Middle East financial regulation pressure will grow

Significance The international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has black-listed Iran, grey-listed Syria and Yemen, and identified significant problems elsewhere. Several Middle Eastern countries have not yet been assessed under the current standards, but they are likely to have significant weaknesses. Impacts Washington is likely to demand that its trading partners emulate its own recent reforms obliging firms to submit beneficial ownership data. Investors will encounter more scrutiny, regulatory risk and capital costs doing business with countries that fall short of FATF standards. Iran will face an ongoing internal struggle over whether to pass FATF-compliant legislation, risking tighter sanctions enforcement.

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin R.J. Soudijn

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to broaden the discussion on trade-based money laundering (TBML). The literature is too narrowly focused on the misrepresentation of the value, quantity or quality of the traded goods. This focus leads to the analysis of price anomalies as a signal of over- or under-invoicing. However, TBML can also occur without manipulation of these factors. Design/methodology/approach – A review of the literature and case study of police investigations. Findings – Financial action task force (FATF) definitions are seriously flawed. The question of whether detecting TBML on the basis of statistical trade data is effective should be much more open to debate. Police investigations show that goods are shipped at their true value within the context of TBML. Research limitations/implications – Using outliers to identify and act on cases of TBML has often been propagated, but scarcely been used to actually show TBML. Real findings are needed. Practical implications – Goods intended for TBML can also be paid for in cash. These cash payments are often out of character with the normal clientele. This should alert companies and compliance sections of banks alike. Originality/value – The critique on the FATF definition opens the field for a more fitting definition. The description of actual TBML cases makes it possible to better understand this method of money laundering.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Deen Kemsley ◽  
Sean A. Kemsley ◽  
Frank T. Morgan

Purpose This paper aims to define the fundamental nexus between income tax evasion and money laundering. The G7 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) designates tax evasion as a predicate offense for money laundering. We determine whether this designation is complete from a conceptual standpoint, or whether there is a stronger connection between tax evasion and money laundering. Design/methodology/approach This paper applies the FATF definition for money laundering – as well as generally accepted definitions for tax evasion and for a standard predicate offense – to identify the necessary conditions for each crime. This paper then uses these conditions to test opposing hypotheses regarding the nexus between tax evasion and money laundering. Findings This paper demonstrates that tax evasion does not meet the conditions for a standard predicate offense, and treating it as if it were a standard predicate could be problematic in practice. Instead, it is concluded that the FATF’s predicate label for tax evasion, together with tax evasion methods and objectives, imply that all tax evasion constitutes money laundering. In a single process, tax evasion generates both criminal tax savings and launders those criminal proceeds by concealing or disguising their unlawful origin. Practical implications The FATF could strengthen its framework by explicitly defining all tax evasion as money laundering. This would enable regulatory agencies to draw upon the full combined resources dedicated to either offense. Originality/value The analysis demonstrates that tax evasion completely incorporates money laundering as currently defined by the FATF.


Significance The bill, which now goes to the Lower House, is in line with demands from Gafilat, the Latin American affiliate of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which began a long-delayed evaluation of Paraguay’s performance on May 7. This will probably avoid Paraguay returning to the FAFT ‘grey list’ but is unlikely to placate the international financial community. Impacts Abdo Benitez will face an uphill struggle to get anti-corruption legislation through Congress. US pressures will mount with respect to purported terrorism finance in the tri-border area. Lack of progress will complicate relations with the international financial community.


