Mauritania’s Gulf ties will survive local rebalancing

Subject Outlook for Mauritania's ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Significance President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani has recently sought to reaffirm the strong partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that were cultivated by his predecessor, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, even as he pursues a markedly more liberal approach to domestic political affairs. Prominent exiles were allowed to return home earlier this month. This raises an apparent contradiction, given the two Gulf states’ endorsement of Ould Abdel Aziz and his repressive internal policies. Impacts Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will remain key sources of financial support for Nouakchott. A 2-billion-dollar aid package from the UAE will likely be disbursed over many months or perhaps several years. As the new chair of the G5 Sahel, Ould Ghazouani will seek to sustain hitherto inconsistent Emirati and Saudi support for the bloc.

Significance The United Arab Emirates (UAE) economy is increasingly diversified, not least with the imposition of VAT since January 1 -- albeit at a low initial level of 5%. Fiscal transparency has not necessarily kept pace, especially in ad hoc financial support both among the emirates and externally to Gulf neighbours. Impacts Any reduction in financial support from Abu Dhabi through GCC funds might endanger Bahrain’s currency peg. Increased clarity on UAE commitments could help to stabilise weaker economies in Bahrain and Oman. The federal government is likely to convert its current deficit to a surplus of around 2% in 2018. Fiscal reforms and innovations will not challenge Abu Dhabi’s financial dominance among the seven emirates. Plans to privatise state-owned firms will create further pressure to boost transparency.


Subject Prospects for the Gulf states to end-2017. Significance Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries agree on the need to check Iran’s regional aspirations, but differ radically on how to achieve this goal -- pushing Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to open confrontation with Qatar and leaving Kuwait and Oman caught uncomfortably in the middle. At the same time, they face the major challenge of adjusting their economies to long-term expectations of lower oil revenue.


Subject The Gulf 's cybersecurity agenda. Significance Offensive cyber capabilities are technological tools for intruding into external digital networks to delete, steal or manipulate data. All six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar -- are developing these capabilities in the face of multiple threats. Impacts There is currently no indication that the GCC states are preparing cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. GCC states will continue relying on Western and Israel private firms for advanced surveillance tools. Efforts to nationalise the cybersecurity sector will advance slowly. Cyber espionage is almost certainly a fourth, covert GCC goal.


Significance As a key ally of Saudi Arabia and the owner of the Arab world's largest armed forces, Egypt is a core member of the coalition campaign fighting the Huthi rebels and loyalists to former Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh. Egyptian planes and naval vessels have already played a key role in the aerial campaign and naval blockade. However, the conflict appears likely to drag on, raising the risk of deeper -- and higher-risk -- Egyptian involvement. Impacts Ground involvement in Yemen would stir popular sensitivities about Egypt being regarded as a client of Gulf states. Egypt's foreign policy will become increasingly aligned with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Intervention in Libya would be more acceptable to the Egyptian public, who view the conflict there as a more immediate threat. Extended deployment would degrade the capabilities of the Egyptian military. Egyptian participation provides vital pan-Arab legitimacy to the Saudi intervention in Yemen.


Significance Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are pursuing ambitious natural gas plans that depend on relatively high-cost non-associated gas developments. Impacts The cost of gas in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE will rise, creating further pressure to reform domestic markets. Hoped-for LNG export opportunities are unlikely to be realised in the short-to-medium term. Initial phases of assessment will determine whether the targeted prospects are genuinely commercial. Gas production will be intimately linked with refinery and petrochemical expansion plans.


Subject Oman-Iran relations Significance Oman is the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member that maintains formal relations with all states in the region, including Iran, which has fallen out with the two most powerful GCC states, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Oman’s diplomatic channel to Tehran enables it to play the role of mediator between the United States and its Arab allies on the one side and Iran on the other. Indeed, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called Sultan Qaboos on May 16 to discuss alleged Iranian threats. Impacts An outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Iran would leave Oman isolated from other GCC states. Oman would reap economic benefits as a transshipment centre for Gulf states if Saudi Arabia and the UAE fight with Iran. A worsening Gulf crisis would increase smuggling between Iran and Oman, with Tehran eager to keep supplying Huthi rebels in Yemen.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

This essay examines how and why Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have pursued policies that have aligned closer to Israel since 2011. The disruptive impact of the Arab Spring and its turbulent aftermath altered threat perceptions in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which increasingly saw Islamism and Iran as the major sources of regional instability. For Saudi and Emirati leaders committed to adopting a more forceful approach to shaping the post-Arab Spring landscape, Israel no longer represented the primary fissure in Middle Eastern politics. Although the process of creating informal ties between the Gulf states and Israel has been decades in the making, the nature of the post-2011 connections between Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Israel have greater strategic depth and are taking place in a far more open setting than ever before.


Subject Prospects for the Gulf states in 2018. Significance The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) saw dramatic political changes in 2017. Mohammed bin Salman advanced to become Saudi crown prince. The GCC also split in a way not seen since its foundation in 1981, after three members -- Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain -- launched a boycott of Qatar in June.


Significance The pope’s trip highlights the efforts of several Gulf countries to brand themselves as religiously tolerant. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are also hoping that the promotion of tolerance will be good for their relations with the United States and Europe, changing perceptions that they have fostered radicalism. Impacts Saudi Arabia will make its moves more slowly and cautiously than other Gulf states. Saudi religious conservatives may object to visits by priests, although their objections are unlikely to be loudly voiced. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh will highlight progress on religious freedom to distract from the Yemen war and (for the latter) the Khashoggi affair.


Subject Federal National Council election. Significance Women won seven out of 20 available seats in what is being promoted as the ‘largest election to date’ in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The country on October 7 held the fourth-ever vote for membership of its only elected body, the Federal National Council (FNC), with results announced on October 13. Impacts The new Council will be a mechanism to cement the dominance of Abu Dhabi and -- to a lesser extent -- Dubai in national decision-making. The FNC’s success may serve as a model for states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia to hold elections without direct accountability. Any push to expand the FNC’s role beyond its current advisory status will be shut down and may prompt reprisals.


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