Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions

2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 829-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cong Wang ◽  
Fei Xie
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 642-656
Author(s):  
Ahmad Ismail ◽  
Wassim Dbouk ◽  
Christina Azouri

This paper is the first to investigate the effect of firm governance characteristics on takeover premiums and returns using an industry-adjusted corporate governance measure. We demonstrate that the worse the governance characteristics of the target firm are, relative to the industry average, the more its efficiency is improved by the acquisition, and the greater the synergistic gains and target’s return are at the announcement of an acquisition. The study also finds a positive relation between the acquirer’s governance characteristics and the combined returns, supporting the management entrenchment hypothesis. Unlike prior research that does not control for industry average governance index, we do not find a relation between acquirer returns and the industry-adjusted governance characteristics of the acquirer or the target. Our results advocate the notion that firm-specific governance partially explains the returns of a merger as industry-specific characteristics play a major role in the determination of corporate governance quality


Author(s):  
Simon Butt ◽  
Tim Lindsey

This chapter deals with the law regulating business vehicles in Indonesia. The principal focus of the chapter is companies (including publicly listed companies, foreign investment, and shari’a companies) but it also covers partnerships, cooperatives, and state-owned enterprises, as well as the different regulations that apply to each. It explains the rules governing shares and capital, and directors and commissioners, as well shareholders’ rights, including in relation to general meetings. The rules for mergers and acquisitions are covered, as are corporate audit and reporting requirements. The chapter then summarizes the corporate governance regime applied in Indonesia through a mix of legislative provisions, codes of conduct, and other rules, including corporate social responsibility obligations. It also explains Indonesia’s corporate crime regime.


Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter examines, from a traditional perspective, several areas where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has impacted corporate governance in a meaningful way. By way of example, these subjects include insider trading, qualitative materiality, the role of gatekeepers (such as outside directors, attorneys, and accountants), the Commission’s use of disclosure to influence conduct, the implementation by subject companies of undertakings pursuant to SEC enforcement proceedings, and mergers and acquisitions (including tender offers and going-private transactions). This chapter’s focus is on the manner in which the SEC for well over 50 years has impacted corporate governance by means of exercising its rule-making and oversight authority.


2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1072 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vikas Mehrotra ◽  
Dimitri van Schaik ◽  
Jaap Spronk ◽  
Onno Steenbeek

AbstractMergers in Japan have the dubious distinction of not creating wealth for shareholders of target firms, in sharp contrast to what occurs in much of the rest of the world. Using a sample of 91 mergers from 1982 through 2003 we document several distinctive features of the merger market in Japan: Mergers tend to be countercyclical and appear to be driven chiefly by creditor concerns. In particular, where the merging firms share a common main bank, we find that merger gains are lower. Overall, our results point to a market that is distinctly less shareholder focused than that in the U.S., and a market where creditors play an important, perhaps dominant, role in corporate governance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 965-986 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Tampakoudis ◽  
Michail Nerantzidis ◽  
Demetres Soubeniotis ◽  
Apostolos Soutsas

Purpose The purpose of this study is twofold: First, to assess the economic impact of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) on European acquiring firms from the beginning of the sixth merger wave onward. And second, to investigate the effect of CG mechanisms such as board size, voting rights and anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) on acquirers’ gains, along with a set of control variables. Design/methodology/approach For the purpose of the study, the authors use a sample of 349 completed M&As across all business sectors between European firms from 01/01/2003 to 31/12/2017. Abnormal returns are estimated by applying an event study methodology, and the effects of CG mechanisms are assessed with univariate and multivariate cross-sectional regressions. Findings The authors present evidence that acquirers realize significant positive excess returns upon the announcement of M&As. The authors find past profitability to be a strong indicator of value creation, while most of the traditional firm-specific and deal variables fail to interpret the results. The authors’ analysis indicates that the examined CG measures have a significant effect on acquirer’s gains. More specifically, the authors find that boards in excess of eight directors are negatively related to announcement-period abnormal returns. In contrast, the wealth effects for acquiring firms are positively related to shareholders’ voting rights and/or to the number of ATPs. The estimated coefficients of all three CG mechanisms are statistically significant across alternative model specifications. Research limitations/implications A clear implication is that the existence of certain CG mechanisms leads to value-enhancing strategic decisions for European acquirers. In terms of policy direction, the authors’ findings assist practitioners and/or national and transnational institutions in perceiving the efficacy of certain CG practices. Practical implications This study indicates that Corporate Governance Statements (CGSs) fail to provide adequate information to investors to understand in-depth the CG mechanisms that companies apply. Thus, the authors recommend that CGSs should provide not only narrative information but also information that may generate value for shareholders and other stakeholders as well. Such information should be qualitative and/or quantitative in nature and be made available to market participants to support their decision-making. Originality/value To the authors knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the effect of CG on the economic impact of M&As for European acquirers, using three widely examined CG mechanisms, namely, the board size, the voting rights and the ATPs. The authors’ empirical findings form the basis for further examination of the linkage between M&As and CG, with the intention of establishing the appropriate CG framework that will ensure shareholder wealth creation. This line of research could produce new insights in the field, allowing investors and policymakers to appreciate the benefits of effective CG.


2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond A. K. Cox

This paper is a selected literature review of the theories and empirical evidence on mergers and acquisitions. Initially, the fundamental factors, and the underlying theories, causing mergers is explored. Subsequently, the empirical evidence is examined on: (1) the operating performance of the acquirers and the acquired firms before and after the merger, (2) stockholder wealth impact, (3) form of payment used to complete the acquisition, (4) conglomerate mergers, and (5) corporate governance affecting the firm’s ownership and control.


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