Political connections, family firms and earnings quality

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arsalan Hashmi ◽  
Rayenda Khresna Brahmana ◽  
Evan Lau
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the effect of political connections on earnings quality by simultaneously controlling the firm characteristics; to test whether Pakistani firms’ ownership, specifically family ownership, plays a significant role in political connections–earnings quality association; to draw a conclusion about the agency theory in the context of Pakistan.Design/methodology/approachA quantitative approach was used to examine the influence of political connections and family ownership on the earnings quality of listed firms in Pakistan. The study uses historical data from 238 active non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange during the period of 2009-2015. The final data set comprises more than 1,600 firm-year observations from ten major non-financial industry classifications. To enhance the robustness of the empirical relationship, the study used several proxies of earnings quality in conjunction with robust regression methods and diagnostic checks.FindingsThe present study’s findings are consistent with the findings of the studies on agency theory previous literature, where politically connected firms have significantly lower earnings quality as compared to non-connected firms. The results also indicate that family firms have superior earnings quality than non-family–controlled firms. Furthermore, family ownership moderates the negative influence of political connections on earnings quality. This implies that family ownership diminishes the costs of political connections and improves the earnings quality of the firm.Originality/valueThis study is different from previous research in three respects. First, it examines whether family ownership concentration has a moderating influence on the relationship between political connections and earnings quality. Second, it uses a robust methodology and extensive data set to examine the influence of political connections and family ownership concentration on earnings quality. Further, this study is the first to analyze the nexus between financial reporting quality and the political business environment in the context of Pakistan.

Family ownership and earnings quality of Thai firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kriengkrai Boonlert-U-Thai ◽  
Pradyot K. Sen
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Earnings Persistence ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Book Value ◽  
Founding Family

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the quality of earnings of family run firms is superior to that of the other firms and that firms run by founding family members exhibit this trait even more prominently. Using insights from the fundamental accounting valuation model, this study also hypothesizes that financial markets place a higher weightage on earnings than book value for founding family-run firms in Thailand as these firms report a more reliable earnings number.Design/methodology/approachThis is an empirical archival research.FindingsThe authors report evidence that financial markets place a higher weightage on earnings than book value for founding family-run firms. The evidence is consistent with the insight that current earnings of the founding family-run firms offer more information about future earnings and cash flow compared to book value than those for family (FAM) and non-family (NonCS) firms. The authors also provide evidence that earnings persistence and the accrual quality of the founding family firms are higher compared to the other firms. This evidence is contrary to the notion that family firms have more opaque disclosures, lower earnings quality and higher implied cost of equity capital.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors find support for the alignment hypothesis of the long-term family ownership of Thai firms. The authors consider these evidences consistent with the shareholder interest alignment hypothesis of the controlling shareholders as opposed to the entrenchment hypothesis.Practical implicationsThe study implies that earnings of the Thai firms run by founding family members are more reliable and can be relied on more for firm valuation. Additionally, the authors also offer a different methodology by appealing to the valuation properties of the reported accounting numbers besides looking at the quality of accruals and earnings persistence tests offered in the existing literature.Social implicationsThe society is better off if there are more opportunities to invest in Thai firms run by founding family members. The finding of the quality difference in governance by firms with founding family members is new. Therefore, the study points to the need of finer partition of the family firms while looking at their corporate governance practices. The fact that the FF firms offer a higher quality of earnings implies that they are less engaged in opportunistic manipulation of earnings and cash flow and, thus, are self-motivated to protect the longer term interest of the firms.Originality/valueThis if the first time the accounting fundamental valuation theory has been used to provide evidence of higher earnings quality.

Family ownership and financial reporting quality: Iranian evidence

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Mousavi Shiri ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Fatemeh Abbasi ◽  
Shayan Farhangdoust
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Content Type

PurposeIn the process of reporting accounting information, the auditor’s objective is to detect possible misstatements and errors in accounting information. Audit evidence aids auditors in providing reasonable assurance about the quality of financial reporting. Studying the quality of family firms’ financial reporting is of higher importance relative to non-family firms due to lower risk of accounting manipulation. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between family ownership structure and financial reporting quality from an auditing perspective.Design/methodology/approachTo analyze the research hypotheses, the authors use a sample data consisted of 221 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (including 52 family and 169 non-family firms) over a five-year span from 2011 to 2015.FindingsUsing multivariate regression analysis of panel data, our results indicate that audit risk in family firms is lower than their counterparts. Likewise, the findings are indicative of lower audit fees paid by family firms as compared to non-family ones. The authors also find that auditors put more effort in family firms and thus audit effort is more significant for these kinds of firms.Originality/valueThe study focuses on family ownership and financial reporting quality in a developing country like Iran and the results of the study may be beneficial to other developing nations, as Iran stock market possesses some unique features which are not normally prevailing in other equity markets, even in the Middle East.

scholarly journals What constitutes successful African enterprises? A survey of performance variations in 210 African food processors

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 1835-1854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wendelboe Hansen ◽  
Esther K. Ishengoma ◽  
Radha Upadhyaya
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Industrial Development ◽  
High Performance ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Performance Variations

