The ignored tool of corporate governance rating: An overview of the corporate world in the emerging market

Generally, the interest of stakeholders is to see the growth of their entities, also they benchmark their entities through business performance metrics or tools like return on equity, return on assets (Mishra & Kapil, 2018), earnings per share, gross profit margin, employee productivity, sales turnover, ratings given by prominent credit rating agencies, such as Investment Information and Credit Rating Agency (ICRA), Credit Rating Information Services of India Limited (CRISIL), Standard and Poor, etc. In addition to this, internal governance mechanisms, board of directors’ characteristics, their independence, transparency, concentration, and presence of employees in the ownership structure also influence financial and stock market performance (Braendle, Stiglbauer, Ababneh, & Dedousis, 2020). However, assessing the performance of entities through some of these limited angles is not always possible. One more criterion for assessing the performance of entities is corporate governance rating (CGR). However, it is not widely used as a tool to assess a firm’s performance in emerging markets. The present research paper is intended to address the scenario of corporate governance rating in Indian corporate world to assess a firm’s performance. With the help of majorly secondary sources of data, this study was conducted from 2003 to 2021 based on the CRISIL’s rating pattern. The results revealed that only 20 companies adopted the process of corporate governance rating. The findings showed the significance of corporate governance rating, its adoption and future research in the development of the rating mechanisms in India as well as in other emerging markets.

Bank Credit Risk Rating Process: Is There a Difference Between Agencies?

The purpose of this article is to compare the bank credit risk rating (BCRR) process between credit rating agency (CRA) after the 2012 revision of their methodologies using 76 banks from 23 EMENA countries rated simultaneously by S&P's, Moody's and FitchRatings. We made this comparison based on the CAMELS model with a proposed 'S’ to BCRR. We use “ordered logit” regression for the rating classes and we complete our analysis by “linear multiple” regression for the rating grades. The results show that the BCRR processes are largely consistent between agencies but not aligned. Some differences appear in the important factors and relevant variables of the intrinsic credit quality component that manifest themselves in specific behaviors distinguishing one agency to another. The three agencies agree on the factors: Capital, Earnings, Liquidity and Supports and the most relevant support variable is the sovereign rating of the bank's country of establishment. The results also confirm a consistence between the BCRR's revealed and practiced methodologies revised by the CRA.

Advertisement-financed credit ratings

This paper investigates the incentives of a credit rating agency (CRA) to generate accurate ratings under an advertisement-based business model. To this end, we study a two-period endogenous reputation model in which a CRA can increase the precision of its ratings by exerting effort. The CRA receives a revenue not from rating fees, as is standard in the literature, but through online advertising. We show that the advertisement-based business model provides sufficient incentives for the CRA to improve the precision of signals at intermediate levels of reputation. Furthermore, we identify conditions under which truthful reporting is incentive compatible.

The Country Ceiling and Sovereign Rating Relationship Exemplified by the Case of Poland

The aim of the article is to answer the question whether the ratings of entities registered in Poland are limited by the sovereign rating of the country. The author theorises that the sovereign rating of Poland does not constitute the upper limit for ratings granted by the Big Three (Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s) to Polish financial and non‑financial entities. The databases of three leading rating agencies were queried, selecting all (52) long‑term foreign ratings assigned to entities registered in Poland. The analysis indicates that currently no confirmation can be found of the use of the country ceiling principle, according to which the rating of any entity registered in a given country cannot be higher than its sovereign rating, by rating agencies (7.7% of rated entities in Poland is given higher rating than the sovereign one). This is at the same time a higher percentage than the average for all Big Three ratings, amounting to approx. 3%. The country ceiling is an upper, potential sovereign rating bound, resulting from the T&C risk. In the case of entities registered in Poland, however, their rating is a maximum of one notch higher than the sovereign rating, which in turn is in line with the policy that Standard & Poor’s officially announced as the only agency among the Big Three (the rating of an entity registered in a given jurisdiction can be up to four notches higher than the sovereign rating). The analysis of ratings assigned to Polish entities also indicates that a rating above the sovereign rating awarded by a given credit rating agency does not translate into similar actions of other agencies. This paper analyses the relationships between the concepts of country risk, T&C risk and sovereign risk. Another original contribution is establishing how the country ceiling principle used by rating agencies works in practice and verifying the scope of application of this principle in the Polish economic reality.

