scholarly journals Business group opportunism: the difference in real earnings management between parent firms and nonparent firms

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenny Alawag

PurposeThis paper aims to understand real earnings management behavior in the context of a parent–subsidiary relationship. It explores the differences between business groups and firms that do not have controlled subsidiaries and provides potential explanations for any measured difference.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses the random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimation to find the difference between the real earnings management behavior of business groups, represented by the ultimate parent firms and the nonparent firms from 73 countries.FindingsThe results show that ultimate parent firms have lower abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses than nonparent firms. In contrast, parent firms have higher abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) than nonparent firms. The results are unexpected because abnormal production costs usually have a dominant direct relationship with abnormal CFO. The results indicate that business groups use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses.Research limitations/implicationsThe results reveal that parent firms use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results can be used to extend the discussion to specific business group cases, such as tracing the route or allocation of real earnings management (REM) pressure from a parent firm to its listed and private subsidiaries, and if the consolidation of minority voting rights and the transitivity of control affect the behavior in its subsidiaries.Originality/valueInstead of the degree of diversification or affiliation, this paper investigates REM behavior based on the parent firm's control of its subsidiaries. With this approach, the study argues that business groups prefer a route other than manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results may redirect the attention of regulators to the activities of parent firms that need more policing.

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-181
Author(s):  
R.P. Sitanggang ◽  
Yusuf Karbhari ◽  
Bolaji Tunde Matemilola ◽  
M. Ariff

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether audit quality is associated with real earnings management in the UK. Design/methodology/approach The authors apply the panel fixed effects method that controls for heterogeneity across firms to investigate whether audit quality is related to real earnings management for a large sample of UK manufacturing companies for the period 2010–2013. The authors utilized three proxies to measure real earnings management and two proxies to measure audit quality. Findings The results provide evidence that audit fees are negatively related to abnormal operating cash flows. Conversely, audit fees are positively related to abnormal discretionary expenses. Besides, audit quality proxies show insignificant relationship with abnormal production costs and real earnings management index. Overall, the study finds partial evidence of significant relationship between audit quality and real earnings management. Research limitations/implications These results are important subject to the adequacy of the indicators of real earnings management and audit quality. Like previous research works that mostly focus on upward earnings management, the authors do not address the question of whether and how firms take real actions to manage earnings downwards in certain contexts. Practical implications The findings inform monitoring bodies that the imposition of higher levels of audit quality may result in unintended consequences. Therefore, monitoring bodies, such as audit committees, should consider the implication of imposing higher quality auditing, which may drive firms to potentially value-decreasing real earnings management practices. Managers should curtail real earnings management practices, especially abnormal operating cash flow, because attempt to use higher-quality auditors to mitigate such practice may destroy firm value. Also, managers’ employment may be threatened due to the potential deterioration of firm value caused by using higher-quality auditors to mitigate managers’ real earnings management practices. Moreover, shareholders are informed of the potential detrimental effects of imposing higher levels of audit quality which may lower the value of their investments. Originality/value The paper extends previous research on earnings management in several ways. First, while earlier studies usually use accruals methods to measure earnings management, the authors use the real earnings management approach as managers can switch from accruals to real earnings management when facing more scrutiny from auditors and/or more constrained regulations or standards that may limit their capability to use discretionary accruals. Second, this study reports new findings, as the authors find partial evidence of a significant relationship between audit quality and real earnings management. Third, it is one of the few studies to use a real earnings management index to measure earnings management and its link to audit quality.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-384
Author(s):  
Qiuhong Zhao

Purpose This study aims to investigate whether firms engage in earnings management behavior that attempts to manipulate Credit Rating Agency (CRA) perceptions during the Watchlist process and, if so, whether earnings management behavior appears to influence CRAs’ decisions. Design/methodology/approach To measure earnings management activities, this paper computes accrual-based and real earnings management measures in the year or in the quarter immediately before the Watchlist resolutions for all negative and positive Watchlist firms. To examine the association between the levels of earnings management and Watchlist resolutions, a logit model is applied to the data obtained from a sample of Watchlist firms. Findings Some evidence suggests that managers in Watchlist firms manage earnings in attempts to gain favorable Watchlist treatment. The findings are consistent with the Graham et al.’s (2005) survey evidence, which shows that one of the primary reasons for earnings management is to gain (or preserve) a desirable rating. In addition, CRAs appear to be misled by these attempts during the negative Watchlist process period. Research limitations/implications The findings support SEC’s (2011, 2013a, 2013b) rules to reduce its reliance on credit ratings and the recent regulation reforms concerning the competition in the rating industry [the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (2006)], and concerning conflicts of interest of CRAs among others [Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010)]. Originality/value While many studies examine whether managers use discretionary accruals as a tool to manage earnings to obtain favorable ratings, those studies do not consider manipulation of real operating activities to manage earnings and CRA perceptions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-704
Author(s):  
Feng Jui Hsu ◽  
Yu-Cheng Chen

