Double-sided moral hazard, information screening and the optimal contract

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin Xue ◽  
Yiwen Fei
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Fixed Income ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Venture Capital Investment ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Purpose In the practice of venture capital investment, the venture capital will not only claim the share of the enterprise’s future output, but also a certain amount of fixed income. The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimal contract which blends the variable ownership income and the fixed income theoretically so as to provide a keen insight into the venture capital practice. Design/methodology/approach This paper establishes an extended principal-agent model and researches on the design of optimal contract dominated by venture capital with double-sided moral hazard and information screening. Findings By establishing theoretical models, the main findings are: first, high-quality enterprise tends to relinquish less ownership but give more fixed return to the venture capital as compensation in order to obtain the venture capital financing; second, low-quality enterprise is willing to relinquish more ownership but give less fixed return to the venture capital for financing; third, due to the existence of double-sided moral hazard, neither of the venture capital and the enterprise will exert their best effort. Originality/value This paper furthers the application of principal-agent model in the field of venture capital investment and researches on the optimal contract, considering double-sided moral hazard and adverse selection at the same time originally.

scholarly journals Asymmetric awareness and heterogeneous agents

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-484
Author(s):  
Antoine Dubus
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Heterogeneous Agents ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
The Other ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Jel Codes ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model

We consider a principal-agent model with moral-hazard and asymmetric awareness and show how the heterogeneity of agents on their aversion to effort affects contract design. We discuss the optimal contract adopted when a principal is aware of all the impacts of an agent’s action, while agents ignore some of them. When a principal faces two types of agents, where one type is more effort-averse than the other, the equilibrium contract is shaped by agent proportions: it pools the agents, separates them, or excludes the more effort-averse agents from the contract. When efforts are observable, all the agents remain unaware, while when efforts are hidden, a principal increases the awareness of the agents to a level commensurate with the nature of the contract. JEL Codes – D82; D83; D86

scholarly journals Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (5) ◽  
pp. 2451-2477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Herweg ◽  
Daniel Müller ◽  
Philipp Weinschenk
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Payment Schemes ◽  
Principal Agent Model

We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Kőoszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold. (JEL D82, D86, J41, M52, M12)

Mainstream interest in cryptocurrencies has momentum

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Storage Space ◽  
Computing Power ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Venture Capital Investment ◽  
Asset Class ◽  
Market Capitalisation ◽  
Initial Coin Offerings ◽  
Digital Assets

Subject Cryptocurrencies outlook Significance The market capitalisation of cryptocurrencies has increased tenfold from a year ago to more than 120 billion dollars. A bitcoin, at par with an ounce of gold as recently as May, now costs nearly three times as much. This year capital raisings from Initial Coin Offerings have significantly surpassed venture capital investment into blockchain-based technologies. Impacts New cryptocurrencies will be blockchain-based cryptographic tokens that represent digital assets such as storage space or computing power. Cryptocurrencies will become their own asset class as values rise across the board with little correlation to other assets. Bitcoin will continue to undergo the transformation necessary for it to retain its dominance, which is reducing. Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings will test the limits of existing laws and regulations.

Incentive strategy about technology innovation based on knowledge ecological coupling in strategic emerging industry

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Long ◽  
Lang Lu ◽  
Pan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Volterra Model ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Profit Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Coupling Relationship ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
Innovation Chain

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to solve the problem of low efficiency on knowledge resources allocation in the strategic emerging industry (SEI), an incentive model of technology innovation based on knowledge ecological coupling is designed.Design/methodology/approachFirst, a principal–agent model of knowledge inputs and a knowledge ecological coupling model based on an improved Lotka–Volterra model are constructed. In addition, a numerical example about Chongqing Yongchuan industrial park, the emulation analysis and the associated discussions are conducted to analyze the equilibriums of principal–agent in different knowledge inputs. Further, the paper analyzes the evolutionary equilibrium in knowledge ecological coupling and reveals the dual adjustments of the node organization on knowledge inputs.FindingsThus, this paper shows that by establishing the relationships of knowledge ecological coupling based on “mutualism and commensalism,” node organization raises the level of knowledge inputs; an incentive mode of “knowledge ecological coupling relationship + technology innovation chain” is conductive to substantially improving the efficiency of knowledge resource allocation, and to stimulate the vitality of node organization for technology innovation in the strategic emerging industry (SEI).Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the extant researches in two ways. First, this paper reveals the dual adjustments of the node organizations in inputting knowledge, which broadens the vision and borders of the researches on traditional knowledge management. The methods of the traditional principal–agent model and the knowledge input/output profit model are also expanded. Second, this paper verifies that applying the mode of “knowledge ecological coupling relationship + technology innovation chain” in practice is conducive to enhancing the efficiency of the cross-organizational knowledge allocation in the strategic emerging industry (SEI).

Agency, Information, and the Structure of Moral Problems in Business

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Husted
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.

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