Crowdsourcing has become an efficient paradigm to utilize human intelligence to perform tasks that are challenging for machines. Many incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing systems have been proposed. However, most of existing incentive mechanisms assume that there are sufficient participants to perform crowdsourcing tasks. In large-scale crowdsourcing scenarios, this assumption may be not applicable. To address this issue, we diffuse the crowdsourcing tasks in social network to increase the number of participants. To make the task diffusion more applicable to crowdsourcing system, we enhance the classic
Independent Cascade
model so the influence is strongly connected with both the types and topics of tasks. Based on the tailored task diffusion model, we formulate the
Budget Feasible Task Diffusion
(
BFTD
) problem for maximizing the value function of platform with constrained budget. We design a parameter estimation algorithm based on
Expectation Maximization
algorithm to estimate the parameters in proposed task diffusion model. Benefitting from the submodular property of the objective function, we apply the budget-feasible incentive mechanism, which satisfies desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget-feasible, truthfulness, and guaranteed approximation, to stimulate the task diffusers. The simulation results based on two real-world datasets show that our incentive mechanism can improve the number of active users and the task completion rate by 9.8% and 11%, on average.
Multi-Dimensional Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Crowdsourcing with Moral Hazard