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships among corporate social responsibility (CSR), analyst forecast accuracy and firms’ earnings management behavior using US-based firms.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) database to construct CSR performance scores and divide all firms into ten groups from high to low as a proxy for CSR performance. The authors obtained an initial sample of 33,364 firm-year observations from 1991 to 2012. Filtering for records which exist in the KLD, Compustat, and Center for Research in Security Prices databases lefts a total of 16,807 firm-year observations and CSR evaluation reports for 5,896 firms.FindingsThe authors find that high CSR-score firms have lower rates of analyst forecast error than their low CSR-score counterparts, suggesting that CSR performance is a useful means of forecasting earnings. Furthermore, firms with better CSR performance have significantly lower accrual-based earnings management behavior. However, the level of the manipulation behavior of real earnings management (REM) activities increased significantly in better CSR firms, suggesting that high CSR-score firms substituted REM methods for accrual-based methods. REM methods are consistent with the stipulations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and allow high CSR-score firms to better manipulate earnings behavior. These results hold after the authors control for various factors related to firm financial characteristics.Originality/valueOverall, the findings have important implications for investors and regulators to more easily assess firms’ earnings manipulation behavior and earnings stability under CSR performance and financial information in financial markets.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-291
Author(s):  
Sorah Park

This paper examines the earnings management behavior of large, family-controlled business groups (so-called ‘chaebol’) in Korea from 2006 to 2010. Specifically, the author studies whether the methods of earnings management are different between chaebol firms versus non-chaebol firms. The author finds no significant difference in accrual-based earnings management by these two types of firms. However, the author shows that chaebol firms’ real-based earnings management is greater than non-chaebol firms, based on their higher abnormal production costs and lower abnormal discretionary expenses, in order to manipulate accounting income upward. The results suggest that owner-managed firms tend to choose real manipulation which negatively affects future corporate performance and consequently mislead investors about the firm value


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Belal Ali Abdulraheem Ghaleb ◽  
Hasnah Kamardin ◽  
Abdulwahid Ahmed Hashed

PurposeThe main aim of this study is to examine the effect of investment in outside governance monitoring (IOGM), through non-executive directors' remuneration (NEDR) and external audit fees (AFEE), on real earnings management (REM) in an emerging market in the Southeast Asia region, Malaysia.Design/methodology/approachThe data comprises 1,056 observations from manufacturing companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the four-year period, 2013 to 2016. The study tests IOGM individually and aggregately with REM. Feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression is used to test the hypotheses.FindingsThe results show that NEDR is negatively and significantly associated with REM. Likewise, AFEE is significantly associated with lower REM. Aggregate IOGM significantly mitigates REM. Additional tests conducted show consistent findings.Research limitations/implicationsThis evidence supports agency theory and signaling theory, that a high level of investment in governance monitoring signals a high demand for monitoring and fewer agency problems. It justifies more investment in outside scrutiny and monitoring to limit the existence of managers' opportunistic behavior in concentrated markets. This study relies on an aggregate measure of REM and focuses on manufacturing companies in Malaysia; thus, the results may not be the same using other measurements and samples.Originality/valueThe study, to the best of the researchers' knowledge, is the first to document evidence in an emerging market suggesting that higher NEDR and AFEE are individually and aggregately associated with lower REM. Policymakers, shareholders and researchers may consider investment in these two mechanisms as a proxy of high-quality monitoring that mitigates REM.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aikaterini C. Ferentinou ◽  
Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the use of accrual-based vs real earnings management (EM) by Greek firms, before and after the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The research is motivated by the fact that past studies have indicated the existence of significant levels of EM for Greece in particular before IFRS. Design/methodology/approach – Accrual-based earnings management (AEM) is examined by assessing performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, while real earnings management (REM) is defined in terms of abnormal levels of production costs, discretionary expenses, and cash flows from operations, for a three-year period before and after the adoption of IFRS in 2005. Findings – The authors find evidence on a statistically significant shift from AEM to REM after the adoption of IFRS, indicating the replacement of one form of EM with the other. Research limitations/implications – The validity of the results depends on the ability of the empirical models used to efficiently capture the existence of AEM and REM. Practical implications – IFRS adoption aims to improve accounting quality, especially in countries with high need for such an improvement; however, the tendency to substitute one form of EM with another highlights unintended consequences of IFRS adoption, which do not improve the informational content of financial statements if EM continues under different forms. Originality/value – Under the expectation that IFRS adoption should lead to improvements in accounting quality, this study examines whether IFRS actually led to a reduction of EM practices for a country with exceptionally high levels of EM before IFRS, by accounting for all possible forms of EM.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Numan Chowdhury ◽  
Yasser Eliwa

