scholarly journals Abstract concepts, language and sociality: from acquisition to inner speech

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna M. Borghi ◽  
Laura Barca ◽  
Ferdinand Binkofski ◽  
Luca Tummolini

The problem of representation of abstract concepts, such as ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’, has become particularly crucial in recent years, owing to the increased success of embodied and grounded views of cognition. We will present a novel view on abstract concepts and abstract words. Since abstract concepts do not have single objects as referents, children and adults might rely more on input from others to learn them; we, therefore, suggest that linguistic and social experience play an important role for abstract concepts. We will discuss evidence obtained in our and other laboratories showing that processing of abstract concepts evokes linguistic interaction and social experiences, leading to the activation of the mouth motor system. We will discuss the possible mechanisms that underlie this activation. Mouth motor system activation can be due to re-enactment of the experience of conceptual acquisition, which occurred through the mediation of language. Alternatively, it could be due to the re-explanation of the word meaning, possibly through inner speech. Finally, it can be due to a metacognitive process revealing low confidence in the meaning of our concepts. This process induces in us the need to rely on others to ask/negotiate conceptual meaning. We conclude that with abstract concepts language works as a social tool: it extends our thinking abilities and pushes us to rely on others to integrate our knowledge. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use, and representation in the brain’.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna M. Borghi ◽  
Laura Barca ◽  
Ferdinand Binkofski ◽  
Luca Tummolini

The problem of representation of abstract concepts, such as “freedom” and “justice”, has become particularly crucial in recent years, due to the increased success of embodied and grounded views of cognition. We will present a novel view on abstract concepts and abstract words. Since abstract concepts do not have single objects as referents, children and adults might rely more on input from others to learn them; we therefore suggest that linguistic and social experience play an important role for abstract concepts. We will discuss evidence obtained in our and other labs showing that processing of abstract concepts evokes linguistic interaction and social experiences, leading to the activation of the mouth motor system. We will discuss the possible mechanisms that underlie this activation. Mouth motor system activation can be due to re-enactment of the experience of conceptual acquisition, which occurred through the mediation of language. Alternatively, it could be due to the re-explanation of the word meaning, possibly through inner speech. Finally, it can be due to a metacognitive process revealing low confidence in the meaning of our concepts. This process induces in us the need to rely on others to ask/negotiate conceptual meaning. We conclude that with abstract concepts language works as a social tool: it extends our thinking abilities and pushes us to rely on others to integrate our knowledge.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angelo Cangelosi ◽  
Francesca Stramandinoli

This paper reviews computational modelling approaches to the learning of abstract concepts and words in embodied agents such as humanoid robots. This will include a discussion of the learning of abstract words such as ‘use’ and ‘make’ in humanoid robot experiments, and the acquisition of numerical concepts via gesture and finger counting strategies. The current approaches share a strong emphasis on embodied cognition aspects for the grounding of abstract concepts, and a continuum, rather than dichotomy, view of concrete/abstract concepts differences. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Lupyan ◽  
Bodo Winter

How abstract is language? We show that abstractness pervades every corner of language, going far beyond the usual examples of freedom and justice . In the light of the ubiquity of abstract words, the need to understand where abstract meanings come from becomes ever more acute. We argue that the best source of knowledge about abstract meanings may be language itself. We then consider a seemingly unrelated question: Why isn't language more iconic? Iconicity—a resemblance between the form of words and their meanings—can be immensely useful in language learning and communication. Languages could be much more iconic than they currently are. So why aren't they? We suggest that one reason is that iconicity is inimical to abstraction because iconic forms are too connected to specific contexts and sensory depictions. Form–meaning arbitrariness may allow language to better convey abstract meanings. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 2154-2171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Mestres-Missé ◽  
Thomas F. Münte ◽  
Antoni Rodriguez-Fornells

