Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hawthorne ◽  
Ofra Magidor
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
John Broome

In this chapter we offer a series of reflections on the ideology of reasons. Among the normative reasons for an agent X to phi, it is common to distinguish between those reasons that the agent possesses and those which she does not. After some background (5.1), we argue (5.2) that possession of a reason requires knowledge. In 5.3, we argue, first, that the normative reason construction is factive, and second, that possession ascriptions can be factored into a normative reason construction and a possession claim. In 5.4, we compare two prominent views concerning the nature of normative reasons: those of Kearns and Star and of John Broome. While both views have significant merit, we argue that they also face some non-trivial challenges, and discuss a range of considerations that can help to adjudicate between these two conceptions.

Weighing Reasons

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Kearns ◽  
Daniel Star
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Interesting Topic ◽  
John Broome

This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis concerning normative reasons, proposed and defended in earlier papers. According to this thesis, a fact is a normative reason for an agent to Φ just in case this fact is evidence that this agent ought to Φ. John Broome and John Brunero have presented a number of challenging criticisms of this thesis which focus, for the most part, on problems that it appears to confront when it comes to the topic of the weighing of reasons. Our paper responds to all of the criticisms that these critics have provided, shedding fresh light on this interesting topic in the process.

Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Planning Agency ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
John Broome

Planning agency involves characteristic norms of practical rationality—in particular, norms of consistency and of means-end coherence of intentions. This essay defends the idea that there is normally a normative reason of self-governance in favor of conformity to these norms in the particular case. I contrast this self-governance-based view of these norms of plan rationality with the myth theories of Joseph Raz and Niko Kolodny, and with the cognitivism of Kieran Setiya. I explain how this view responds to concerns (including an argument from Setiya that focuses on nonmodifiable intentions) about the inappropriate bootstrapping of normative reasons. And I explore relations between this view and related work of John Broome, and between this view and Harry Frankfurt’s work on volitional necessity.

Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Governance Strategy ◽  
John Broome ◽  
Over Time

Is there a diachronic rationality constraint on an agent’s intentions over time, one that favors stability of intention? I argue that there is reason to think that there is some such diachronic rationality constraint and that a plausible approach to this matter draws on our understanding of a planning agent’s self-governance over time. On natural assumptions, we normally have a reason of diachronic self-governance to conform to this constraint. This argues against what we can call brute shuffling in cases (of a sort discussed by John Broome) of continued incomparability over time. And we can embrace this norm without endorsing unacceptable forms of bootstrapping of normative reasons. In this way we extend the self-governance strategy for supporting basic norms of plan rationality from a focus on synchronic norms to this focus on a diachronic norm.

What Matters in Survival

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Ehring
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Motivating Reasons ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
Extreme View ◽  
What Matters

This work is about what matters in survival, that is, about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit, common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In this work, it is argued that this Parfitian thesis, revolutionary though it is, does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view, “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns—such as a commitment to find a vaccine for the Covid-19 virus—there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View, and is, in effect, something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.

scholarly journals Authoritatively speaking : a speech pragmatic analysis of authority and power

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alek Willsey
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Normative Influence ◽  
Pragmatic Analysis ◽  
Normative Status

A speaker needs authority to perform some speech acts, such as giving orders. A paradigm example of this is when a manager orders their employee to take out the trash; ordinarily, these words will give the employee a normative reason of considerable strength for them to take out the trash, and so they should take out the trash, all things considered. I will explore three related problems regarding a speaker's authority. First, there is the problem of defining how and within what scope a speaker has the capacity to set norms for others -- I will call this the Authority Problem. An answer to the Authority Problem would settle what constitutes a manager's capacity to change the normative status of their employee. Second, there is the problem of showing how a speaker uses their authority to produce felicitous authoritative speech -- I will call this the Illocutionary Authority Problem. An answer to this problem will show how a manager exercises their capacity to alter the normative status of their employee, assuming they have such a capacity. Third, there is the problem of explaining how a speaker's right to produce authoritative speech can be systematically infringed -- I will call this the Problem of Discursive Injustice. An answer to this problem will explain how a manager can have their orders systematically misfire despite exercising their capacity to alter the normative status of others in the usual way, such as when the employee routinely misapprehends their manager's orders as being requests. To answer each of these problems within the philosophy of language, I draw on recent work in social and political philosophy. I defend the view that a speaker's authority to alter what someone else ought to do (by giving them and taking away normative reasons for action) is constituted entirely by the respect their addressee(s) have for their use of power directed at them. Further, a speaker's powers are the linguistic tools by which they attempt to exert this normative influence over their addressee(s). Finally, a speaker may be discursively entitled to use their power in specific institutions because of the role they occupy, and this speech can systematically misfire despite this entitlement because they are wrongfully deprived of the respect they deserve.