Purpose To understand African small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) performance and its antecedents is essential, both from a strategic management and an industrial development perspective. While a substantial literature on African SMEs has emerged in recent years, studies of their performance specifically are few and inconclusive. The purpose of this paper is to address this lacuna in the literature by examining variations in performance of 210 East African SMEs. Design/methodology/approach The paper employs OLS and logistic regression and Classify k-means test to analyze performance variations in a unique data set of 210 food processing enterprises in Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia. Findings Three generic types of African SMEs are identified based on performance: laggards, followers and gazelles. The gazelles are typically medium-sized, skill-intensive companies selling relatively differentiated products in niche markets. The laggards are typically small, capital-intensive companies involved in grain milling that adopt a cost differentiation strategy. A key driver of variation in performance is found to be the quality of the external business environment (in particular the quality of intermediary markets), and also capability factors such as the strength of management. Strategy factors such as differentiation and political strategies explain performance variations. Practical implications Among the policy implications are that African industrial policy should focus on improving the functioning of intermediary markets, e.g. by reducing the transaction costs of inter-firm collaboration. Moreover, rather than focusing industrial policy on SMEs per se, policymakers should focus on those types of enterprises that are capable of generating high performance, e.g. skill-intensive enterprises with strong managerial capabilities, engaged in differentiation strategies. Originality/value The paper integrates the extant literature on African SME performance, develops an analytical framework for studying it and presents novel empirical insights based on one of the most detailed surveys of SME performance in the continent to date. The findings have important and tangible implications for literature, as well as for industrial policy.

scholarly journals Political connections and earnings quality

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 339-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iman Harymawan ◽  
John Nowland
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Government Effectiveness ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
Market Pressures

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate how the earnings quality of politically connected firms is affected by changes in political stability and government effectiveness in a developing country. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 2,073 firm-year observations from 349 firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2012 to examine how political stability and government effectiveness affect the earnings quality of politically connected firms, relative to non-politically connected firms. A two-stage model is used to address self-selection issues in the choice of firms to establish political connections. Findings This study finds that increased government effectiveness reduces the benefits of political connections, requiring politically connected firms to be more responsive to market pressures and resulting in higher earnings quality. However, increased political stability enhances the certainty of benefits from political connections, reducing the need for politically connected firms to respond to market pressures and resulting in lower earnings quality. Research limitations/implications For policymakers, these results indicate that different dimensions of political and economic development can affect the incentives of firms with political connections in different ways. Originality/value This study finds that the earnings quality of politically connected firms increases as government effectiveness improves, but it decreases as the political environment becomes more stable.

Did Japanese-SOX have an impact on earnings management and earnings quality?

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4/5) ◽  
pp. 482-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masumi Nakashima ◽  
David A. Ziebart
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Reporting System ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accruals Management

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether Japanese Sarbanes – Oxley Act (J-SOX) impacted earnings management and earnings quality of public firms in Japan. Design/methodology/approach – This archival study compares earnings management and earnings quality of firms that disclose at least one material weakness with a sample matched on size and industry without a material weakness. Findings – The authors investigate whether the differences in regulations, corporate governance and regulatory environment acceptance influence earnings management and earnings management of Japanese listed firms, relative to findings in the USA. They found the Japanese results to be slightly different from the results found in previous USA studies. First, the time-series observations suggest that while accruals management and real earnings management remained unchanged for control firms, accruals management and real earnings management increased for material weaknesses disclosing firms following J-SOX. The regression analyses suggest that accruals management for both the groups is significant in the pre-and post-J-SOX periods, but that real earnings management declined for both the groups post-J-SOX. Second, while, both accruals quality and accuracy of cash flow predictions improved in the post-J-SOX period. Research limitations/implications – The sample of Japanese firms disclosing a material weakness is small because the number of firms that disclose internal control deficiencies is decreasing in Japan. The authors have no evidence that their results are not generalizable to a larger sample and leave this for future research. Practical implications – The authors provide evidence that J-SOX, which does not have a direct reporting system, does not constrain earnings management. Their results drive the regulator to reconsider whether the reporting system works in the Japanese business environment. Additionally, their results show that J-SOX has no effect on earnings management; thus, regulators need to reconsider the governance function of directors and internal auditors. This paper communicates to the world how J-SOX works in Japan through changes in earnings quality and management post J-SOX and the root problems. Originality/value – This paper is the first (of which the authors are aware) to examine whether J-SOX impacted both earnings management and earnings quality in Japan. This paper discusses how the differences in regulations and corporate governance as well as the differences between USA-SOX and J-SOX may explain the results observed in Japan. This paper provides results regarding whether J-SOX improved earnings quality.

