Aquinas’ Reception in Contemporary Metaphysics

Author(s):  
Gyula Klima

This chapter reviews Aquinas’ reception in contemporary metaphysics as it is practised today in the analytic tradition, focusing on issues that make this reception problematic. I identify the main trouble spots based on the historical development of the analytic tradition. The discussion will target those major conceptual hurdles inherent in the analytic tradition that Aquinas’ genuine reception faces regarding his metaphysical notions of being and essence and his conception of the hylomorphic composition of material substances. This strategy will allow me to introduce an ‘analytically acceptable’ sketch of the metaphysical foundations of Aquinas’ unique position on the ontological status of the human intellective soul, which places it on a razor-thin borderline between the material and purely spiritual realms of reality, running right across our very being. I conclude with a summary of the conceptual prerequisites of a genuine and full reception of Aquinas’ thought in contemporary metaphysical discourse.

Anthropos ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 471-480
Author(s):  
Georg W. Oesterdiekhoff

Ethnography and historical disciplines report on different kinds of folk or premodern societies’ ideas and superstitions regarding shadows that are not to find among the collective representations of modern, industrial societies. Shadows were seen as material substances and as doubles of persons and objects, as mystical beings capable to exert all kinds of magical influences. After certain time, however, these ideas were replaced by the rational view that seems so self-evident to every modern adult person. The article shows that developmental psychology has found the same mystical ideas among children. Only older children, due to their psychological development, discover the rational explanation of the origin and nature of shadows. It is argued that the strict parallel of the ontogenetic and historical development of the understanding of shadows is by no means an exception but reflects the same parallel concerning the development of the complete understanding of nature and world, physics and cosmos. Overall, developmental psychology delivers a key to understanding the historical development of humankind, thus forming a basis for ethnology or cultural anthropology specifically, or the human disciplines in general. This in former times widely demonstrated view was replaced by the currently prevailing ideas of “cultural relativism” and “universalism of mankind” especially after 1980. However, the empirical data do not support relativism and universalism but rather the developmental approaches of the previous generations of the human disciplines.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 131-145
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Jaeger ◽  
Jeremy Sienkiewicz

In this paper, we provide an account of the ontological status of Christ’s dead body, which remained in the tomb during the three days after his crucifixion.  Our account holds that Christ’s dead body – during the time between his death and resurrection – was prime matter without a substantial form.  We defend this account by showing how it is metaphysically possible for prime matter to exist in actuality without substantial forms.  Our argument turns on the truth of two theses: (i) God is able to produce all acts of secondary causes without those secondary causes, and (ii) Substantial forms are secondary causes of the actuality of prime matter.  We argue that the metaphysical possibility of matter without form is perfectly consistent with holding both there is only one substantial form in a material substance and that prime matter is pure potentiality.  Moreover, we argue that the metaphysical possibility of matter without form does little-to-no damage to our natural understanding of material substances.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Sander Verhaegh

During the past few decades, a radical shift has occurred in how philosophers conceive of the relation between science and philosophy. A great number of analytic philosophers have adopted what is commonly called a “naturalistic” approach, arguing that their inquiries ought to be in some sense continuous with science. This chapter sketches the history of naturalism, distinguishes between different types of naturalism, and shows that contemporary naturalists in the analytic tradition typically view Quine as the intellectual father of their position. Furthermore, this chapter introduces Quine’s naturalism and examines the status of contemporary Quine scholarship, arguing that although many excellent papers have been written about Quine’s philosophy, little work has been devoted to reconstructing Quine’s naturalism and/or its historical development. The chapter ends with an overview of the structure of the book.


Author(s):  
Jaime Nubiola

Criticisms of analytic philosophy have increased in intensity in the last decade, denouncing specifically its closing in on itself, which results in barrenness and ignorance of real human problems. The thought of C. S. Peirce is proposed as a fruitful way of renewing the analytic tradition and obviating these criticisms. While this paper is largely a reflection on Hilary Putnam’s study of the historical development of analytic philosophy, not only can some of its main roots be traced back to Peirce, but also the recent resurgence of pragmatism can be regarded as a pragmatist renovation of the analytic tradition. Further, Peirce’s thought offers suggestions for tackling some of the most stubborn problems in contemporary philosophy, thereby enabling us to shoulder once more the philosophical responsibility which has been abdicated by much of twentieth-century philosophy. The most accurate understanding of Peirce is to see him as a traditional and systematic philosopher, but one dealing with the modern problems of science truth, and knowledge from a valuable personal experience as a logician and an experimental researcher in the bosom of an interdisciplinary community of scientists and thinkers.


Author(s):  
Monika Woźniak

AbstractThe discussion on the principle of non-contradiction (1946–1957) between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers was one of the major philosophical discussions in Polish philosophy of this period. In my text, I carefully reconstruct this discussion and outline its relation to Soviet debates on the subject. I show that the change in Schaff’s position happened in the early 1950s under the combined influence of the Lvov–Warsaw School and the changes in the official Soviet position regarding formal logic. I discuss the aftermath following Schaff’s change in attitude towards the analytic tradition for the development of Polish philosophy, as well as the critique of this change by Jarosław Ładosz. In my reconstruction of the latter, I focus on the problem of the historical development of science. I refer to Ilyenkov’s critique of Schaff, opposing synchronic (“positivist”) and diachronic (“dialectical”) concepts of knowledge. As I argue, these opposing concepts of science can be seen as a genuine issue at stake in the Polish discussion as well, especially in the polemic between Schaff and Ładosz.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document