Significant Differences in Proved Reserves Estimates Using SPE/WPC Definitions Compared to United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Definitions

2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (06) ◽  
pp. 520-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
D.R. Harrell ◽  
Thomas L. Gardner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
The United States ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Classification Systems ◽  
Direct Function ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Publicly Owned ◽  
Hydrocarbon Reserves ◽  
The U.S

Summary A casual reading of the SPE/WPC (World Petroleum Congresses) Petroleum Reserves Definitions (1997) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) definitions (1978) would suggest very little, if any, difference in the quantities of proved hydrocarbon reserves estimated under those two classification systems. The differences in many circumstances for both volumetric and performance-based estimates may be small. In 1999, the SEC began to increase its review process, seeking greater understanding and compliance with its oil and gas reserves reporting requirements. The agency's definitions had been promulgated in 1978 in connection with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and at a time when most publicly owned oil and gas companies and their reserves were located in the United States. Oil and gas prices were relatively stable, and virtually all natural gas was marketed through long-term contracts at fixed or determinable prices. Development drilling was subject to well-spacing regulations as established through field rules set by state agencies. Reservoir-evaluation technology has advanced far beyond that used in 1978;production-sharing contracts were uncommon then, and probabilistic reserves assessment was not widely recognized or appreciated in the U.S. These changes in industry practice plus many other considerations have created problems in adapting the 1978 vintage definitions to the technical and commercial realities of the 21st century. This paper presents several real-world examples of how the SEC engineering staff has updated its approach to reserves assessment as well as numerous remaining unresolved areas of concern. These remaining issues are important, can lead to significant differences in reported quantities and values, and may result in questions about the "full disclosure" obligations to the SEC. Introduction For virtually all oil and gas producers, their company assets are the hydrocarbon reserves that they own through various forms of mineral interests, licensing agreements, or other contracts and that produce revenues from production and sale. Reserves are almost always reported as static quantities as of a specific date and classified into one or more categories to describe the uncertainty and production status associated with each category. The economic value of these reserves is a direct function of how the quantities are to be produced and sold over the physical or contract lives of the properties. Reserves owned by private and publicly owned companies are always assumed to be those quantities of oil and gas that can be produced and sold at a profit under assumed future prices and costs. Reserves under the control of state-owned or national oil companies may reflect quantities that exceed those deemed profitable under the commercial terms typically imposed on private or publicly owned companies.

scholarly journals The Total S.A. Case: Meaning of “Investment” under the ILSA

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rex J. Zedalis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Clinton Administration ◽  
The United States ◽  
Oil Field ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Petroleum Resources ◽  
Petroleum Development ◽  
Oil Company ◽  
The U.S

On March 7, 1995, Conoco oil company of Houston, Texas, announced that it had entered into a contract with Iran to have a Netherlands-based affiliate assist in the development of the Sirri Island oil field. In response, the Clinton administration issued Executive Order No. 12,957, prohibiting participation by U.S. entities in the development of Iranian petroleum resources. Eventually, Conoco withdrew from its contract, but in early May of 1995 the administration stepped up its pressure on Iran by issuing Executive Order No. 12,959, prohibiting U.S. entities from using foreign entities they owned or controlled to make investments in or conduct trade transactions with Iran. On July 13 of that year, the French oil company Total S.A. entered into an agreement with Iran to replace Conoco in developing the Sirri Island field, and over the next several months Iran struck nearly a dozen petroleum development agreements worth in excess of $50 million each with other foreign oil companies. Within a couple of months, both Houses of the U.S. Congress took up consideration of proposals to complicate Iran’s ability to develop its hydrocarbon resources. By the end of 1995, the proposals, which even extended to wholly foreign entities organized and operating outside the United States, had come to include Libya as well. Final passage of one of the proposals, specifically, H.R. 3107, took place in the Senate and the House in July 1996. It was signed into law as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) on August 5.

Notes from the Editors, June 2020

2020 ◽  
pp. c2-63
Author(s):  
The Editors
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Oil Industry ◽  
The United States ◽  
Oil Price ◽  
Tight Oil ◽  
Shale Oil ◽  
The World ◽  
The U.S

buy this issue The current massive oil glut is the product of the effects of the tight oil or shale oil revolution, which for a time turned the United States into the biggest oil and gas producer in the world. Now, suddenly as a result of an overproduction of world oil, made far worse by the sudden falloff in demand due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we are witnessing the possible euthanasia of the U.S. tight oil industry, bleeding cash even before the oil price collapse and encumbered with mountains of debt.

