Corporate Governance Regulations and Practices under COVID-19 Crisis: Time to Rethink

The COVID-19 has brought the challenge of survival for all the companies around the globe. This pandemic totally changed the procedures of managing and governing the firms with the help of regulations of the state. The said disaster has also hit the existence of the major companies in different sectors of the economy. Consequently, it has drawn the attention of all the practitioners of the Corporate Governance along with the policy makers of the economy. The focus of this article is to see the utility and practicability of different regulations and practices of the corporate governance to cope with the current emerging challenges of COVID-19 in corporate sector. Furthermore, the current study takes some valuable insights from the leading business journal articles and find the key mechanisms of the corporate governance, which help the companies to deal with the recent crisis. These mechanisms could be effective for the different business units during this dilemma of COVID-19. This review intends to change the management philosophy of the different companies. Furthermore, this study aims to provide them with the latest mechanisms of corporate governance, which are helping the companies for their successful progression of business affairs in this tough time of Corona Virus. These mechanisms include presence of risk management committee, more attention to the stakeholders, family ownership, and block holders. This paper concludes that all the above said mechanisms of corporate governance are very helpful during the crisis of COVID-19. The study highlights that this pandemic has affected the governance mechanisms of al the establishments, therefore firms should be prepared for such crisis in future by paying attention to the different corporate governance mechanisms. The study recommends that certain practices of the corporate governance are very helpful in coping the challenges posed by the pandemic of COVID-19.

Impact of Ownership Structure on Bank Risk Taking: A Comparative Analysis of Conventional Banks and Islamic Banks of Pakistan

This study is about the impact of ownership structure on bank risk taking with comparison between conventional banks and Islamic banks of Pakistan. Z-Score and SDROA are used as risk taking variables. While managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and block holders were taken as proxies for ownership structure. Ten private commercial banks and four Islamic banks were randomly selected and data have been collected from annual reports of these banks from 2010 to 2016. The result suggested that all the proxies of ownership structure i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and block holders have significant positive impact on Z-Score. On the other hand using SDROA as proxy for risk taking the proxies of managerial ownership has significant positive impact on SDROA and institutional ownership has significant negative impact on SDROA of banks in Pakistan. On the other hand foreign ownership and block holders have insignificant impact on SDROA. The result of BankID is significant which shows that ownership structure has significant impact on bank risk taking in conventional banks while in Islamic banks ownership structure doesn’t have any significant impact on bank risk.

Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy in Listed Industrial and Consumer Goods Firms in Nigeria: Heckman’s Two-Stage Approach

The decision on the magnitude of dividend has been identified to be highly related to the decisions to pay or not to pay dividends in formulating dividend policy. However, literature seems to be homogeneous and focused on examining the effect of ownership structure on dividend level or probability of paying dividends. Therefore, the paper examines the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy using Heckman’s two-stage technique. Utilizing 304 firm-year observations from industrial and consumer goods firms listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period within 2009-2019, the result shows that in the first stage, only foreign ownership has a negative significant effect on the probability of paying dividends. However, after accounting for a possible correlation between the probability of paying dividends and dividend pay-out, the result on the second stage exhibits a significant negative effect with block-holders and foreign ownerships on dividend policy while institutional ownership reveals a positive significant effect. The overall results show that the lower the foreign ownership the higher the possibility of paying dividends. Also, higher dividend pay-out is associated with the lower level of block-holders and foreign ownerships coupled with higher institutional ownership in listed industrial and consumer goods firms in Nigeria.

THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL VARIABLES ON UNDERPRICING

After the shares were introduced to the public by the underpricing company (IPO), the problem lies in the closing price on the first day which tends to be higher than the initial offering price. Various factors can influence the occurrence of underpricing, both external and internal, that occurs in Islamic stocks. This study examines more about the influence of financial and non-financial variables on underpricing shares, especially in Islamic stocks. The population used includes, among others, listed companies on the IDX with a sample of issuers that went public from 2015 to 2019. Data analysis in this study used multiple regression. The results of the study prove that block holders in a company have an effect on the level of underpricing. Debt to Equity Ratio (DER) have an effect on the underpricing variable. Return on Asset (ROA) harms the underpricing variable. There is an effect of the current ratio value on underpricing. Firm size has an effect on underpricing. Company age (firm age) has an effect on the underpricing variable. JEL: D53; E44; G10 <p> </p><p><strong> Article visualizations:</strong></p><p><img src="/-counters-/edu_01/0727/a.php" alt="Hit counter" /></p>

THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, DIVERSIFICATION, AND DISCLOSURE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

