The fair shaper: an efficient mechanism for Internet bandwidth share over ATM in a multitasks OS

Purpose – To advise companies of a recent SEC no-action letter relating to tender and exchange offers for certain debt securities. Design/methodology/approach – Reviews various conditions allowing an issuer to use a shortened timeframe in which certain debt tender/exchange offers need be kept open for as few as five business days. Findings – The abbreviated debt tender/exchange offer structure contemplated by the no-action letter provides a more efficient mechanism for conducting debt tender/exchange offers in certain circumstances. Practical implications – Issuers conducting a debt tender/exchange offer should consider whether the new abbreviated structure is more effective in achieving their objectives than the more traditional structures. Originality/value – Practical guidance from experienced securities regulatory lawyers that gives an overview of important developments in debt tender/exchange offer practice.

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Efficient Mechanism of Output Constraint Handling for Analytical Predictive Controllers Based on Hammerstein Models

Recent Advances in Automation, Robotics and Measuring Techniques - Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ◽

10.1007/978-3-319-05353-0_14 ◽

2014 ◽

pp. 137-146 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Piotr M. Marusak

Keyword(s):

Constraint Handling ◽

Efficient Mechanism ◽

Hammerstein Models ◽

Predictive Controllers ◽

Output Constraint

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Stock and Option Proportions in Executive Compensation

Quarterly Journal of Finance ◽

10.1142/s2010139211000055 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 01 (01) ◽

pp. 169-203 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Phelim P. Boyle ◽

Ranjini Jha ◽

Shannon Kennedy ◽

Weidong Tian

Keyword(s):

Executive Compensation ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

Risk Taking ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Optimal Contract ◽

Efficient Mechanism ◽

Opposite Conclusion

There is controversy about the relative merits of stock and options in executive compensation. Some observers contend that stock is a more efficient mechanism, while others reach the opposite conclusion. We focus on the manager's risk-taking incentives and derive an optimal compensation contract by using the concept of a comparable benchmark and imposing a volatility constraint in a principal-agent framework. We demonstrate a joint role for both stock and options in the optimal contract. We show that firms with higher volatility should use more options in compensating their executives and provide empirical evidence supporting this testable implication.

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