Subject Prospects for Pakistan in 2020. Significance In early 2020, Pakistan will again face a challenge to convince the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that it has strengthened its measures against terrorist financing. Islamabad wants to avoid being put on the organisation’s ‘blacklist’, which would expose it to a risk of sanctions at a time when it is trying to spur an economic revival. Meanwhile, Pakistan is looking to bolster its relations with allies as tensions with enemy India simmer over the disputed Kashmir region.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehi Eric Esoimeme

Purpose This paper aims to critically examine the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Bill, 2016. It also aims to determine the level of effectiveness of the preventive measures in the Bill. Design/methodology/approach The appraisal took the form of a desk study, which analyzed various documents and reports such as the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012, Mutual Evaluation Reports conducted by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) on Nigeria, the judgment delivered by Justice Gabriel Kolawole of the Federal High Court Abuja and the United Kingdom’s national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing. Findings This paper determined that the Bill could achieve its core objectives if the following recommendations are implemented: section 15 of the Bill should be modified to include the definition of “Arrangement”; lawyers should be allowed to send their Suspicious Transaction Report to the Nigerian Bar Association, provided that there are appropriate forms of cooperation between the NBA and the Financial Intelligence Unit, and this approach is in line with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations; the Bill should expressly prohibit retaliation by employers against whistleblowers and provide them with a private cause of action in the event that they are discharged or discriminated against by their employers, and this approach is being adopted by the US Dodd–Frank Act; a request for customer information, by the Director-General of the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Centre, should be made pursuant to an order of the Federal High Court obtained upon an ex-parte application supported by a sworn declaration by an authorized officer of the Centre, justifying the request for customer information. Originality/value This paper offers a critical appraisal of the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Bill, 2016. The paper will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Bill. This is the only paper to adopt this kind of approach.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehi Eric Esoimeme

Purpose This paper aims to examine the anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria, to determine whether the policy is working and/or has produced unintended effects. The Federal Executive Council is the body comprising all the Ministers of the Federation, including the President and Vice President. Design/methodology/approach The analysis took the form of a desk study, which analysed various documents and reports such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2008-2016, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004, the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act, 2016, the Public Interest Disclosure and Witness Protection Bill, 2017 and the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, 2012. Findings This paper determined that the anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria could achieve its desired objectives if the following recommendations are implemented: research grants which are sent to Nigerian universities by international and corporate bodies should be exempted from the current treasury single account arrangement. This would enable universities to easily access the funds and disburse the same to qualified students. The Federal Government should follow the guidelines laid down in Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 for plea agreements. In other words, the prosecution should only offer a plea bargain to a person who has been charged with an offence. The prosecution should not receive and consider a plea bargain from a person who has not been charged with an offence. Any attempt to water down the effect of Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 may weaken the ongoing fight against corruption and money laundering because criminals will be encouraged to continue looting public funds. The Financial Action Task Force Recommendations (Recommendation 3) requires that criminal sanctions for natural persons convicted of money laundering should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Federal Government of Nigeria should introduce a Bill to the National Assembly that would provide a clear framework for the use of investigatory powers by law enforcement, the security and intelligence agencies and other public authorities. This includes the interception of communications, the retention and acquisition of communications data, the use of equipment interference and the retention and use of bulk data by the security and intelligence agencies. The Bill must establish a number of safeguards against the arbitrary or unlawful use of investigatory powers by the executive. The UK’s Investigatory Powers Act, 2016, for example, established a number of safeguards for the retention and acquisition of communications data. Authorisations for obtaining communications data will have to set out why accessing the communications data in question is necessary in a specific investigation for a particular statutory purpose and how it is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved. A police officer who receives information from a whistleblower about money hidden in an apartment should apply to a Court or Justice of the Peace within the local limits of whose jurisdiction he/she is for the issue of a search warrant before conducting a search on the said premises. This procedure is in line with Section 143 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 and the Court of Appeal decision in Hassan v. E.F.C.C. (2014) I NWLR (Pt. 1389) 607 at 625. The Public Interest Disclosure and Witness Protection Bill, 2017 should be given accelerated consideration in the House of Representatives based on its urgency and significance for the Federal Executive Council’s whistleblowers policy. Research limitations/implications This paper focusses on the anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria from 29 May 2015 to 10 June 2017. It does not address the older policies. Originality/value This paper offers a critical analysis of the new anti-corruption policy of the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria. The paper will provide recommendations on how the policy could be strengthened. This is the only paper to adopt this kind of approach.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramandeep Kaur Chhina

