Philosophical Naturalism

Author(s):  
Hilary Kornblith

This article focuses on naturalistic approaches to philosophical methodology. It begins with an overview of naturalism, its relationship with views about the a priori, and the implications of a philosopher’s commitment to naturalism for proper method in philosophy. It then considers the disagreement among naturalists about the tenability of the a priori/a posteriori distinction with respect to naturalism, before turning to a discussion of the use of science to address philosophical questions. It also looks at work in epistemology which draws on results in the cognitive sciences as a way of understanding the nature of knowledge, with particular emphasis on the role of Alvin Goldman in getting epistemologists to pay attention to the import of empirical work for understanding epistemological issues. Finally, it explores experimental philosophy as a methodological approach to philosophical questions and comments on the debate over the legitimacy of armchair methods in philosophy.

This is the second volume in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, a series with the aim of providing a venue for publishing work in this emerging field. Experimental philosophy is a new movement that seeks to use empirical techniques to illuminate some of the oldest issues in philosophy. It is an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and related disciplines, such as linguistics and sociology. Although the movement is only a few years old, it has already sparked an explosion of new research, challenging a number of cherished assumptions in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences. This volume includes both theoretical and experimental chapters as well as chapters that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. It is divided into three parts that explore epistemology, moral and political philosophy, and metaphysics and mind, showcasing the diversity of work that has arisen as traditionally philosophical questions have met the tools of social science.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 1589-1595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth T.M. Leermakers ◽  
Edith H. van den Hooven ◽  
Oscar H. Franco ◽  
Vincent W.V. Jaddoe ◽  
Henriëtte A. Moll ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-25
Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson ◽  

The article presents an anti-exceptionalist view of philosophical methodology, on which it is much closer to the methodology of other disciplines than many philosophers like to think. Like mathematics, it is a science, but not a natural science. Its methods are notprimarily experimental, though it can draw on the results of natural science. Likefoundational mathematics, its methods are abductive as well as deductive. As in the natural sciences, much progress in philosophy consists in the construction of better models rather than in the discovery of new laws. We should not worry about whether philosophy is a priori or a posteriori, because the distinction is epistemologically superficial.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-296
Author(s):  
Anand Vaidya ◽  

Recent work in philosophical methodology by experimental philosophers has brought to light a certain kind of skepticism about the role of intuitions in a priori philosophical inquiry. In this paper I turn attention away from a priori philosophical inquiry and on to the role of intuition in experimental design. I argue that even if we have reason to be skeptical about the role of intuition in a priori philosophical inquiry, we cannot remove intuition from inquiry altogether, because appeals to intuition are essential for experimental design.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Thomas Bennett
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  

As we explore the role of philosophy in HCI it is useful to look to examples from related fields. Weoutline two ways of engaging with philosophy, found in the cognitive sciences, which might beinstructive for HCI. First we point to the risk of Hegelian arguments - a priori arguments againstempirical research. Then we point to a more positive model, a highly practice-engaged approach wecall "small-p" philosophy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 156-167
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson

This chapter replies to Boghossian’s defence of the epistemological depth of the a priori–a posteriori distinction in Chapter 9 against the author’s critique in Chapter 8. It shows that nothing essential to the argument depends on the distinction between inner and outer experience. It then explains how Boghossian provides no workable alternative to the account in Chapter 8 of the role of imagination in generating knowledge in the key examples, and why the absence of such an alternative leaves Boghossian in danger of drifting into very extensive scepticism about mathematical knowledge. It is also noted that epistemological externalism does not figure as a premise in the key arguments of Chapter 8, although they may offer support for such externalism.


Reasoning ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 101-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian

What happens when we reason our way from one proposition to another? This process is usually called “inference” and this chapter examines its nature. It revisits the author’s earlier attempts to explain the nature of the process of inference, and tries to further clarify why we need the type of “intellectualist” account of that process that he has been pursuing. In the course of doing so, the chapter traces some unexpected connections between our topic and the distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification, and tries to draw some general methodological morals about the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of mind.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-95
Author(s):  
G. D. Gefan

Among the problems of mathematical education, the article highlights: (1) insufficient attention paid to the fundamental, structure-forming role of mathematics; (2) speculative learning, its isolation from practice. The concept of theoretical-empirical dualism in teaching is formulated as the unity of the abstract-theoretical and experimental-empirical cognitive activity of students. According to the author, a priori and a posteriori mathematical knowledge should be distinguished. A priori knowledge either seems to an individual to be completely obvious, indisputable, or he assimilates it uncritically, “on faith”. A posteriori mathematical knowledge subjectively arises in the process of student’s intense theoretical and practical activity, and is being actively and comprehensively verified experimentally – either using mathematical applications, or through mathematical experiments. The empirical component of teaching mathematics implies a variety of forms and methods of active (including computer) and professionally oriented learning, giving experience in independent formulation of problems, joint search for ways to solve them, interaction and teamwork. Particular attention is paid to the use of mathematical experiments in those frequent cases when it is necessary to replace or supplement complex evidence, illustrate new knowledge, and give research skills. Monte Carlo mathematical experiments are demonstrated, which serve, in particular, as a bright, figurative, and convincing form of reinforcing theoretical knowledge in the field of stochastic branches of mathematics. The research work of students is considered as the highest stage of the students’ theoretical-empirical activity. The article proposes subjects of research activities of students in the process or upon completion of the study of probabilistic and statistical disciplines.


1997 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 267-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin D. Sumrall

Morphological data can be used effectively in phylogenetic analyses to determine relationships among echinoderm clades. These data in the form of characters are simply hypotheses that any observed morphological state among taxa results from a single character state transformation and is therefore, homologous. All such character states must be scored as potentially homologous unless the hypothesis of homology can be rejected by the tests of similarity, conjunction (a priori), or character congruence (a posteriori). Fossils are not always more incomplete than extant forms and incompleteness originates from non-preservation and long phylogenetic branches. The greatest strength of fossil data lies in its ability to effectively shorten long phylogenetic branches by occurring on the tree nearer to the nodes than extant terminal taxa and thus circumventing positively misleading results encountered in parsimony analysis under long branch conditions.


Author(s):  
Donald T. Siebert

This chapter argues for the History of England’s importance in Hume’s overall achievement. The chapter describes the History’s genesis, reception, methods, and aims. In the role of historian, Hume shared with the ancients the assumption that history is an elevated genre functioning as the “Mistress of Wisdom.” Yet this long work is more notable for historiographical innovation. Like William Robertson and Edward Gibbon, Hume wrote conjectural or philosophical history. Like Machiavelli, Voltaire, and Montesquieu, Hume wrote civil or cultural history, including detailed information on political events, law, commerce, and manners. In a larger sense, the History demonstrates a great philosopher leaving his study (or “closet”) to deal with that practical, sometimes intractable world outside the study. A priori reasoning is tested against that a posteriori reality provided by historical evidence. Thus, in writing the History, Hume became an empiricist in an almost literal sense.


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