scholarly journals Follow the straggler: zebrafish use a simple heuristic for collective decision-making

2020 ◽  
Vol 287 (1940) ◽  
pp. 20202690
Author(s):  
Kevin Kadak ◽  
Noam Miller

Animal groups often make decisions sequentially, from the front to the back of the group. In such cases, individuals can use the choices made by earlier ranks, a form of social information, to inform their own choice. The optimal strategy for such decisions has been explored in models which differ on, for example, whether or not agents take into account the sequence of observed choices. The models demonstrate that choices made later in a sequence are more informative, but it is not clear if animals use this information or rely instead on simpler heuristics, such as quorum rules. We show that a simple rule ‘copy the last observed choice', gives similar predictions to those of optimal models for most likely sequences. We trained groups of zebrafish to choose one arm of a Y-maze and used them to demonstrate various sequences to naive fish. We show that the naive fish appear to use a simple rule, most often copying the choice of the last demonstrator, which results in near-optimal choices at a fraction of the computational cost.

2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (44) ◽  
pp. E10387-E10396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Mann

The patterns and mechanisms of collective decision making in humans and animals have attracted both empirical and theoretical attention. Of particular interest has been the variety of social feedback rules and the extent to which these behavioral rules can be explained and predicted from theories of rational estimation and decision making. However, models that aim to model the full range of social information use have incorporated ad hoc departures from rational decision-making theory to explain the apparent stochasticity and variability of behavior. In this paper I develop a model of social information use and collective decision making by fully rational agents that reveals how a wide range of apparently stochastic social decision rules emerge from fundamental information asymmetries both between individuals and between the decision makers and the observer of those decisions. As well as showing that rational decision making is consistent with empirical observations of collective behavior, this model makes several testable predictions about how individuals make decisions in groups and offers a valuable perspective on how we view sources of variability in animal, and human, behavior.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Mann

The patterns and mechanisms of collective decision making in humans and animals have attracted both empirical and theoretical attention. Of particular interest has been the variety of social feedback rules, and the extent to which these behavioural rules can be explained and predicted from theories of rational estimation and decision making. However, models that aim to model the full range of social information use have incorporated ad hoc departures from rational decision-making theory to explain the apparent stochasticity and variability of behaviour. In this paper I develop a model of social information use and collective decision making by fully rational agents that reveals how a wide range of apparently stochastic social decision rules emerge from fundamental information asymmetries both between individuals, and between the decision-makers and the observer of those decisions. As well as showing that rational decision making is consistent with empirical observations of collective behaviour, this model makes several testable predictions about how individuals make decisions in groups, and offers a valuable perspective on how we view sources of variability in animal, and human, behaviour.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pickering

"Instead of considering »being with« in terms of non-problematic, machine-like places, where reliable entities assemble in stable relationships, STS conjures up a world where the achievement of chancy stabilisations and synchronisations is local.We have to analyse how and where a certain regularity and predictability in the intersection of scientists and their instruments, say, or of human individuals and groups, is produced.The paper reviews models of emergence drawn from the history of cybernetics—the canonical »black box,« homeostats, and cellular automata—to enrich our imagination of the stabilisation process, and discusses the concept of »variety« as a way of clarifying its difficulty, with the antiuniversities of the 1960s and the Occupy movement as examples. Failures of »being with« are expectable. In conclusion, the paper reviews approaches to collective decision-making that reduce variety without imposing a neoliberal hierarchy. "


Author(s):  
Claire Taylor

The chapter examines a major corruption scandal that involved the Athenian orator Demosthenes and an official of Alexander the Great. This episode reveals how tensions between individual and collective decision-making practices shaped Athenian understandings of corruption and anticorruption. The various and multiple anticorruption measures of Athens sought to bring ‘hidden’ knowledge into the open and thereby remove information from the realm of individual judgment, placing it instead into the realm of collective judgment. The Athenian experience therefore suggests that participatory democracy, and a civic culture that fosters political equality rather than reliance on individual expertise, provides a key bulwark against corruption.


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