Detecting conflicts of interest in credit rating changes: a distribution dynamics approach

In this study, we compare the adjustments of credit ratings by an investor-paid credit rating agency (CRA), represented by Egan-Jones Ratings Company, and an issuer-paid CRA, represented by Moody’s Investors Service, vis-à-vis conflict of interest and reputation. A novel distribution dynamics approach is employed to compute the probability distribution and, hence, the downgrade and upgrade probabilities of a credit rating assigned by these two CRAs of different compensation systems based on the dataset of 750 U.S. issuers between 2011 and 2018, that is, after the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act. It is found that investor-paid ratings are more likely to be downgraded than issuer-paid ratings only in the lower rating grades, which is consistent with the argument that investor-paid agencies have harsher attitudes toward potentially defaulting issuers to protect their reputation. We do not find evidence that issuer-paid CRAs provide overly favorable treatments to issuers with threshold ratings, implying that reputation concerns and the Dodd–Frank regulation mitigate the conflict of interests, while issuer-paid CRAs are more concerned about providing accurate ratings.

Preparing for an Uncertain Future

This chapter discusses the report of the Wall Street Journal about Stuyvesant Town, one of the biggest, most high-profile deals of the commercial real-estate boom, being in danger of imminent default. It explains how Tishman Speyer was stuck at $139 million rather than raising the net operating income up to $252 million by 2009, which MetLife had promised could be done. It also mentions RealPoint LLC, a credit-rating agency that estimated the property to only be worth $2.1 billion — less than half the purchase price from the time it has been purchased in 2006. The chapter focuses on the impacts of the recession to Tishman Speyer and all owners of real-estate, which had been precipitated by a collapse in the inflated housing market. It refers to apartment prices in Manhattan that had fallen sharply as 2009 wore on and prices that went down by 25 percent compared to 2008.

Legislative pressure and credit rating agency behavior

This study investigates whether legislative pressure influences credit rating agency (CRA) behavior. It covers a time period in which the European Union moves from exerting minimal to intense legislative pressure on CRAs, providing an almost ideal context for analyzing if and how CRAs are affected by this pressure. Two possible outcomes are discussed: 1) more timeliness in the flow of information and 2) more stickiness in the flow of information. The analysis is based on an examination of market reactions following CRA announcements between 2000 and 2019. The results show that the market reactions after CRA announcements decrease when legislative pressure increases. The interpretation is that as legislative pressure increases, the flow of information from CRAs becomes stickier. This confirms that legislative initiatives that put pressure on CRAs have an effect, evidence that legislators’ intention to change behavior by threatening or initiating new regulations works, which confirms assumptions underlying the theory of legislative threats (Halfteck, 2008). A reasonable interpretation of legislators’ push for changes in this context is that they want to see a faster flow of information. The results, however, show the opposite. A plausible explanation for this is increased caution on the part of CRAs because if in retrospect, the information in an announcement turns out to be wrong or misleading, the ensuing criticism could lead to additional pressure.

The Existing and Proposed Credit Rating Agency (CRA) Business Models and Compensation Models Are Inefficient

Credit ratings agencies (CRAs) are prone to various antitrust and conflict-of-interest problems that arise from their regulation and their business and compensation models. CRAs have played a critical role in global capital markets for the last few decades, and the inefficiencies inherent in the compensation contracts, and business models of CRAs were clearly illustrated during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2011, during which ABS trusts and some large companies suddenly defaulted without prior downgrades of their ratings – it's well known that markets often price in potential defaults or down-grades before CRAs revise their ratings downwards. This chapter explores the inefficiencies of the existing and proposed CRA business models and compensation models.

Complex Systems, Competition/Antitrust, and Legal Problems in the Global Credit Rating Agency Industry

This chapter explains how the tie-breaker effect reduces social welfare and distorts equilibria. This chapter introduces new definitions of “equilibrium” in the CRA ratings processes. (This has been one of the major missing elements in the existing literature on the credit ratings industry) It explains why “reputational capital” (of CRAs) is a sub-set of “influence” (which can have more impact on bond-issuers' decisions and investors' decisions than traditional “influence”) and critiques the games theorems in Virag and other important papers.