Assertoric Quality

2019 ◽  
pp. 624-641
Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Sufficiency Condition

The practice of assertion is said to be governed by an epistemic norm, with one of the leading candidates being the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). In this paper, I focus on the sufficiency condition of this norm, according to which one is properly positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. I show that this condition is false, and that the arguments to this end reveal something very important about the nature of epistemically proper assertion: the assertoric quality of the epistemic support, such as whether the belief in question has firsthand or secondhand grounding, is just as important as the quantity of epistemic support.

The Epistemic Norms of Action

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Epistemological Principle ◽  
Knowledge Norms

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.

The Epistemic Norms of Assertion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Norms Of Assertion ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Conversational Context

Chapter 7 extends the discussion of epistemic norms to the linguistic realm. Again, it is argued that a Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNAS) is inadequate and should be replaced with a Warrant-Assertive Speech Act norm (WASA). According to WASA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her conversational context in order to meet the epistemic requirements for asserting that p. This epistemic norm is developed and extended to assertive speech acts that carry implicatures or illocutionary forces. Particular attention is given to the development of a species of WASA that accounts for assertive speech acts having a directive force, such as a recommendation. Thus, Chapter 7 contributes to the debates concerning epistemic norms of assertions.

Human Fallibility and Fallibilism about Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Brown
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Concessive Knowledge Attributions ◽  
To Come ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Threshold Problem

This chapter distinguishes between fallibilism and infallibilism by appeal to entailment: infallibilists hold that knowledge that p requires evidence which entails that p; fallibilists deny that. It outlines some of the recent motivations for infallibilism, including the infelicity of concessive knowledge attributions, the threshold problem, closure, and the knowledge norm of practical reasoning. Further, we see how contemporary infallibilists attempt to avoid scepticism by appeal either to a generous conception of evidence or a shifty view of knowledge, such as contextualism. The chapter explains the book’s focus on non-shifty versions of infallibilism which defend a generous conception of evidence. It ends by defending the entailment definition of infallibilism over other potential definitions, and outlining the chapters to come.

scholarly journals The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Mueller
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Novel Variant

AbstractI will argue for a novel variant of the knowledge norm for practical reasoning. In Sect. 2, I will look at current variations of a knowledge norm for practical reasoning and I will provide reasons to doubt these proposals. In Sects. 3 and 4, I develop my own proposal according to which knowledge is the norm of apt practical reasoning. Section 5 considers objections. Finally, Sect. 6 concerns the normativity of my proposed knowledge norm and its significance.

scholarly journals Charge completeness and the massless charge lattice in F-theory models of supergravity

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Morrison ◽  
Washington Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Gauge Group ◽  
Gauge Factor ◽  
Connected Component ◽  
Standard Assumption ◽  
Supergravity Theory ◽  
Positivity Condition ◽  
Sufficiency Condition ◽  
Weil Group ◽  
Full Charge ◽  
Made In

Abstract We prove that, for every 6D supergravity theory that has an F-theory description, the property of charge completeness for the connected component of the gauge group (meaning that all charges in the corresponding charge lattice are realized by massive or massless states in the theory) is equivalent to a standard assumption made in F-theory for how geometry encodes the global gauge theory by means of the Mordell-Weil group of the elliptic fibration. This result also holds in 4D F-theory constructions for the parts of the gauge group that come from sections and from 7-branes. We find that in many 6D F-theory models the full charge lattice of the theory is generated by massless charged states; this occurs for each gauge factor where the associated anomaly coefficient satisfies a simple positivity condition. We describe many of the cases where this massless charge sufficiency condition holds, as well as exceptions where the positivity condition fails, and analyze the related global structure of the gauge group and associated Mordell-Weil torsion in explicit F-theory models.

scholarly journals A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Way
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Position ◽  
Good Reasoning

Abstract Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.

Evolved Fuzzy NN Control for Discrete-Time Nonlinear Systems

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Chen ◽  
A. Babanin ◽  
Assim Muhammad ◽  
B. Chapron ◽  
C. Y. J. Chen
Keyword(s):  
Nonlinear Systems ◽  
Asymptotic Stability ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Fuzzy Neural Network ◽  
Bat Algorithm ◽  
Linear Matrix ◽  
Rule Base ◽  
Sufficiency Condition ◽  
Fuzzy Neural ◽  
Linear Differential

To guarantee the asymptotic stability of discrete-time nonlinear systems, this paper proposes an Evolved Bat Algorithm (EBA) fuzzy neural network (NN) controller. In the evolved fuzzy NN modeling, an NN model and linear differential inclusion (LDI) representation are established for arbitrary nonlinear dynamics. This representation is constructed by the use of sector nonlinearity to convert a nonlinear model to the multiple rule base of the linear model, and a new sufficiency condition to guarantee asymptotic stability in the Lyapunov function is implemented in terms of linear matrix inequalities. The proposed method is an enhancement of existing methods which produces good results.

scholarly journals Unitarity Sufficiency Condition in Some Concrete Cases

1979 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
pp. 1357-1366
Author(s):  
S. K. Chan ◽  
I. A. Sakmar
Keyword(s):  
Sufficiency Condition

ON THE KNOWABILITY OF EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM: A REPLY TO M. MONTMINY AND W. SKOLITS

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Freitag
Keyword(s):  
Original Problem ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Recent Contribution ◽  
Precise Nature ◽  
Knowledge Norm

AbstractIt has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments (Freitag 2011, 2012, 2013b). In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal (2014), their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply ventures to demonstrate that their objections are ineffective, since they rest on a confusion of two different ways in which contextualism is unknowable. The precise nature of the original problem will be clarified and my solution briefly restated.

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