scholarly journals The Evolution of Cooperation by the Hankshaw Effect

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah P Hammarlund ◽  
Brian D Connelly ◽  
Katherine J Dickinson ◽  
Benjamin Kerr

The evolution of cooperation—costly behavior that benefits others—faces one clear obstacle. Namely, cooperators are always at a competitive disadvantage relative to defectors, individuals that reap the same social benefits, but evade the personal cost. One solution to this problem involves genetic hitchhiking, where the allele encoding cooperative behavior becomes linked to a beneficial mutation. While traditionally seen as a passive process driven purely by chance, here we explore a more active form of hitchhiking. Specifically, we model hitchhiking in the context of adaptation to a stressful environment by cooperators and defectors with spatially limited dispersal. Under such conditions, clustered cooperators reach higher local densities, thereby experiencing more opportunities for mutations than defectors. Thus, the allele encoding cooperation has a greater probability of hitchhiking with alleles conferring stress adaptation. We label this probabilistic enhancement the "Hankshaw effect" after the character Sissy Hankshaw, whose anomalously large thumbs made her a singularly effective hitchhiker. Using an agent-based model, we demonstrate that there exists a broad set of conditions allowing the evolution of cooperation through the Hankshaw effect. We discuss the feasibility of our theoretical assumptions for natural systems, not only for the case of cooperation, but also for other costly social behaviors such as spite. The primary elements of our model, including genetic hitchhiking and population structure, have been discussed separately in previous models exploring the evolution of cooperation. However, the combination of these elements has not been appreciated as a solution to the problem of cooperation.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaideep Joshi ◽  
Iain D Couzin ◽  
Simon A Levin ◽  
Vishwesha Guttal

AbstractThe evolution of costly cooperation, where cooperators pay a personal cost to benefit others, requires that cooperators interact more frequently with other cooperators. This condition, called positive assortment, is known to occur in spatially-structured viscous populations, where individuals typically have low mobility and limited dispersal. However many social organisms across taxa, from cells and bacteria, to birds, fish and ungulates, are mobile, and live in populations with considerable inter-group mixing. In the absence of information regarding others’ traits or conditional strategies, such mixing may inhibit assortment and limit the potential for cooperation to evolve. Here we employ spatially-explicit individual-based evolutionary simulations to incorporate costs and benefits of two coevolving costly traits: cooperative and local cohesive tendencies. We demonstrate that, despite possessing no information about others’ traits or payoffs, mobility (via self-propulsion or environmental forcing) facilitates assortment of cooperators via a dynamically evolving difference in the cohesive tendencies of cooperators and defectors. We show analytically that this assortment can also be viewed in a multilevel selection framework, where selection for cooperation among emergent groups can overcome selection against cooperators within the groups. As a result of these dynamics, we find an oscillatory pattern of cooperation and defection that maintains cooperation even in the absence of well known mechanisms such as kin interactions, reciprocity, local dispersal or conditional strategies that require information on others’ strategies or payoffs. Our results offer insights into differential adhesion based mechanisms for positive assortment and reveal the possibility of cooperative aggregations in dynamic fission-fusion populations.Author SummaryCooperation among animals is ubiquitous. In a cooperative interaction, the cooperator confers a benefit to its partner at a personal cost. How does natural selection favour such a costly behaviour? Classical theories argue that cooperative interactions among genetic relatives, reciprocal cooperators, or among individuals within groups in viscous population structures are necessary to maintain cooperation. However, many organisms are mobile, and live in dynamic (fission-fusion) groups that constantly merge and split. In such populations, the above mechanisms may be inadequate to explain cooperation. Here, we develop a minimal model that explicitly accounts for mobility and cohesion among organisms. We find that mobility can support cooperation via emergent dynamic groups, even in the absence of previously known mechanisms. Our results may offer insights into the evolution of cooperation in animals that live in fission fusion groups, such as birds, fish or mammals, or microbes living in turbulent media, such as in oceans or in the bloodstreams of animal hosts.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. T. Fessler ◽  
Colin Holbrook

AbstractMarket models are indeed indispensable to understanding the evolution of cooperation and its emotional substrates. Unfortunately, Baumard et al. eschew market thinking in stressing the supposed invariance of moral/cooperative behavior across circumstances. To the contrary, humans display contingent morality/cooperation, and these shifts are best accounted for by market models of partner choice for mutually beneficial collaboration.


