behrends

The area around the border of Sudan and Chad, where Darfur lies, has been an unimportant and unknown backwater throughout history. Today, however, Darfur is all over the international press. Everybody knows about the grim war there. There is no oil currently in production in Darfur. However, there is oil in the south of neighboring Chad and in Southern Sudan, and there might be oil in Darfur. This article considers a case of fighting for oil when there is no oil yet. It takes into account the role of local actors doing the fighting, that is, the army, rebels, and militias; national actors such as the Sudanese and Chadian governments; and international actors, such as multinational oil companies, the United States, China, and the United Nations. It explains how oil can have disintegrative consequences even when it is still only a rumor about a future possibility.


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