The meaning of a novel word can be acquired by extracting it from linguistic context. Here we simulated word learning of new words associated to concrete and abstract concepts in a variant of the human simulation paradigm that provided linguistic context information in order to characterize the brain systems involved. Native speakers of Spanish read pairs of sentences in order to derive the meaning of a new word that appeared in the terminal position of the sentences. fMRI revealed that learning the meaning associated to concrete and abstract new words was qualitatively different and recruited similar brain regions as the processing of real concrete and abstract words. In particular, learning of new concrete words selectively boosted the activation of the ventral anterior fusiform gyrus, a region driven by imageability, which has previously been implicated in the processing of concrete words.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence W. Barsalou ◽  
Léo Dutriaux ◽  
Christoph Scheepers

From the perspective of the situated conceptualization framework, the primary purpose of concepts is for categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action (including communication and social interaction). To the extent that important situational elements are categorized and integrated properly, effective goal-directed action follows. Over time, frequent patterns of co-occurring concepts within situations become established in memory as situated conceptualizations, conditioning the conceptual system and producing habitual patterns of conceptual processing. As a consequence, individual concepts are most basically represented within patterns of concepts that become entrained with specific kinds of physical situations. In this framework, the concrete versus abstract distinction between concepts is no longer useful, with two other distinctions becoming important instead: (i) external versus internal situational elements, (ii) situational elements versus situational integrations. Whereas concepts for situational elements originate in distributed neural networks that provide continual feeds about components of situations, concepts for situational integrations originate in association areas that establish temporal co-occurrence relations between situational elements, both external and internal. We propose that studying concepts in the context of situated action is necessary for establishing complete accounts of them, and that continuing to study concepts in isolation is likely to provide relatively incomplete and distorted accounts. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110536
Author(s):  
Chiara Fini ◽  
Gian Daniele Zannino ◽  
Matteo Orsoni ◽  
Giovanni Augusto Carlesimo ◽  
Mariagrazia Benassi ◽  
...  

Compared to concrete concepts, like “book”, abstract concepts expressed by words like “justice” are more detached from sensorial experiences, even though they are also grounded in sensorial modalities. Abstract concepts lack a single object as referent and are characterized by higher variability both within and across participants. According to the Word as Social Tool (WAT) proposal, owing to their complexity, abstract concepts need to be processed with the help of inner language. Inner language can namely help participants to re-explain to themselves the meaning of the word, to keep information active in working memory, and to prepare themselves to ask information from more competent people. While previous studies have demonstrated that the mouth is involved during abstract concepts’ processing, both the functional role and the mechanisms underlying this involvement still need to be clarified. We report an experiment in which participants were required to evaluate whether 78 words were abstract or concrete by pressing two different pedals. During the judgment task, they were submitted, in different blocks, to a baseline, an articulatory suppression, and a manipulation condition. In the last two conditions, they had to repeat a syllable continually and to manipulate a softball with their dominant hand. Results showed that articulatory suppression slowed down the processing of abstract more than that of concrete words. Overall results confirm the WAT proposal’s hypothesis that abstract concepts processing involves the mouth motor system and specifically inner speech. We discuss the implications for current theories of conceptual representation.


Author(s):  
Claudia Mazzuca ◽  
Chiara Fini ◽  
Arthur Henri Michalland ◽  
Ilenia Falcinelli ◽  
Federico Da Rold ◽  
...  