<p class="JurnalASSETSABSTRAK"><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></p><p>Anti-corruption disclosures reflect the company's commitment to prevent and combat corruption. This study examines the impact of managerial ownership, block holder ownership, government ownership, diversification, board independence, the board of commissioners' size, and diversification on anti-corruption disclosures. The object of this research is IDX listed companies from 2013 to 2017. Data obtained from the company's annual report Data analysis is multiple linear regression. The results showed that the managerial ownership, government ownership, board independence, and board size positively affected anti-corruption disclosures, block holders ownership had a negative effect, and diversification positively affected anti-corruption disclosures.</p><p class="JurnalASSETSABSTRAK"><strong><em>ABSTRAK</em></strong><em></em></p><p><em>Pengungkapan anti-korupsi menunjukkan komitmen perusahaan untuk mencegah dan memberantas korupsi. Penelitian ini menguji dampak kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan pemegang blok, kepemilikan pemerintah, diversifikasi, independensi dewan komisaris, dan ukuran dewan komisaris terhadap pengungkapan anti korupsi. Objek penelitian ini adalah perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2013 -2017. Data diperoleh dari laporan tahunan perusahaan Analisis data yang digunakan adalah regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa struktur kepemilikan manajerial, struktur kepemilikan pemerintah, independensi dewan komisaris dan ukuran dewan komisaris berpengaruh positif terhadap pengungkapan anti korupsi, sedangkan struktur kepemilikan blockholder berpengaruh negatif dan diversifikasi berpengaruh positif pada pengungkapan anti korupsi.</em></p>

THE PRICING OF DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS - EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN

Even now with the cutting edge businesses and specialized management, a large number of the firms are owned by families in Pakistan. Agency disagreements and issues exist between the management and the owners as well as the minority shareholders and the block holders. To handle these feuds, accountants use discretionary accruals. These accruals help to manage earnings and smooth sharp trends to protect the interest of management and the owners. This study determines whether the investors manage the earnings through discretionary accruals or do they price these accruals when considering the stock price. This study finds significant evidence that the market prices discretionary accruals. We find that the firms with higher number of institutional ownership, high quality audit production and higher number of independent board have significantly higher impact of discretionary accruals on their stock returns as compared to other firms.

Value Boosters or Dampers? Insights of Corporate Governance Practices From Pakistan

Rampant corporate failures have placed corporate governance in the limelight again however not all governance practices help firms in enhancing value. This empirical research examines impact of corporate governance practices on shareholders' value represented by earning per share of 243 listed firms on Pakistani Bourse. It ensued in the conclusion that overall corporate governance tends to have significant impact on earnings per share and reveals dichotomy of corporate governance practices based on direction of their association with share holders' value and terms them as value boosters and value dampers. It has also been found that pro-entrenchment practices tend to lower earnings per share in the listed firms either due to complacency or vested interests while rest of the practices help in enhancing value earned on each share thus endorsing the theoretical perspectives emanating out of agency and shareholder activism theories. This study emphasizes the significance of Board Attendance, Board Independence, Non-duality of CEOChairman Role for listed firms' value. It also shows that entrenchment acts like larger boards, directors' ownership, large block holders and disclosure of such ownership can adversely impact the firms' value and thus play a significant role in scaring away the potential investors who primarily look at earnings per share for buying of stocks of a particular company. It entails policy implications that implementation of counter-entrenchment regulations needs strengthening as the existing seem to have cosmetic effect. Identification and implementation of good governance practices can be best ensured when propagated in the perspective of value enhancement.

Bulk and block holders herding behaviour

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine industry herding among the institutional investors and to find whether their herding behaviour is intentional or unintentional. Design/methodology/approach The study uses Lakonishok et al. (1992) model to examine the presence of industry herding behaviour among institutional investors. To determine whether the herding observed is intentional or unintentional, herding measure is regressed with volatility, volume, beta and return. The period of the study is from 1 April 2005-31 March 2015. Findings The findings of the study showed that though institutional investors have herding tendency towards most of the industries, in the overall period industry herding was not significant. The herding found in some industrial sectors was linked to economic performance of those sectors in India during the period of study and hence the herding was unintentional in nature. Research limitations/implications This is the first attempt to study industry herding among institutional investors and their intent in Indian market ever since the country opened its market to foreign investors in a big way. Present study is limited to the use of only bulk/block data instead of the entire trading data for the period. Originality/value This study is the first attempt to investigate industry herding behaviour of institutional investors in the market using their bulk and block trading data. The herding observed in well performing industries has been shown to be unintentional and hence rational. The results indicate that the entry of big institutional investors, including foreign institutions into the Indian market has not destabilised the market by irrational herding.