A Rational Choice Perspective on Political Executives
Rational choice theory has shaped the study of executive politics in important ways. We contend most of the rational choice literature on executive politics can be seen as exploring the consequences of two related problems that all executives confront: credible commitment and delegation. The credible commitment problem arises because executives require political support. This support is forthcoming only to the extent that the executive can assure potential supporters that the executive will faithfully advance their interests. How, then, does an executive make a credible commitment to advance his or her supporters’ interests? The delegation problem arises because executives must rely on subordinates to carry out their agenda. Such delegation is efficient from executive’s perspective only to the extent that subordinates competently and faithfully execute their orders. How, then, does an executive choose and monitor his or her subordinates? We briefly review the key components of rational choice theory that distinguish it from other theoretical approaches. We then examine how the two different problems have different expressions in parliamentary and presidential systems.