scholarly journals Deep oil. Offshore deposits of the Gulf of Mexico

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
K. O. Iskaziev ◽  
P. E. Syngaevsky ◽  
S. F. Khafizov
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Gulf Of Mexico ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
The United States ◽  
Upper Jurassic ◽  
Seismic Facies ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
History Of ◽  
Hydrocarbon Deposits

This article continues a series of reviews of the worlds oil and gas basins, where active exploration and development of hydrocarbon deposits in superdeep (6 km +) horizons are taking place, as probable analogues of projects in the Caspian megabasin, primarily the Eurasia project. In this regard the Gulf of Mexico is of great interest, since this region is very well studies over such a long history of its development and thus makes it possible to analyze a huge amount of data collected during this time. The Gulf of Mexico includes the deep-water, offshore and coastal parts of three countries the United States, Mexico and Cuba, and is one of the most important oil and gas provinces in the world. Its deposits are represented by various complexes from the Middle Jurassic to modern sediments, with a total thickness of 14,000 m and more. Exploration for hydrocarbons has been going on here for almost 100 years. During this time, various new technologies have been developed and successfully applied, such as forecasting abnormally high reservoir pressure, cyclostratigraphy and seismic facies analysis, characterization of low-resistivity productive reservoirs and the search for ultra-deep hydrocarbon deposits. Of all the variety of objects developed in the Gulf, in the context of the study of deep deposits, the main interest and possible associations with the Caspian megabasin are the deposits of the Norflet Formation of the Upper Jurassic, which are discussed in the main part of this article. Of course, we are not talking about a direct comparison; in particular, the aeolian origin of part of the section makes this object significantly different. Nevertheless, according to the authors, studying it, as well as understanding how a successful project for its development is being implemented right before our eyes, can provide a lot of important information for working in the deep horizons of the Caspian region. The article is divided into two parts. The first examines the geological history of the formation of the Gulf of Mexico Basin, the features of the deep-lying productive complex of the Norflet Formation. The second part provides information about the history of exploration of the Norflet productive complex, characteristics of the main discoveries, as well as the prospects for discoveries of new superdeep deposits in the Norflet Formation within the Gulf of Mexico (sectors of the United States and Mexico). Analysis of the history of the development of this complex by the global player Shell, is very important, as one of the scenarios for the development of deep horizons in other oil and gas basins, incl. Caspian. International Oil Companies are able to mobilize the necessary resources and technology to effectively address this challenge.

Energy in the 1980s - The world energy outlook to the mid-1980s: the effect of an alternative supply path in the United States

1974 ◽  
Vol 276 (1261) ◽  
pp. 413-430 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Growth Rate ◽  
Energy Consumption ◽  
World Wide ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
The United States ◽  
Total Energy Consumption ◽  
World Energy ◽  
World Energy Consumption ◽  
The U.S

A brief review and interpretation of regional and world-wide trends in total energy consumption and its composition since the end of World War II is given. A review of energy-consumption projections into the 1980s — world-wide and regional — focuses on the role of international trade in oil in achieving supply—demand balances. The prospective position of the U.S. as a major oil importer is emphasized. An analysis of the sensitivity of world supply prospects to alternative assumptions concerning the growth of indigenous sources of supply in the United States of America and Western Europe is presented. The post-war growth rate in world energy consumption averaged out to over 5% per annum. Marked shifts in regional shares and variations in regional growth rates have occurred, but regional differences in the level of per capita energy use, while narrowing, remain conspicuously wide. The sharp relative decline of coal during this period was accompanied by a dramatic relative increase in both oil and gas. The rapid growth of world energy consumption as a whole, the continued shift toward oil and the rising volume of U.S. oil imports all failed to be adequately anticipated in past energy projections. A standard projection to the mid-1980s shows: world-wide energy growth of between 5-J- and 6% ; an even faster growth rate for oil, resulting in about 115x10® barrels (18.3 x 10® m3)/day in 1985 (compared to 53 x 102 b (8.4 x 104 m3)/d in 1972); and the addition of the U.S. to the ranks of the major oil importers. The Middle East, along with areas of lesser reserve holdings, is in all likelihood physically capable of accommodating expected oil demand to the mid-1980s. But the acute degree of dependence that this would pose for major consuming regions prompts the question of how a greatly expanded indigenous producing capability in the U.S. could blunt the one-sidedness of the demand-supply picture. Recently completed research suggests that, within an appropriate policy setting, the U.S. could probably meet all but 20% of its oil and gas internally by 1985 - and do so at real prices no higher than the $6/barrel ($38/m3>) delivered price rapidly being approached by Persian Gulf crude. Such a development, along with whatever contribution can be made by Western Europe’s own petroleum-producing capability, can perhaps introduce a stabilizing element of major importance into world energy flows.

