Collective memory in primate conflict implied by temporal scaling collapse

In biological systems, prolonged conflict is costly, whereas contained conflict permits strategic innovation and refinement. Causes of variation in conflict size and duration are not well understood. We use a well-studied primate society model system to study how conflicts grow. We find conflict duration is a ‘first to fight’ growth process that scales superlinearly, with the number of possible pairwise interactions. This is in contrast with a ‘first to fail’ process that characterizes peaceful durations. Rescaling conflict distributions reveals a universal curve, showing that the typical time scale of correlated interactions exceeds nearly all individual fights. This temporal correlation implies collective memory across pairwise interactions beyond those assumed in standard models of contagion growth or iterated evolutionary games. By accounting for memory, we make quantitative predictions for interventions that mitigate or enhance the spread of conflict. Managing conflict involves balancing the efficient use of limited resources with an intervention strategy that allows for conflict while keeping it contained and controlled.

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A Two-Player Iterated Survival Game

10.1101/465294 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

John Wakeley ◽

Martin Nowak

Keyword(s):

Overall Survival ◽

High Probability ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Single Step ◽

Mixed Population ◽

Pairwise Interactions ◽

Player Game ◽

Expected Payoffs ◽

Number Of Iterations ◽

Over Time

AbstractWe describe an iterated game between two players, in which the payoff is to survive a number of steps. Expected payoffs are probabilities of survival. A key feature of the game is that individuals have to survive on their own if their partner dies. We consider individuals with hardwired, unconditional behaviors or strategies. When both players are present, each step is a symmetric two-player game. The overall survival of the two individuals forms a Markov chain. As the number of iterations tends to infinity, all probabilities of survival decrease to zero. We obtain general, analytical results for n-step payoffs and use these to describe how the game changes as n increases. In order to predict changes in the frequency of a cooperative strategy over time, we embed the survival game in three different models of a large, well-mixed population. Two of these models are deterministic and one is stochastic. Offspring receive their parent’s type without modification and fitnesses are determined by the game. Increasing the number of iterations changes the prospects for cooperation. All models become neutral in the limit (n → ∞). Further, if pairs of cooperative individuals survive together with high probability, specifically higher than for any other pair and for either type when it is alone, then cooperation becomes favored if the number of iterations is large enough. This holds regardless of the structure of pairwise interactions in a single step. Even if the single-step interaction is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, the cooperative type becomes favored. Enhanced survival is crucial in these iterated evolutionary games: if players in pairs start the game with a fitness deficit relative to lone individuals, the prospects for cooperation can become even worse than in the case of a single-step game.

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Quasi-Periodic Oscillations in Dwarf Novae

International Astronomical Union Colloquium ◽

10.1017/s0252921100073310 ◽

1979 ◽

Vol 46 ◽

pp. 77-88

Author(s):

Edward L. Robinson

Keyword(s):

Binary Systems ◽

Outer Edge ◽

Light Curves ◽

Close Binary ◽

Bright Spot ◽

Dwarf Novae ◽

Periodic Oscillations ◽

High Frequencies ◽

Short Period ◽

Typical Time

Three distinct kinds of rapid variations have been detected in the light curves of dwarf novae: rapid flickering, short period coherent oscillations, and quasi-periodic oscillations. The rapid flickering is seen in the light curves of most, if not all, dwarf novae, and is especially apparent during minimum light between eruptions. The flickering has a typical time scale of a few minutes or less and a typical amplitude of about .1 mag. The flickering is completely random and unpredictable; the power spectrum of flickering shows only a slow decrease from low to high frequencies. The observations of U Gem by Warner and Nather (1971) showed conclusively that most of the flickering is produced by variations in the luminosity of the bright spot near the outer edge of the accretion disk around the white dwarf in these close binary systems.

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Is there a temporal correlation between cough and GERD?

Gastroenterology ◽

10.1016/s0016-5085(01)80584-9 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 120 (5) ◽

pp. A119-A119

Author(s):

A WUNDERLICH ◽

J MURRAY

Keyword(s):

Temporal Correlation

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Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

10.1017/cbo9781139173179 ◽

1998 ◽

Cited By ~ 2056

Author(s):

Josef Hofbauer ◽

Karl Sigmund

Keyword(s):

Population Dynamics ◽

Evolutionary Games

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Appropriation des Savoirs et Mémoire Collective

Swiss Journal of Psychology ◽

10.1024/1421-0185/a000099 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 72 (2) ◽

pp. 71-78

Author(s):

Sophie Richardot

Keyword(s):

Collective Memory ◽

Factorial Analysis ◽

Experimental Results ◽

Ancient History ◽

Historical Events ◽

Memoire Collective ◽

Obedience To Authority

The aim of this study is to understand to what extent soliciting collective memory facilitates the appropriation of knowledge. After being informed about Milgram’s experiment on obedience to authority, students were asked to mention historical or contemporary events that came to mind while thinking about submission to authority. Main results of the factorial analysis show that the students who do not believe in the reproducibility of the experimental results oppose dramatic past events to a peaceful present, whereas those who do believe in the reproducibility of the results also mention dramatic contemporary events, thus linking past and present. Moreover, the students who do not accept the results for today personify historical events, whereas those who fully accept them generalize their impact. Therefore, according to their attitude toward this objet of knowledge, the students refer to two kinds of memory: a “closed memory,” which tends to relegate Milgram’s results to ancient history; and an “open memory,” which, on the contrary, transforms past events into a concept that helps them understand the present. Soliciting collective memory may contribute to the appropriation of knowledge provided the memory activated is an “open” one, linking past to present and going beyond the singularity of the event.

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