2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 656-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Monticino ◽  
Miguel Acevedo ◽  
Baird Callicott ◽  
Travis Cogdill ◽  
Christopher Lindquist

Author(s):  
Shun Kurokawa

The existence of cooperation demands explanation in terms of natural selection. Prisoner’s dilemma is a framework often used when studying the evolution of cooperation. In prisoner’s dilemma, most previous studies consider the situation wherein an individual who cooperates will give an opponent an amount b at a personal cost of c, where b > c > 0 while an individual who defects will give nothing. This model setting is convenient; however, previous studies have not considered the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and different cost while in reality, it is natural to consider that a different player has a different benefit and different cost. Here, we raise the following question: Taking that a different individual has a different benefit and a different cost into consideration, what strategy is likely to evolve? In this paper, we focus on the direct reciprocity and analyze the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost. We obtain the condition for the evolution in the general case. And in addition, we have revealed that under a specific condition as the interaction repeats longer and the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger and the cooperating probability is more sensitive to the benefit the opponent provides, the establishment of cooperation is more likely.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joao Xavier ◽  
William Chang

We present a type of agent-based model that uses off-lattice spheres to represent individual cells in a solid tumor. The model calculates chemical gradients and determines the dynamics of the tumor as emergent properties of the interactions between the cells. As an example, we present an investigation of cooperation among cancer cells where cooperators secrete a growth factor that is costly to synthesize. Simulations reveal that cooperation is favored when cancer cells from the same lineage stay in close proximity. The result supports the hypothesis that kin selection, a theory that explains the evolution of cooperation in animals, also applies to cancers.


2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shade T. Shutters

Altruistic punishment occurs when an agent incurs a cost to punish another but receives no material benefit for doing so. Despite the seeming irrationality of such behavior, humans in laboratory settings routinely pay to punish others even in anonymous, one-shot settings. Costly punishment is ubiquitous among social organisms in general and is increasingly accepted as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Yet if it is true that punishment explains cooperation, the evolution of altruistic punishment remains a mystery. In a series of computer simulations I give agents the ability to punish one another while playing a continuous prisoner's dilemma. In simulations without social structure, expected behavior evolves—agents do not punish and consequently no cooperation evolves. Likewise, in simulations with social structure but no ability to punish, no cooperation evolves. However, in simulations where agents are both embedded in a social structure and have the option to inflict costly punishment, cooperation evolves quite readily. This suggests a simple and broadly applicable explanation of cooperation for social organisms that have nonrandom social structure and a predisposition to punish one another. Results with scale-free networks further suggest that nodal degree distribution plays an important role in determining whether cooperation will evolve in a structured population.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Mewes ◽  
Andreas H. Schumann

Abstract. In the last decade, agent-based modelling (ABM) became a popular modelling technique in social sciences, medicine, biology and ecology. ABM was designed to simulate systems that are highly dynamic and sensitive to small variations in their composition and their state. As hydrological systems, and natural systems in general, often show dynamic and nonlinear behaviour, ABM can be an appropriate way to model these systems. Nevertheless, only few studies have utilized ABM method for process-based modelling in hydrology. The percolation of water through the unsaturated soil is highly responsive to the current state of the soil system, small variations in composition lead to major changes in the transport system. Hence, we present a new approach for modelling the movement of water through a soil column: autonomous water agents that transport water through the soil while interacting with their environment as well as with other agents under physical laws.


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