scholarly journals Building bridges in the post-Trump era: can conservation scientists help recover bipartisan support for U.S. environmental protection?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kurz ◽  
Arthur D. Middleton ◽  
Melissa Chapman ◽  
Kyle Schuyler Van Houtan ◽  
Christine Wilkinson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Environmental Science ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
The United States ◽  
Environmental Conservation ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
Policy Action ◽  
The U.S

Nearly three-fourths of U.S. citizens support strong environmental protection, yet the U.S. Congress has passed little momentous environmental legislation since 1980. This dearth of new bipartisan environmental policy has coincided with increasing political polarization, which has risen to historic levels in the United States. Though broadly supported by the U.S. public, environmental protection has wavered as the Trump administration has left the Paris Climate Agreement, lifted oil and gas regulations, and deprioritized endangered species conservation. This discordance between U.S. public opinion and policy action leads us to ask: How did environmental conservation become so polarized, and how can the U.S. environmental movement recover broad bipartisan support? As conservation scientists in academia, we believe our community has contributed to the partisan breakdown over the environment. We also believe that scientists have a critical role to play in bridging this divide. In this essay, we consider how “the environment” has become a political wedge issue in the United States and identify opportunities for conservation scientists to: (a) better respond to public needs and values; and (b) build support for bipartisan conservation policies through greater proximity with local communities, re-structured academic advancement policies, and 21st century approaches to training environmental science students.

scholarly journals Why the CHIPS Are Down: Stock Buybacks and Subsidies in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Lazonick ◽  
◽  
Matt Hopkins ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Semiconductor Industry ◽  
The United States ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Chip Technology ◽  
The Government ◽  
Stock Buybacks ◽  
The U.S

The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) is promoting the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act, introduced in Congress in June 2020. An SIA press release describes the bill as “bipartisan legislation that would invest tens of billions of dollars in semiconductor manufacturing incentives and research initiatives over the next 5-10 years to strengthen and sustain American leadership in chip technology, which is essential to our country’s economy and national security.” On June 8, 2021, the Senate approved $52 billion for the CHIPS for America Act, dedicated to supporting the U.S. semiconductor industry over the next decade. As of this writing, the Act awaits approval in the House of Representatives. This paper highlights a curious paradox: Most of the SIA corporate members now lobbying for the CHIPS for America Act have squandered past support that the U.S. semiconductor industry has received from the U.S. government for decades by using their corporate cash to do buybacks to boost their own companies’ stock prices. Among the SIA corporate signatories of the letter to President Biden, the five largest stock repurchasers—Intel, IBM, Qualcomm, Texas Instruments, and Broadcom—did a combined $249 billion in buybacks over the decade 2011-2020, equal to 71 percent of their profits and almost five times the subsidies over the next decade for which the SIA is lobbying. In addition, among the members of the Semiconductors in America Coalition (SIAC), formed specifically in May 2021 to lobby Congress for the passage of the CHIPS for America Act, are Apple, Microsoft, Cisco, and Google. These firms spent a combined $633 billion on buybacks during 2011-2020. That is about 12 times the government subsidies provided under the CHIPS for America Act to support semiconductor fabrication in the United States in the upcoming decade. If the Congress wants to achieve the legislation’s stated purpose of promoting major new investments in semiconductors, it needs to deal with this paradox. It could, for example, require the SIA and SIAC to extract pledges from its member corporations that they will cease doing stock buybacks as open-market repurchases over the next ten years. Such regulation could be a first step in rescinding Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-18, which has since 1982 been a major cause of extreme income inequality and loss of global industrial competitiveness in the United States.

scholarly journals Comparison of risk management regulation from a corporate governance perspective within the German and united states legal areas

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 138-148
Author(s):  
Remmer Sassen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Governance System ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
The U.S

Risk management is one of the main corporate governance components or management tasks. This paper details a comparison of risk management regulation from a corporate governance perspective of listed stock corporations in Germany and the United States (U.S.). Obviously, there are differences and commonalities between the national legal norms and the regulatory levels of risk management in both countries. The comparison helps to understand different traditions and practices in terms of how significant corporate governance rules are for risk management. Therefore, this article intends to inspire future research on the regulation of risk management across different regions and explore the relevance of national interests in the regulation of risk management. A principal finding of the comparison is that the U.S. corporate governance system seems to be more strongly regulated than the German system. This results from the powerful and coordinating role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Thus, the seemingly more liberal system of non-binding standards in the U.S. has a higher impact on the regulation of risk management than in Germany.

scholarly journals International Dimension of Contemporary U.S. Energy Policy: Challenges for Russia and the World

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-353
Author(s):  
Yury Viktorovich Borovsky
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Energy Policy ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
The United States ◽  
Western Hemisphere ◽  
Energy Industry ◽  
Energy Market ◽  
Global Energy ◽  
The World ◽  
The U.S

