Conference Papers: Providing Humanitarian Relief and Protection in the Future The Problems of Moral Hazard: Humanitarian Aid During Violent Conflict

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 230-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.-K. Pease
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice

This chapter attempts to sum up the conclusions that can be drawn about the Irish Supreme Court from the surveys and analyses in foregoing chapters. It highlights the constraints placed on the Court’s decision-making, especially its lack of power to turn away many appeals. Some of the Court’s principal achievements are reviewed but some of the opportunities it has failed to exploit are also referred to. The future of the Court is considered, especially in light of the creation of the Court of Appeal in 2014. Attention is given to the importance of strong leadership at the Chief Justice level and to the need for more public pronouncements from the judges in lectures and conference papers. Final remarks are made on how the Court compares to supreme courts in other common law countries.


The Drone Age ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 195-233
Author(s):  
Michael J. Boyle

Chapter 7 argues that drones will enable international organizations, NGOs, and advocacy groups to monitor human rights abuses, deliver relief, and pressure governments for change. Small surveillance drones are ideally suited for taking on the “dull, dirty, and dangerous” jobs that are needed in these situations. In the future, drones will be able to transport and drop food and medicine in response to crises in places where humanitarian organizations are reluctant to send their own personnel. Drones will ultimately give these actors another tool with which they can monitor events on the ground and possibly shame governments into stronger action. But drones may also increase the ambitions of IOs/NGOs to intensify the pace of humanitarian relief and social change, even if doing so is unsustainable.


1988 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
TED ROBERT GURR

Modern states are powerful, resilient institutions, the most durable of which have established and consolidated their rule through conquest, revolution, and war. Successful involvement in violent conflict leads to the development of militarized and police states and reinforces elite political cultures that favor the use of coercion in future disputes. If warfare has unfavorable outcomes, elites will prefer noncoercive strategies in the future. From these and other propositions are derived models of the processes by which garrison states emerge and persist in autocracies and democracies. States with high material capabilities are more likely to become garrison states than weaker states, which tend to avoid international conflict and to rely on accommodation in internal conflicts. States with low political capabilities are susceptible to revolutionary overthrow and the establishment of revolutionary garrison states. The role of diversion of domestic conflicts to the external environment also is considered. One general conclusion is that only homogeneous democracies with low power capabilities and limited alliance obligations are unlikely to develop the institutions and political culture of militarized and police states.


Author(s):  
Matthew Bywater

AbstractThis paper explores and illustrates the diverse manifestations of the phenomenon of the ‘humanitarian alibi’, drawing upon historical and contemporary cases of violent conflict in order to identify substitutionary phenomena by governments and international actors. It affirms the existence of substitution process where humanitarian aid intervention substitutes for the prevention and resolution of violent conflict and the protection of civilian populations. The paper argues for expanding the humanitarian alibi, however, to take into account how international aid intervention compensates for both the systemic neglect of conflict related crises and for the systemic harm that exacerbates and perpetuates these crises. It also challenges the suggestion that the humanitarian alibi phenomenon is the product of a bygone era, and finds that the use of aid as a substitute for peacemaking can co-exist alongside the use of aid as a direct component of international intervention.


2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 1717-1753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliezer M. Fich ◽  
Anh L. Tran ◽  
Ralph A. Walkling

AbstractIn acquisitions, target chief executive officers (CEOs) face a moral hazard: Any personal gain from the deal could be offset by the loss of the future compensation stream associated with their jobs. Larger, more important parachutes provide greater relief for these losses. To explicitly measure the moral hazard target CEOs face, we standardize the parachute payment by the expected value of their acquisition-induced lost compensation. We examine 851 acquisitions from 1999–2007, finding that more important parachutes benefit target shareholders through higher completion probabilities. Conversely, as parachute importance increases, target shareholders receive lower takeover premia, while acquirer shareholders capture additional rents from target shareholders.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-116
Author(s):  
Paul S. Cha

Abstract During the 1950s a number of private and voluntary aid organizations (PVOs) in the United States mobilized to address the humanitarian crisis caused by the Korean War. However, the activities and roles PVOs played in both providing humanitarian relief in South Korea and shaping American perceptions of the country are poorly understood. This article examines the strategies PVOs employed in their campaigns to convince Americans to contribute aid. The existence of need was a necessary but not sufficient condition. As scholars of humanitarian aid have argued, potential donors might view images of suffering with pity and sympathy but then quickly turn away. Donors must feel a sense of solidarity to move beyond sympathy and act in compassion. This work demonstrates that PVOs tried to create narratives of commonality between Americans and South Koreans. However, a reliance on images of poverty—which were critical to raise money—conflicted with the message that South Koreans were, like Americans, independent and hardworking people. The aid groups’ strategic attempts to mitigate this dissonance by focusing on the supposedly weak (elderly, women, children, and amputees) had the unintended consequence of casting South Korea as an emasculated nation needing to be “saved.”


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