Hedge Funds and Limited Partnership Agreements

2021 ◽  
pp. 86-110
Author(s):  
Na Dai
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Current Literature ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Limited Partnership ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis

Due to the lack of regulations in the hedge fund industry and the great discretion given to hedge fund managers during the daily operations, limited partnership agreements are the most important if not the only tool for investors to incentivize and monitor hedge fund managers and protect their own interests. This chapter reviews the current literature on hedge funds contractual terms and their implications for fund performance and risk taking, before discussing the variation of the contracts conditional on the jurisdiction of the hedge fund. Finally, the development of hedge funds limited partnership agreements is investigated as many jurisdictions have imposed new regulations on hedge funds after the 2008 financial crisis.

Style and Skill: Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and Momentum

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5505-5531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Grinblatt ◽  
Gergana Jostova ◽  
Lubomir Petrasek ◽  
Alexander Philipov
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Short Sales ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Liquidity Provision ◽  
Stock Picking ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

Classifying mandatory 13F stockholding filings by manager type reveals that hedge fund strategies are mostly contrarian, and mutual fund strategies are largely trend following. The only institutional performers—the two thirds of hedge fund managers that are contrarian—earn alpha of 2.4% per year. Contrarian hedge fund managers tend to trade profitably with all other manager types, especially when purchasing stocks from momentum-oriented hedge and mutual fund managers. Superior contrarian hedge fund performance exhibits persistence and stems from stock-picking ability rather than liquidity provision. Aggregate short sales further support these conclusions about the style and skill of various fund manager types. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

Compensation and Incentives in Hedge Funds

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett C. C. Smith ◽  
Gaurav Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
High Water ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Fee Structure ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Structure Research ◽  
Subsequent Risk

Although hedge funds typically report a 2 and 20 fee structure, some investors want to change this standard practice. Many funds sustained substantial losses as a result of the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Given the strategies used by hedge funds, they were not supposed to incur large losses. Subsequent underperformance to equity during the bull market recovery left many investors questioning the fee structure. Research shows the fee structure is more fluid than typically reported. The reluctance of many hedge fund managers to appear weak perpetuates the reported 2 and 20 fee structure. Fees respond to the relative bargaining power between managers and investors. Some investors speculate that the fee structure encourages managers to undertake high-risk strategies. However, fees and other incentive provisions, such as a high-water mark, provide better opportunities for talented managers to enter the industry, mitigating their subsequent risk-taking.

Corporate governance, European bank performance and the financial crisis

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-371
Author(s):  
Mohamed A. Ayadi ◽  
Nesrine Ayadi ◽  
Samir Trabelsi
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bank Performance ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Euro Zone ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis paper aims to analyze the effects of internal and external governance mechanisms on the performance and risk taking of banks from the Euro zone before and after the 2008 financial crisis.Design/methodology/approachTo avoid macroeconomic problems and shocks and because of data availability, the authors select some countries of the Euro zone, namely, France, Belgium, Germany and Finland, during the 2004-2009 period. These countries share similar macroeconomic environments (unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates). All the data relating to the banks are manually drawn from the supervising reports submitted to banks and are available on the banks’ websites and/or on that of the AMF website. The banks included in our sample are drawn from the list of European central banks onwww.ecb.intFindingsThe empirical results show that banks undertake tradeoffs between different governance mechanisms to alleviate the intensity of the agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers. The findings also confirm that internal mechanisms and capital regulations are complementary and significantly impact bank performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis analysis can be extended through studying the interaction between bondholders’ governance and shareholders’ governance and their impact on the 2008 financial crisis.Practical implicationsThe changes in banking governance help banks find a useful and necessary way to avoid ill-considered risks that can cause a systemic risk. Therefore, some conditions should be met so that banking governance can contribute to the economic development.Social implicationsCulture and mentality of good banking governance must grow as much as possible through awareness-raising, training, promotion, recognition of performance, enhancing procedure transparency and stability of good banking governance and regulations, strengthening the national capacity to fight against corruption, and preventive mechanisms.Originality/valueThis paper complements previous studies, mainly those of Andres and Vallelado (2008) who examine the impact of the components of the board on banking performance and of Laeven and Levine (2009) who estimate the combined effect of regulatory and ownership structure on the risk-taking of each bank.

Direct or Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds: A European Dilemma

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Tosetti Dardanelli
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Investment Fund ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Eu Legislation

This paper deals with the debate on the methods to regulate hedge funds, with a particular focus on direct or indirect regulation. After having briefly examined the pros and the cons of directly regulating these investment schemes, it comes to the conclusion (largely shared by most scholars) that hedge funds should not be directly regulated, while regulation should concern their management companies and, most of all, their counterparts (lenders in the first place) with a view to managing systemic risk. In addition, regulation should also set precise thresholds for access which should aim at protecting unsophisticated investors from hazardous moves, without, however, falling into the trap of regulating hedge fund themselves.The attention is then turned to the European Union and to its Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD). An analysis is conducted on some of the most significant approaches to hedge fund regulation which have fuelled (and are partly still fuelling) the debate within EU institutions in its struggle to provide Member States with a valid response to the financial crisis, and on some key provisions of the first level AIFMD. In this light the author concludes that, despite the declared intent to regulated fund managers, the directive often seems to regulate hedge fund themselves. This does not seem to be in line with the thoughts of most scholars and market operators on hedge fund regulation and also looks at odds with other pieces of EU legislation (in particular with the so-called “Newcits”).

Mathematics without Apologies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Harris
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Pop Culture ◽  
First Century ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Dinner Party ◽  
Mathematical Life ◽  
Personal Experiences ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Guided Tour

What do pure mathematicians do, and why do they do it? Looking beyond the conventional answers, this book offers an eclectic panorama of the lives and values and hopes and fears of mathematicians in the twenty-first century, assembling material from a startlingly diverse assortment of scholarly, journalistic, and pop culture sources. Drawing on the author's personal experiences as well as the thoughts and opinions of mathematicians from Archimedes and Omar Khayyám to such contemporary giants as Alexander Grothendieck and Robert Langlands, the book reveals the charisma and romance of mathematics as well as its darker side. In this portrait of mathematics as a community united around a set of common intellectual, ethical, and existential challenges, the book touches on a wide variety of questions, such as: Are mathematicians to blame for the 2008 financial crisis? How can we talk about the ideas we were born too soon to understand? And how should you react if you are asked to explain number theory at a dinner party? The book takes readers on an unapologetic guided tour of the mathematical life, from the philosophy and sociology of mathematics to its reflections in film and popular music, with detours through the mathematical and mystical traditions of Russia, India, medieval Islam, the Bronx, and beyond.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document