Since the mid-2000s, the American energy industry has undergone profound changes. Having made the so-called shale revolution and achieved impressive results in the field of energy efficiency and renewable energy, the United States of America has not only radically reduced its dependence on imported hydrocarbons, but has begun to increase exports of these commodities. Given the economic weight of the U.S., such changes have significantly transformed the global energy market, requiring leading oil and gas exporters (including Russia) to take non-standard steps (for example, the OPEC+ deal). They also created serious prerequisites for Washington’s revision of its traditional energy policy in the international arena. The author makes a conclusion that the United States has not yet come out of the paradigm of net oil importer, which was formed after the first world oil crisis of 1973-1974. This means that Washington is still committed to the traditional principles of it’s foreign energy policy: diversification of oil import sources; promotion of free trade in world energy; special relations with oil exporters in the Persian Gulf and the strategic importance of the Middle East; reliance on energy suppliers from the Western hemisphere, etc. However, having radically reduced oil and gas imports and having got the opportunity to export them, the United States could not help but bring something new to its energy policy. While still prioritizing security of energy supply, the U.S. under B. Obama has started talking about the American energy independence, and D. Trump has proclaimed the global energy dominance as a new key American goal. The author assumes that global energy dominance implies Washington’s aggressive promotion of the American energy exporters, as well as its intention to turn the U.S. into a technological leader and a key regulator in the global energy market. Moreover, the U.S. has become freer in the matter of sanctions and other pressure on major oil and gas exporters, guided by its geopolitical and economic interests. Due to the growth of the American oil and gas export potential, the confrontation between Moscow and Washington in the energy sector, which began during the Cold war, has now acquired an additional economic dimension. Previously, the United States has tried to restrain the development of the Soviet, later Russian energy industry, but acted purely in the logic of political rivalry, not economic competition. Thus, in the foreseeable future the United States is unlikely to abandon its attempts to politicize and discredit Russia as an energy supplier to Europe and other regions of the world.

Evolution of Oil and Gas Waste/Soil Remediation Regulations

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. E. Deuel ◽  
G. H. Holliday
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South America ◽  
Waste Management ◽  
Soil Remediation ◽  
Petroleum Hydrocarbon ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Animal Health ◽  
The United States ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Waste Soil

The meaningful United States regulation of onshore oil and gas field waste/soil commenced in the mid 1980’s in response to a series of state, federal, industry and international initiatives. Most initiatives centered on the design, construction and operation of earthen pits used in the exploration and production of oil and gas (E&P). Prior to this time, earthen pits were constructed as needed by the operator and used in all phases of E&P activity. Chief concerns of the regulators were focused on what had gone into pits historically, what was going into them currently and was the E&P exemption excluding high volume E&P wastes from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations justified. Several investigations, including the comprehensive field study by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1987, determined E&P wastes are ostensibly non-hazardous. EPA concluded regulation of E&P wastes under RCRA Subtitle C was not necessary. To this day there is no U. S. federal regulatory program with exclusive jurisdiction over exempt E&P wastes. Other studies, primarily industry and academic, focusing on land limiting constituents, management practices and pit closure strategies revealed sodium salts and petroleum hydrocarbon in the form of diesel range organics were the primary limiting constituents. One state, Louisiana, adopted the technical aspects of these studies and developed a comprehensive regulation known as Statewide Order 29-B, which was based on the concept of limiting constituents and defined post closure performance standards. These standards limited salinity, sodicity, total metals and total petroleum hydrocarbon (oil & grease) with values varying with respect to landform, land use and closure technique. Other states have adopted some of the concepts and criteria advanced under 29-B but none are as comprehensive. Obviously there is a need to control what goes into pits and how pits should be closed. The industry would best be served by adopting the concepts and standards set forth in the Louisiana 29-B regulation. A few of the provisions could be changed to make it more palatable to industry without sacrificing the protection afforded human and animal health, safety and the environment. Internationally, particularly countries in South America embraced USEPA protocol for testing characteristically hazardous wastes, but 1) without the framework to handle the relatively large volume of non-hazardous E&P waste generated and 2) no regulations or protocols for on-site waste management. Several operators, although partners with state owned oil companies, on their own volition, applied the concepts and standards under Louisiana’s 29-B to rainforests in South America and rice paddies in Indonesia. Canada and European oil and gas producing countries have developed stringent standards not based on science, which favor costly treatment technologies. Generally, these countries prohibit cost effective on-site waste management and closure techniques. This paper traces the evolution of waste/soil remediation within the United States and internationally. We trace the progress as a function of time; the impetus for regulation; and probable future controls.

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