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether audit quality influence real earnings management activities using a sample of UK listed firms that have strong incentives to manage earnings upward through meeting past year’s earnings as a benchmark in the post-adoption period of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Design/methodology/approach The authors use a sample of 4,774 firm-year observations of UK listed firms during the period 2005–2018. Univariate and multivariate analyses have been conducted to test the association after controlling for firm characteristics and institutional variables. Findings The study reports that the presence of Big 4 auditors is significantly and positively related with greater levels of sales and discretionary expenses manipulation. Though the authors do not find any conclusive evidence on production costs manipulation, the aggregated measure of real earnings management shows a significant positive association with the presence of Big 4 auditors. Practical implications The study implies that managers who have incentives to manage earnings upward around the UK firms take advantage of the accounting flexibility in defining policies while reducing information asymmetry among the investors to signal better future performance. The approach to detect earnings manipulation as described in the auditing standards fails to limit the managerial use of real activities due to limited scope and unclear guidance. Thus, due to the significant impact on public policies, the results should, therefore, be of interest to the regulators and standard setters. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the association between audit quality and real earnings management for the UK all-purpose operational firms in sampled data that just meet past year’s earnings as a benchmark in the post-IFRS period.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 508-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noorul Azwin binti Md Nasir ◽  
Muhammad Jahangir Ali ◽  
Rushdi M.R. Razzaque ◽  
Kamran Ahmed

Purpose We examine whether the fraud firms are engaged in real earnings management and accrual earnings management prior to the fraud year in the Malaysian context. Design/methodology/approach Our sample comprises of 65 financial statement fraud and 65 non-fraud firms over a period of eight years from 2001 to 2008. Findings Using the abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) and abnormal production costs as the proxies for real earnings management, we find that financial statement fraud firms engage in manipulating production costs during preceding two years of the fraud event. However, our results show that financial fraud firms engage in manipulating CFO prior to the fraud event. Additionally, we find that financial statement fraud firms prefer to manipulate earnings using accruals relative to real earnings prior to the fraud year. Originality/value Our results demonstrate that real earnings management is more aggressive in financial statement fraud firms compared to the non-fraud firms in the four years prior to fraud.


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Sun ◽  
George Lan ◽  
Guoping Liu

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of independent audit committees in constraining real earnings management. This study examines the relationships between audit committee characteristics and real activities manipulation. Design/methodology/approach – US firms with stronger incentives to undertake real earnings management are selected as a sample. Regressions are run for the empirical analyses. Findings – It is found that audit committee members' additional directorships are positively associated with real earnings management measured by abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs, suggesting that audit committees with high additional directorships are less effective in constraining real earnings management. The findings are consistent with the notion that audit committee members' busyness impairs their monitoring effectiveness. Originality/value – This study extends the extant research on audit committees' oversight of real earnings management by using refined research design and updated data. This study also provides further evidence on how audit committee members' additional directorships affect their ability to oversee both accrual and real earnings management.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 491-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ye Liu ◽  
Changjiang Lyu

Purpose The performance of the first batch of listed companies since the restart of new initial public offerings (IPOs) in January 2014 and their accounting information face repeated and volatile questioning from different sides. This paper aims to take Guirenniao (China) Co. Ltd. (GRN for short), one of the first batch of listed companies in 2014 that suffered performance decline, as an example to analyze how it managed earnings before IPO. Design/methodology/approach This paper examines earnings management signs that exist in GRN through analysis of its financial statements compared to those of its industry peers. This paper then uses the modified Jones model to detect its accrual earnings management and build three models, which are abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, to detect real earnings management. Findings This paper finds that GRN managed earnings through accrual and real activities in 2012 and 2013. Finally, this paper provides evidence on the specific methods of earnings management, which are easing credit policy to recognize revenue in advance, abnormal expansion, decreasing costs and connected transactions. Originality/value This paper examines earnings management signs exist in GRN through analysis of its financial statements comparing to those of its industry peers. This paper then uses the modified Jones Model to detect its accrual earnings management and build three models which are abnormal levels of cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses to detect real earnings management.


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