The relationship between management attributes and accounting comparability

Purpose This study aims to concern about the relationship between management managerial attributes (management entrenchment, narcissism and overconfidence of the chief executive officer, board effort and real and accrual earnings management) and comparability of financial statements listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In other words, this paper aims to answer the question that “whether managerial attributes contribute significantly to the comparability of financial statements or not”. Design/methodology/approach The multivariate regression model is used for hypothesis testing. The hypotheses were examined using a sample of 768 listed observations on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2012–2017 and by using from the multivariate regression pattern based on panel data techniques and the random-effects model. Findings The obtained results show a significant and negative relationship between management entrenchment, real and accrual earnings management, comparability and the relationship between management narcissism, overconfidence and board effort and comparability of financial statements is positive and significant. Originality/value As the present study is the pioneer study on such topics in the emerging markets, it provides valuable information concerning the intrinsic and acquired features of the management for users, analysts and legal institutions with a considerable impact on the comparability of financial statements. Moreover, this study’s results contribute significantly to the development of science and knowledge in this field and fill the gap in the literature.

PENGARUH KARAKTERISTIK PERUSAHAAN, KINERJA PERUSAHAAN, DAN MANAGEMENT ENTRENCHMENT TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA

ABSTRACTThe purposes of this study is to investigate the impact of firm characteristics, firm performances, and management entrenchment on earnings management by using firms registered on Bursa Efek Indonesia for the period 2015-2019. Sampling method that is used in this study is purposive sampling method so the objects should meet the criteria. The exception sample for this study is financial firms due to differences on some regulations of reporting and firms without complete annual and financial report published for the period 2015-2019. The secondary data were obtained from firms’ financial report and annual report that were published on the firms’ official website and Bursa Efek Indonesia’s website. In this study, earnings management is measured with Modified Jones Model. This study analyzed using fixed effect model approach panel data regression analysis. The results show that growth opportunities, board size, current ratio, auditor size, financial statement, and CEO ownership have no significant influences. Leverage, firm size, asset growth and turnover, and cash flow show significant negative influences. On the other hand, long-term and short-term debts, and CEO tenure show significant positive influences. Some results are not compatible with hypothesis since there are limitations on the period time and methods that were chosen. ABSTRAKPenelitian ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk meneliti adanya pengaruh dari karakteristik perusahaan, kinerja perusahaan, dan management entrenchment terhadap manajemen laba dengan menggunakan perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2015-2019. Metode pengambilan sampel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode purposive sampling sehingga objek penelitian harus sesuai dengan kriteria. Sampel data yang dikecualikan adalah perusahaan keuangan atau finansial karena memiliki regulasi pelaporan yang berbeda dan perusahaan yang tidak memiliki kelengkapan laporan keuangan dan laporan tahunan periode 2015-2019. Data sekunder diperoleh dari laporan keuangan dan laporan tahunan perusahaan yang dipublikasikan pada website resmi perusahaan dan website Bursa Efek Indonesia. Dalam penelitian ini, manajemen laba diukur dengan Modified Jones Model. Penelitian ini dianalisis menggunakan analisis regresi data panel dengan pendekatan fixed effect model. Hasil pengujian menunjukan bahwa peluang pertumbuhan, ukuran dewan direktur, rasio lancar, ukuran auditor, laporan keuangan, dan kepemilikan direktur utama tidak memiliki pengaruh signifikan. Sedangkan leverage, ukuran perusahaan, pertumbuhan dan perputaran aset, dan arus kas operasional memiliki pengaruh signifikan negatif terhadap manajemen laba. Utang jangka panjang dan pendek, serta masa jabatan direktur memiliki pengaruh signifikan positif. Hasil pengujian yang tidak sesuai dengan hipotesis dapat disebabkan karena adanya keterbatasan dalam periode waktu dan metode pengukuran yang digunakan.JEL : M410, M480

The relationship between business strategy and management entrenchment

PurposeThe present study's main objective is to assess the relationship between business strategy and management entrenchment in listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, 128 firms have been assessed during 2012–2017. The management entrenchment variable is measured using five factors: management ownership, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, managers' compensation and CEO duality.FindingsThe obtained results show a negative and significant relationship between the aggressive strategy of the current year (and that of the previous year) and management entrenchment such that adopting an aggressive business strategy in the current and previous years can debilitate the management entrenchment. Moreover, there is a negative and significant relationship between the current year's defensive strategy and management entrenchment, and employing a defensive business strategy in the current year can also weaken the management entrenchment. At the same time, there is no significant relationship between the previous year's defensive business strategy and management entrenchment.Originality/valueManagerial entrenchment is a determining factor in the economy, and regarding the dominant norms in the emerging markets and developing countries, this factor is different from that of the developed countries. It is more important in some markets, like Iran that is dealing with economic sanctions. On the other hand, Tehran Stock Exchange observes numerous modifications, especially providing financial statements in accordance with international standards that are expected to affect the determination of business strategy in firms.

Does managerial entrenchment affect audit report lag?