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the concept of “politically exposed persons (PEPs)” as provided under the Indian anti-money laundering (AML) regime, particularly focussing on the Reserve Bank of India guidelines to its supervised banks on dealing with the potential money laundering risks posed by PEPs. Design/methodology/approach The definition of PEPs as provided by international standard setters and the concept as defined by the Indian AML regime was examined to examine the extend of the compliance of the Indian AML regime with the mandatory requirements of revised 2012 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and other international standards. Findings The paper clearly establishes that the current AML regime of India does not fully comply with the mandatory requirements of the revised 2012 FATF recommendations, and the RBI guidelines do not provide any clear indications to its supervised banks on the effective development and implementation of AML PEPs control. The paper argues that it is high time for India to increase its regulatory focus on the issue of PEPs and to expand its definition of PEPs by including both domestic PEPs and “close associates” of PEPs within the definition. Originality/value The paper demonstrates in an exceptional way that despite variations in the scope of the PEPs definition at an international level, all the standard setters have included certain key individuals (both domestic and foreign PEPs and “close associates” of PEPs) within the scope of the definition and how the legal and regulatory requirements in India are falling short of compliance even with these minimum key requirements. By adopting a step-by-step approach in critically examining the current legal and regulatory requirements enforced on banks in India to efficiently deal with the money laundering risks posed by PEPs, the paper makes a valuable contribution in highlighting the steps that might be taken to strengthen PEPs’ AML controls in India.


Subject Prospects for Pakistan to end-2019. Significance Key challenges for Pakistan in the second half of this year include finalising its latest loan programme with the IMF and extricating itself from the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘grey list’. While the IMF bailout will require consent from Fund executives in Washington, Islamabad will need to convince the FATF that it has taken steps to crack down on terrorist financing.


Subject Likely consequences of Pakistan's imminent IMF bailout. Significance Pakistan appears on the brink of finalising a loan programme with the IMF, less than three years after the end of the last one, to help deal with a macroeconomic crisis. Separately, Prime Minister Imran Khan has made promises about welfare provision and job creation and his government last month launched a four-year plan to bolster economic growth. Impacts Pakistan’s access to international markets will depend on extrication from a Financial Action Task Force ‘grey list’ as much as an IMF loan. Hiking energy tariffs to increase revenue, in line with IMF conditionality, will probably incite anti-government protests. Islamabad will draw closer politically and economically to Riyadh.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 855-870
Author(s):  
Doron Goldbarsht ◽  
Hannah Harris

Purpose This paper aims to explore the case of counter-terrorist financing (CTF) within the transnational regulatory network (TRN) of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The paper demonstrates how the structure and operation of the FATF reflect those of a TRN and shows how the FATF has been successful in securing formal compliance with CTF policies. Design/methodology/approach The paper stresses that formal compliance does not guarantee actual compliance or effective enforcement. It is argued that the FATF and the CTF regime must balance concerns for legitimacy with those of flexibility and efficiency. Traditionally, TRNs have focused on flexibility, efficiency and informal cooperation over legitimacy. This paper demonstrates that legitimacy concerns cannot be ignored. Findings A lack of legitimacy may ultimately result in non-compliance and ineffectiveness. On this basis, current efforts to build legitimacy through the FATF are noted but deemed insufficient. If this balance is not struck, the FATF may be doomed to failure through an overreliance on coercive methods. Particularly in the case of CTF, coercion is insufficient for meaningful compliance. Global enforcement by diverse states is a necessary condition for the success of the regime. Originality/value This paper will fill the gaps existing in the literature by examining CTF, as well as the FATF as an example of TRN. This approach differs from other literature in the field, which deals solely with the effectiveness of the FATF and the global CTF without considering the effect of legitimacy on compliance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document