CEO career horizons and earnings quality in family firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-172
Author(s):  
Ayoib B. Che-Ahmad ◽  
Salau Olarinoye Abdulmalik ◽  
Nor Zalina Mohamad Yusof
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Related Result ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Earnings Persistence ◽  
Method Of Moment ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Earnings Predictability

PurposeThe present study examines the effect of the chief executive officer (CEO) career horizon (CH) problem on earnings quality (ERN) for selected family-controlled firms known to have a unique operational goal.Design/methodology/approachThe generalised method of moment linear regression model was used on a sample of family-controlled firms in Malaysia from 2005 to 2016.FindingsThe study found a negative relationship between CH and ERN, measured by earnings persistence and earnings predictability. However, in the earnings predictability model, the reverse was found to be the case after interacting CH with CEO family affiliation, CEO experience and CEO equity. However, the use of a reputable auditor could not mitigate the CH problem. Also, the study obtained a closely related result in the earnings persistence model. The result aligns with the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) theory, which states that the goals of family-controlled firms go beyond financial objectives to include other non-financial objectives, and hence, their commitment to perpetuating their dynasty encourages them to preserve the quality of their earnings.Originality/valueExisting studies on family firms and ERN have treated family firms as homogeneous entities by comparing family and non-family firms, using the underlying theoretical justification of the agency theory. However, this study departs from the agency theory, by considering those factors (i.e. the extent of CEO alignment with family owners and the choice of auditor), using the SEW theory, which establishes the differences among family firms. This work builds on that of Chen et al., (2018) and Ali and Zhang (2015), which suggested that corporate governance can mitigate the CH problem. Therefore, the strength of a CEO's attachment to the family firm (measured by CEO equity ownership and CEO affiliation to family members in family firms) and the choice of the auditor can explain the variation in the effect of the CH problem in family firms.

The Influence of Family Ownership on the Quality of Accounting Information

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 246-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Cascino ◽  
Amedeo Pugliese ◽  
Donata Mussolino ◽  
Chiara Sansone
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Financial Information ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Accounting Quality ◽  
Quality Of Accounting Information ◽  
Block Holders

This article explores the quality of accounting information in listed family firms. The authors exploit the features of the Italian equity market characterized by high ownership concentration across all types of firms to disentangle the effects of family ownership from other major block holders on the quality of accounting information. The findings document that family firms convey financial information of higher quality compared to their nonfamily peers. Furthermore, the authors provide evidence that the determinants of accounting quality differ across family and nonfamily firms.

scholarly journals The governance role of shareholders and board of directors on firm performance: an eclectic governance-performance model

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozgur Ozdemir ◽  
Erhan Kilincarslan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Resource Based View ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to examine the governance role of shareholders and board of directors in determining firm performance through an eclectic multi-theoretic model that integrates structure and incentive functions of agency theory and capability aspect of the resource-based view. Design/methodology/approach The research model uses a large panel data set of 2,364 UK firms over the period 2000–2010 and uses alternative specifications of the model to improve robustness. Findings The results show that the industry experience of major shareholders as a proxy for shareholder capability has a significant positive impact on investee firm performance. The findings also reveal that the lock-in effect of the largest shareholder has a positive impact on performance, whereas the monitoring effectiveness of shareholders is not associated with ownership concentration. Moreover, the results indicate the underlying capabilities of the board of directors and their impact on corporate performance – particularly, the interlocking directorates of executives have a positive impact on firm performance but those of non-executives have a negative one. However, the previous directorship experience of non-executives has a positive impact on performance. Research limitations/implications This study presents a more comprehensive and complete understanding of the governance-performance relationship beyond the narrow or partial explanations provided by single-theory-based studies or those of investigating the effect of various governance tools separately. Practical implications This study provides more insights into the capability dimension of shareholders and the role of incentives in motivating shareholders to exercise stronger oversight on the management rather than just using ownership concentration. Hence, the study can serve as valuable guidance for investors, corporate managers and policymakers. Originality/value To the best of the knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study that uses an eclectic philosophical approach, integrating the agency theory and resource-based view, to not only examine the impact of board of directors but also investigate the governance role of shareholders in modern corporations to understand how shareholders acquire the requisite skills and information, the best practices and processes, and ultimately use the scarce and inimitable resources that help investee firms in improving their performance.

Why do investors not punish politically connected firms for financial misrepresentation?

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-107
Author(s):  
Xin Yu ◽  
Ying Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Market Reaction ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Market Reactions ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Event Study Method ◽  
The Government

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the political connections of listed firms in China affect how the market reacts to cases of financial misrepresentation investigated by the regulatory authorities. Design/methodology/approach The authors use an event study method and the financial misrepresentation events in China stock markets as research setting and empirically test the association between market reactions to the announcement of financial misrepresentations and the presence of political connections. Findings The results show that on average, there is no significant market reaction to financial misrepresentation for politically connected firms. In contrast, however, there is a significantly negative market reaction for non-connected firms, which suggests that investors do not punish politically connected firms for financial misrepresentation. The authors argue that politically connected companies use the altered financial information to gain legitimacy and obtain benefits from the government. Consistent with the argument, the authors find that in the years after they disclose their financial misrepresentation, firms with political connections are more likely to increase their bank loans than firms without political connections. Originality/value The authors provide a new explanation for the low-earnings quality of politically connected firms.

A Study of the Earnings Quality of Family Firms

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Mengoli ◽  
Federica Pazzaglia ◽  
Elena Sapienza
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Earnings Quality
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