The Language of “Ought,” and Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Bronfman ◽  
J. L. Dowell
Keyword(s):  
Representative Sample ◽  
Formal Semantics ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Deontic Modals ◽  
The One

The bulk of this chapter addresses the question: what is the proper semantics for deontic modal expressions in English? We consider a representative sample of recent challenges to a Kratzer-style formal semantics for modal expressions, as well as the rival views—Fabrizio Cariani’s contrastivism, John MacFarlane’s relativism, and Mark Schroeder’s ambiguity theory—those challenges are thought to motivate. We argue that the challenges can be met and that the rival views face challenges of their own. Our overall conclusion is that a Kratzer-style semantics remains the one to beat. With this assumption in place, we turn to the question: what is the connection between true deontic modal statements and normative reasons? We argue that acceptance of Kratzer’s semantics for deontic modals can, in many cases, leave open for substantive normative theorizing the question of whether an agent has a normative reason to comply with what she ought to do.

Achievements and Intelligibility

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Errol Lord
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Causal Chain ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Motivating Reasons ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
In Virtue Of

The type of view defended about correctly responding to normative reasons doesn’t fit nicely into the landscape of views in the philosophy of mind and action about reacting for reasons. This is because it doesn’t account for cases where we react for reasons that are not normative reasons—i.e., cases where we merely react for motivating reasons. This chapter defends a view about what it is to react for motivating reasons. According to this view, what it is for A to X for a consideration r is for A to X in virtue of the fact that A conceives of r as a normative reason to X. It is argued that this account solves the classic deviant causal chain problems for causal theories of reacting for reasons. Finally, disjunctivism about reacting-for-reasons is defended: the view that reacting for motivating reasons is different in kind from reacting for normative reasons.

The Coherent and the Rational

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Errol Lord
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Reasons Responsiveness ◽  
John Broome ◽  
The Way

This chapter motivates Reasons Responsiveness by situating it within the metaethical literature on rationality. The first task is to show how Reasons Responsiveness can overcome prominent arguments given by John Broome that seek to show that rationality is not a function of normative reasons. The second task is to show that Reasons Responsiveness can capture the data that motivates rival coherentist accounts in the metaethical literature. It is argued that usually one is irrational when incoherent and that Reasons Responsiveness can explain this because of the way in which reasons transmit. Some forms of incoherence are not irrational. Reasons Responsiveness can explain this as well. The upshot is that Reasons Responsiveness can explain the data that motivates rival views without incurring their main problems.

scholarly journals Elusive Reasons and the Motivational Constraint

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Cohen Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons

The Motivational Constraint says that a consideration is a normative reason for an agent to act only if it is logically possible for the agent to act for that reason, or at least to be moved so to act. Because it is entailed by a number of prominent views about normative reasons, its truth or falsehood has important implications. Mark Schroeder (2007) and Julia Markovits (2014) have criticized the Motivational Constraint for its inconsistency with so-called “elusive reasons.” Elusive reasons are normative reasons that an agent cannot act for. Hille Paakkunainen (2017), Neil Sinclair (2016), and Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever (2012) have offered three strategies for reconciling the Motivational Constraint with elusive reasons. In this paper, I argue that these strategies fail in that conciliatory task. Furthermore, I argue for the existence of a type of elusive reason not heretofore discussed in the literature, and show how these strategies also fail to reconcile this type of elusive reason with the Motivational Constraint.

Normative Reasons and Moral Reasoning in the Mengzi and the Xunzi

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 33-52
Author(s):  
Philippe Brunozzi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Moral Questions

Given that moral reasoning is directed towards providing well-supported answers to moral questions, our understanding of what it means to be a normative reason that speaks in favor or against a line of conduct largely informs our conception of moral reasoning. This article focuses on this relationship between moral reasoning and normative reasons and tries to clarify how the early Confucian conceptions of moral reasoning we find in the Mengzi and the Xunzi are conditioned by their underlying accounts of normative reasons. This enables us to better locate and synthesize the remarks concerning moral reasoning we find in these texts.

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