Glazebrook, Hon. Dame Susan (Gwynfa Mary), (born 1956), a Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, since 2012

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Matthew Barber

In the Supreme Court decision of Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, Tipping J put forward an approach to contact interpretation that, while indebted to that of Lord Hoffmann, was expressed differently and promoted the use of evidence of prior negotiations. Despite not gaining the support of any of the other sitting judges, this approach was swiftly taken up in the lower courts and, until recently at least, seems to have been accepted as representing New Zealand law. This article attempts a comprehensive examination of Tipping J’s approach. It concludes that, while coherent in principle, the detail of the approach is flawed in a number of ways, especially the way in which evidence of subsequent conduct is assumed to work. The future of Tipping J’s approach is considered.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Nicholas Kirk

This paper examines the development of adaptive management in New Zealand’s resource management case law. In particular, this paper investigates a Supreme Court decision (Sustain Our Sounds Inc v King Salmon New Zealand Co Ltd), which established a set of criteria for implementing adaptive management through New Zealand’s Resource Management Act. This paper describes King Salmon’s initial request for aquaculture permits, the Supreme Court appeal, and the Supreme Court’s justification for an adaptive management approach. Analyzing this justification, this paper explores the remaining constraints using an adaptive management approach to enable a more agile and flexible resource management system in New Zealand.


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-468
Author(s):  
Gordon Thatcher

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler

The paper examines whether there was any basis for Parliament to enact section 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003 in regard to human rights decisions of the Court of Appeal. The paper asks whether the Court of Appeal has indeed been "activist" in its human rights decisions. The discussion focuses on the areas where judicial activism might be suspected, firstly the filling of legislative gaps, and secondly statutory interpretation, with a special focus on implied repeal. Relevant decisions of the House of Lords under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) are used as a contrast to the decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The paper comes to the conclusion that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has not been activist in the area of human rights.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Webb

<p>Burial disputes are something of a novelty in New Zealand. Most are resolved amicably by those with ties to the deceased. The exception to has been the long-running case of Takamore v Clarke, the matter finally being resolved by the Supreme Court this year. Burial disputes raise fundamental issues of religious and cultural identity (including tikanga Māori), personhood, and the meaning of family. Despite their rarity in New Zealand, the response of the law in resolving such disputes should “fit the fuss”, having regard to the context in which they arise. This essay begins by discussing the form of resolution advocated for by the majority and minority in Takamore. Their respective approaches are essentially the same, especially with regards to tikanga Māori. This is one of Court intervention coupled with a merits-based assessment of the dispute. However the Court failed to apprehend there was no pressing need for burial, prior to creating a solution of general application. The experience of comparable jurisdictions, where speedy resolution has been necessary (such as Australia) demonstrates that the role of the Court applying such a test in burial disputes is misconceived. Rather than providing “justice” for the parties concerned, merits-based resolution produces unfair and unconvincing outcomes. The more just response is to ensure the parties never get to Court, via mediation. Insofar as agreement is not possible, the role of the Court should be supervisory in the application of a prescriptive test emphasising expediency and ensuring the dispute is resolved out of Court.</p>


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 447
Author(s):  
Sam McMullan

Many New Zealanders live in shared living arrangements. The result of this is that reasonable expectations of privacy are becoming more limited. State officials may conduct a lawful search where a person consents to such a search if that person has the authority to consent. Where people live in shared living arrangements, several people may have authority to consent to a search of the same property. This article explores the extent of a third party's power to consent to property searches where more than one person has authority to consent to a search under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. It argues that the question of reasonable expectations of privacy should not be assessed by reference to property rights. It also considers the concept of "apparent" authority which has arisen in New Zealand from the Court of Appeal's decision in R v Bradley as well as the concept of a present and objecting occupant which has arisen in the United States in the Supreme Court decision of Georgia v Randolph.


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