scholarly journals Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

2020 ◽  
Vol 101 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco A. Amaral ◽  
Marco A. Javarone
Keyword(s):  
Strategy Equilibrium

scholarly journals Multi-Robot Searching using Game-Theory Based Approach

10.5772/6232 ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Meng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Dynamic Environment ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Target Searching ◽  
Multi Robot

This paper proposes a game-theory based approach in a multi–target searching using a multi-robot system in a dynamic environment. It is assumed that a rough priori probability map of the targets' distribution within the environment is given. To consider the interaction between the robots, a dynamic-programming equation is proposed to estimate the utility function for each robot. Based on this utility function, a cooperative nonzero-sum game is generated, where both pure Nash Equilibrium and mixed-strategy Equilibrium solutions are presented to achieve an optimal overall robot behaviors. A special consideration has been taken to improve the real-time performance of the game-theory based approach. Several mechanisms, such as event-driven discretization, one-step dynamic programming, and decision buffer, have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity. The main advantage of the algorithm lies in its real-time capabilities whilst being efficient and robust to dynamic environments.

scholarly journals Mixed Equilibrium in a Pure Location Game: The Case of n≥4$$n \ge 4$$ Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Ewerhart
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Mixed Equilibrium

AbstractThe Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and strategic forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for

scholarly journals Biological auctions with multiple rewards

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1812) ◽  
pp. 20151041 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes G. Reiter ◽  
Ayush Kanodia ◽  
Raghav Gupta ◽  
Martin A. Nowak ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Fundamental Characteristic ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Multiple Resources ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Competition For Resources

The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However, in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments. Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific values of the rewards.

scholarly journals Bundling and Competition for Slots

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (5) ◽  
pp. 1957-1985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doh-Shin Jeon ◽  
Domenico Menicucci
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Digital Goods ◽  
Efficient Technology ◽  
Pure Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium

We consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having k slots. Under independent pricing, a pure strategy equilibrium often does not exist, and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never efficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products, and an efficient “technology-renting” equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned, all equilibria are efficient. Comparing the mixed-strategy equilibrium with the technology-renting equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyer's surplus. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.(JEL D43, D86, K21, L13, L14, L41, L82)

scholarly journals External Economies and International Trade Redux: Comment*

2013 ◽  
Vol 128 (4) ◽  
pp. 1895-1905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Lyn ◽  
Andrés Rodríguez-Clare
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Transport Costs ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Alternative Set

Abstract Recently, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (GRH; “External Economies and International Trade: Redux,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 [2010], 829–858) proposed a novel way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the industry level. Instead of perfect competition and two industries, GRH assume Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. GRH conclude that the equilibrium is unique if transport costs are low, that there is no trade for high transport costs, and that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies when transport costs are intermediate. In this note we reexamine the equilibrium analysis under different transport costs for a single industry (partial equilibrium) version of GRH’s model. We confirm many of GRH’s results, but also find that there are circumstances under which there are multiple equilibria, including equilibria in which trade patterns run counter to “natural” comparative advantage, and also find that there is a profitable deviation to the mixed-strategy equilibrium postulated by GRH for intermediate trading costs. We propose an alternative set of strategies for this case and establish that they constitute an equilibrium.

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