Recent research has shown that the sensorimotor system plays a significant role in a variety of cognitive processes. In this paper, we will review recent studies performed in our lab (Body Action Language Lab, BALLAB) or in labs with which we collaborate, showing the involvement of the sensorimotor system at different levels. With the purpose of expounding on this aspect, we focus on studies that highlight two main characteristics of the involvement of the sensorimotor systems. First, we concentrate on the flexibility of sensorimotor grounding during interaction with objects. We report evidence showing how social context and current situations influence affordance activation. We then focus on the tactile and kinesthetic involvement in body-object interaction. Second, we illustrate flexible sensorimotor grounding in word use. We review studies showing that not only concrete words, like “bottle,” but also abstract words, like “freedom,” “thinking,” and “perhaps,” are grounded in the sensorimotor system. We report evidence showing that abstract words activate sensory modalities and involve the mouth effector more than concrete words due to their privileged relationship with language, both outer and inner speech. We discuss the activation of the mouth sensorimotor system in light of studies on adults (e.g., studies employing articulatory suppression), children (e.g., studies on the effects of pacifier use on word acquisition and processing), and infants (e.g. studies on emergence of new words). Finally, we pinpoint possible mechanisms at play in the acquisition and use of abstract concepts. We argue that with abstract concepts, we rely more on other people to learn or negotiate the meaning of words; we have called this mechanism social metacognition.Social metacognition is bidirectionally linked to our sensorimotor system. On the one hand, linguistic explanations constitute a primary source of grounding that may be re-enacted when retrieving a concept, for example through inner speech. On the other hand, it leads us to feel closer and be more synchronous in movement with others, who can help us understand the meaning of very complex words. Overall, we show that the sensorimotor system provides a grounding basis not only for objects and concrete words but also for more abstract and concrete ones. We conclude by arguing that future research should address and deepen two different and interrelated aspects concerning the involvement of the sensorimotor system during object and word processing. First, the sensorimotor system is flexibly modulated by the context, as studies on affordances reveal. Second, the sensorimotor system can be involved at different levels, and its role can be integrated and flanked by that of other systems, like the linguistic one, as studies on abstract concepts clearly show. We urge future research aimed at unravelling the role of the sensorimotor system in cognition to fully explore the complexity of this intricate-and sometimes slippery-relation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Dove

A growing body of evidence suggests that cognition is embodied and grounded. Abstract concepts, though, remain a significant theoretical challenge. A number of researchers have proposed that language makes an important contribution to our capacity to acquire and employ concepts, particularly abstract ones. In this essay, I critically examine this suggestion and ultimately defend a version of it. I argue that a successful account of how language augments cognition should emphasize its symbolic properties and incorporate a view of embodiment that recognizes the flexible, multimodal and task-related nature of action, emotion and perception systems. On this view, language is an ontogenetically disruptive cognitive technology that expands our conceptual reach. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon De Deyne ◽  
Danielle Navarro ◽  
Guillem Collell ◽  
Amy Perfors

One of the main limitations in natural language-based approaches to meaning is that they are not grounded. In this study, we evaluate how well different kinds of models account for people’s representations of both concrete and abstract concepts. The models are both unimodal (language-based only) models and multimodal distributional semantic models (which additionallyincorporate perceptual and/or affective information). The language-based models include both external (based on text corpora) and internal (derived from word associations) language. We present two new studies and a re-analysis of a series of previous studies demonstrating that the unimodal performance is substantially higher for internal models, especially when comparisons at the basiclevel are considered. For multimodal models, our findings suggest that additional visual and affective features lead to only slightly more accurate mental representations of word meaning than what is already encoded in internal language models; however, for abstract concepts, visual andaffective features improve the predictions of external text-based models. Our work presents new evidence that the grounding problem includes abstract words as well and is therefore more widespread than previously suggested. Implications for both embodied and distributional views arediscussed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna M. Borghi ◽  
Charles Fernyhough

We explore the role of inner speech (covert self-directed talk) during the acquisition and use of concepts differing in abstractness. Following Vygotsky, inner speech results from the internationalization of linguistically mediated interactions that regulate cognition and behaviour. When we acquire and processabstract concepts, uncertainties about word meaning might lead us to search actively for their meaning.Inner speech might play a role in this searching process and be differentially involved in concept learning compared to use of known concepts. Importantly, inner speech comes in different varieties – e.g., it can be expanded or condensed (with the latter involving syntactic and semantic forms of abbreviation). Do we useinner speech differently with concepts varying in abstractness? Which kinds of inner speech do we preferentially use with different kinds of abstract concepts (e.g., emotions vs. numbers)? What other features of inner speech, such as dialogicality, might facilitate our use of concepts varying in abstractness(byallowing us to monitor the limits of our knowledge in simulated social exchanges, through a process we term inner social metacognition)? In tackling these questions, we address the possibility that different varieties of inner speech are flexibly used during the acquisition of concepts and their everyday use.


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