We examine the association between audit report lag (ARL) and managerial entrenchment using data spanning 2008-2016. We use regression analysis and data obtained from publicly available sources to construct our sample consisting of 5,155 firm-year observations and 807 unique firms to investigate whether the behavior of entrenched managers influences the time it takes auditors to complete an audit. The length of the annual audit is the most critical determinant of the timeliness and relevance of the financial reports. Our proxy for managerial entrenchment is the entrenchment index (EINDEX) as constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell (2009). We find a negative relation between audit report lag and the entrenchment index. We stratify the entrenchment provisions in line with existing literature and find a negative association between the provisions that restrict shareholder rights and the provisions that discourage hostile takeovers. Overall, our findings suggest that management entrenchment curtails managerial opportunism and reduces the auditors’ efforts, and the time auditors spend to complete the audit.

Managerial ownership, audit committees and non-audit services

We extend prior research on corporate governance and non-audit services (NAS) by distinguishing between the management entrenchment region of management ownership and regions in which the interests of management and shareholders converge. Management entrenchment and convergence-of-interests regions were estimated for our sample of 5198 Australian firm-years. NAS is negatively (positively) associated with management ownership in the convergence-of-interests (entrenchment) regions. However, using a sub-sample based on firms that have audit committees, we find the association between NAS and management ownership is confined to the entrenchment region, while audit committee strength is negatively associated with NAS fees across all management ownership regions. JEL Classification: M42, M48

Management Entrenchment, Firm Characteristics and Earnings Management Of Conglomerate Companies In Nigeria

Sometimes the rivalry between shareholders and management is an indication of the level of entrenchment within the corporate environment. Managers are believed to routinely manipulate earnings in order to mislead shareholders about their company's actual economic outlook or performance. As a result, the study investigated the impact of managerial entrenchment, firm characteristics and earnings management of conglomerate companies in Nigeria. Employing the ex-post facto research design, the data was gathered from secondary source of the 6 listed conglomerate companies for the 11-year period running (2008-2018). The study used discretionary accruals a proxy for earnings management and to calculate discretionary accruals, the study used modified Jones model. The result showed that management entrenchment and firm characteristics have Impact on multinational firms ' earnings management in Nigeria. Specifically, from the conglomerate’s entrenchment proxies, CEO’s tenure has a positive and significant impact on earnings management (coff. =1.062821, p-value =0.0367) and management entrenchment as measured by CEO’s shareholding has a negative and insignificant effect on earnings management (coff. =-6252391, p-value = 0.4090) while firm size, profitability and leverage indicated a significant and positive impact on earnings management (coff, = 0.124587, p-value = 0.0000; coff. = 0.006647, p-value = 0.0431 and coff. = 0.032065, p-value = 0.0000). The study therefore recommended among others that management should reduce the debt in their capital structure in order to improve their companies’ value and their capital structure should be majorly financed by equity rather than debt and reduce CEOs tenure to minimise earnings management practices.

Shareholders and Takeover Bids: Revisiting the Poison Pill

This chapter assesses change-of-control transactions and the use of the defensive tactic known as the poison pill, a governance tool that often puts boards, rather than shareholders, in charge of a corporation’s response to a takeover. Much as in the MVS context, this separation of ownership of the corporation from its control may invite conflicts of interest, here between boards and shareholders. The chapter then asks how shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG) can and should inform regulation of this defensive tactic. It also considers management entrenchment theory and the shareholder-primacy norm in the context of changes of control. Both the normative and the positive aspects of SCG make it necessary to revisit the current legal balance between the interests of directors and the interests of target shareholders in takeovers.

Incentive Effects of Granting Equity-Based Payment on Reducing Top Executive Turnover

The main focus of the study is to examine the incentive effect of granting equity-based payments for reducing turnover among the executives. In specific, the study was guided on determining the influencing effects of managerial ownership and equity-based payment may reduce executive turnover among the Malaysian Listed companies. From the analysis, the main finding shows that firms with equity-based programme with a presence of family control indicates that turnover is likely to be a lower. This implies that family ties play a significant role for removing of inefficient executives. And, where the family members are also served as the board members, the likelihood to shield from being removed is consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis. Then, extended examination results for the mix pay components of cash and equity reveal the turnover is found to produce less incentive for executives to stay in the firm. The result implies that executives are willing to lose their equity benefits from unexercised value of shares equity and nd the firms fail to restrain executives’ departure as the findings documented in past studies.

The relationship between management characteristics and firm performance

Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between management characteristics including management capability, management entrenchment, agency costs and overconfidence and firm performance in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange market. Design/methodology/approach The research population includes 125 companies after applying systematic elimination sampling method during 2010-2016. The primary measure for companies’ performance is return on assets and Demerjian et al. (2012a) model is used to measure managerial characteristics. Findings The results indicated that two management characteristics, namely, management capability and overconfidence are positively associated with firm performance and improve the level of performance. Agency costs did not have any significant effect on firm performance and management entrenchment leads to deterioration in firm performance. Originality/value The paper focuses on managerial characteristics and firm performance, which the results may very helpful to companies and investors to hiring managers with specific characteristics. Moreover, the results may give strength to further studies.